Al-Qaeda and Pakistan

Kashmir isn't the only hotspot these days that involves Pakistan. The other is, uh, Pakistan. The recent car bomb in the seaside city of Karachi illustrates one facet of our war, while events in that country's "lawless frontier" to the west pose a very different set of challenges.

Karachi Blast: Aftershocks

The recent Karachi car bombing that killed 10 French engineers rocked France as well as Pakistan, highlighting the seriousness of the Al-Qaeda threat to both polities and providing an inadvertent but significant boost to the War on Terror.

As STRATFOR notes:

bq. "From the attackers' point of view, the bombing was a prime opportunity to make a clear statement against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and his perceived acquiescence to the goals of the United States. A bus full of Western foreigners, parked in front of a hotel full of foreigners, was too good a target to pass up. This is not to suggest that the operation was a spur-of-the-moment decision, rather that it was planned to make a maximum impact on the psyche of foreigners in Karachi."

Alas for the terrorists, they could not have picked a worse group of foreigners.

The new diesel submarines that kept those French engineers busy are seen as a key asset to counter India's small but growing Navy. The Pakistani military is now officially pissed off. Especially since the French withdrew a number of their workers in the bombing's aftermath. The submarines will now be late. Possibly very late. Expect the military to take out some of their frustrations on local militants.

The French were also less than appreciative. This news reaches beyond the elites and into the French electorate, a fact that Chirac seems to grasp if his recent statements are any guide. I don't expect to see the end of France's cynical obstructionism and appeasement any time soon, but this event has shifted its political center of gravity slightly in our favour.

It also underscores an important flip side to Al-Qaeda's oft-touted decentralization. Local affiliates are unpredictable and hard to track, and add to the "noise" level of intelligence efforts. Rooting them out will also divide states' attention from pursuit of the main Al-Qaeda infrastructure. All true. The trouble for Osama is that these locals can also act in ways that make perfect sense on a local level, while hurting the whole movement on a larger stage.

The Tunis synagogue bombing, which killed those German tourists and modified Germany's anti-terrorist tone, is Exhibit A. The Karachi bombing is Exhibit B. Expect more such exhibits in the coming months and years.

Al-Qaeda in "The Wild East"

One of the main requirements of successful guerilla struggle is a safe sanctuary from which to operate. As Al-Qaeda terrorists slowly reconstitute themselves across the border following their escapes from Tora Bora et. al., Pakistan risks becoming just such a sanctuary. Open U.S. operations there risk destabilizing the Musharraf regime, but leaving Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements in Pakistan risks a sustained guerilla war in Afghanistan and further destabilization in Pakistan.

Worse, there are many western regions where even the Pakistani government has little control. Little wonder that it has been dubbed "the lawless frontier." What to do?

Some Pakistani help has been forthcoming, as seen in the recent arrest of Al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydeh in the eastern city of Lahore. Good job by the CIA, which apparently planned and organized that op. Tribal leaders in western Waziristan, meanwhile, have been warned by their government in harsh terms. One Waziri leader told the Islamabad-based News Network International (NNI) that last week, after local youths posted armed bands outside schools and mosques to resist searches by U.S. forces, Pakistani military intelligence warned that giving refuge to Al Qaeda invited "carpet bombing of the area by the U.S. B-52 bombers."

Which is almost certainly an empty threat, and Pakistan's military knows it. They're just hoping the Wazir don't know it too.

Reports of U.S. special forces operating semi-covertly in western Pakistan are persistent, and almost certainly true. There, the USA appears to be following the "Afghan model" by working with a local tribe (the Mashuds) against larger rivals (the Wazir, who are more fundamentalist and are widely believed to be helping al-Qaeda). It's a classic imperial strategy, honed to perfection by the British. Whether the Americans can effectively play this game with all of its double-dealing, alliance switching from weaker to stronger allies as successes mount, and other necessary ruthlessness remains to be seen.

As with previous operations involving the Pakistanis, there also seems to be trouble with leaks. Many operations are unsuccessful. Still, one salutes the Americans for trying. At the moment, the "war by proxy" option is better than any available alternative.

There's even some good news from this front. NNI reports that since May 13, Pakistani paramilitary troops have arrested hundreds of suspected al Qaeda members during an operation in the western tribal territory near the Afghan border. The FBI helped with intelligence, US air power flew surveillance, and Pakistani troops and U.S. commandoes worked to seal off escape routes into Afghanistan.

A good start, and a hopeful sign. Still, we're a long way from done.