4GW: What the Muhajir Case Tells Us

Every operation tells us something. This operation tells us a lot, or at least enables us to draw some useful conclusions.

For starters, Al-Qaeda truly does not appear to have prepared for a series of attacks post 9/11. Muhajir was in Pakistan and the Mideast since 1998, and could easily have been slipped back into the US ahead of September 11, 2001. Instead, he is arrested coming into the country on May 8, 2002.

From Ashcroft's own statement:

"Subsequent to his release from prison, he traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan. On several occasions in 2001, he met with senior al Qaeda officials.

"While in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al Muhajir trained with the enemy, including studying how to wire explosive devices and researching radiological dispersion devices. Al Qaeda officials knew that as a citizen of the United States, as a citizen of the United States holding a valid U.S. passport, Al Muhajir would be able to travel freely in the U.S. without drawing attention to himself."

I don't get it.

Al-Qaeda knew what they were preparing him for. The Chechens already had experience with the devices. They had Muhajir himself on hand well before 2001. That's plenty of time to train, and he met with senior figures during 2001.

So why go back now?

-- Why Wasn't Muhajir Here Already? --

Why not send him in August of 2001, have him answer to "Jose Padilla" at all times, "renounce" Islam, support pacifist organizations due to his "disillusionment" with the experience of Sunni-Shi'ite violence in Pakistan, and attend Catholic Mass regularly? Not only does he get back in without any risk that way owing to timing, he may not even be a suspect later. Based on that story, there are even ways to make ongoing contacts with local Muslims and operatives seem completely normal.

The possible explanations for why this was not done are all bad for Al-Qaeda:

1. They just didn't think in terms of a rapid-tempo sequence of attacks, figuring that each operation would be run like the ones to date: complete in and of themselves, with lazy multi-year lead times and no major change in the operational environment. In 4GW parlance, this is called having a long OODA Loop. If true, Al-Qaeda is in big trouble and will fight the USA at a substantial disadvantage.

2. Their operating cadre in the USA is weak, and was weak before 9/11. Otherwise, the sensible procedure would be to insert Muhajir and have the planning done with a local leader.

Why wasn't this done? The justification for holding him back cannot be the effect of the FBI dragnet, because we're talking pre-9/11 decisions here. Nor can it be the need for supplies. If the radiological materials were expected to come from US sources - which seems to be the plan then the best place to work that out is inside the USA. Even if the materials were being shipped from abroad, that part of the plan should be compartmentalized. Muhajir should be sent immediately with no knowledge of that sub-plan, then informed of the pick-up arrangements if it was successful.

Could it have been money and communications issues? Doubt it. They were doing fine with Mohammed Atta and friends.

Unless I've missed something, this leaves "inability to plan it in the USA" as the only major explanation left. It's Sherlock Holmes' dictum about removing all the impossible things until what you're left with, however unlikely, is the truth.

Either Muhajir is not considered a very bright bulb and so needed a skilled leader who wasn't available, or he is a bright bulb but didn't have a good group of followers waiting for him until now. Regardless, it points to real weaknesses in Al-Qaeda's US operational capabilities.

-- Foreign Gambits --

Even if Al-Qaeda had inserted Muhajir in August 2001, it looks like his cover would still have been blown.

It's obvious that Pakistan played a role in this investigation on some level, and that the USA had Al Muhajir "made" from multiple angles. It's equally obvious that the sources involved are sources the USA badly wants to conceal. Hence the military detention.

This isn't about trial formats. Although the US would be within legal rights to put him before a military tribunal, they've said they won't do so. He can be tried later for sedition or treason, however, and meanwhile he can be detained 'for the duration of the conflict.'

Still, all of this misses the key thrust of the very public Muhajir detention and revelations. Which is the claim that information from Zubaydeh helped with this operation. That could well be a two-edged bluff. Al-Qaeda knows it could be. But it doesn't matter, as long as they doubt and wonder.

On the one hand, the gambit works to freeze other Al-Qaeda operations. If it's true, and Zubaydeh has talked, what other operations has he blown? This may force those operators into deep cover, or put their operations in stasis because the "compartmentalized" elements can no longer be trusted.

Very good timing to do this just before Rumsfeld's visit to Pakistan.

Strategically, the USA gains time and breathing room. Which is something like giving Microsoft time and breathing room. It always means less of those commodities for their enemies down the road.

The second edge is even more subtle. They can just show the news reports to Zubaydeh now, and plausibly tell him:

"You're a dead man. Your compatriots believe you've betrayed them now, or at the very least they doubt you. You will never be safe among your Islamist brethren again. As our successes mount, which they will given our resources, more and more of them will take the easy way out and blame you.

"So what, you say. You are safe here. True... but your family is not. And maybe we won't keep you forever. Maybe we'll release you in a year or two under a poorly executed 'witness protection' program, just to cement suspicions. You could run to Osama himself after that - do you think he'll believe? Or forgive?

"Your only hope - and your family's only hope - is to cooperate with us now. If you do, we'll protect you and we'll bring them to you in safety. If not...."

They are not small payoffs. If they make Al-Qaeda pause, and Zubaydeh crack, the Al-Qaeda front of this war on Islamists may have just had its Battle of Midway.

UPDATE: Reader Alexander Eaton points out that in the case of Ex Parte Quirin, a (unanimous) 1942 Supreme Court decision, established that ununiformed combatants entering this country "for the purposes of waging war by destruction of life or property" are subject to military courts.

UPDATE: 2 years later, here's a series of articles describing what we think we know about al-Qaeda in the USA as of August 4, 2004. On the bright side, they have not yet succeeded in mounting a successful follow-up attack on American soil.