Since Pearl Harbor we are supposed to have used the method of "capabilities" not the method of "intentions" to analyze intelligence.

Intentions are more satisfying because it paints a more definite picture. Capabilities can only deal with probabilities.

Humans do not do well with uncertainty.

An age old problem.

I agree with M. Simon and would add that until this current administration we did not engage in pre-emptive wars. Saddam has neither the ability nor, I believe, the willingess to "take out a city or two" in the US. He has not crossed his borders since Kuwait. He has not threatened the US or Europe. His intentions are to be as big a frog in his pond as he can without risking his own neck. Nothing in this world is perfect, including containment. Surely the results of war are not only not perfect, but not knowable. Especially in that region.

Unlike Cuba, we have people (inspectors) on the ground in Iraq. We control the air space over Iraq. I believe it is not appeasement to take a calculated risk rather than engage in a pre-emptive war.

The idea that Saddam has no ability to attack US cities is obviously wrong. He has weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorist groups. That's a capability.

It's not often that someone writes in to illustrate one's argument so vividly. I can hardly imagine a better illustration of my points re: unwise approaches to dealing with uncertainty and "mirror imaging" than Michael L's comments. I don't actually believe I'll convince him, but going through the argument helps illustrate my key points and their real-world implications more clearly.

** ML: "Saddam has neither the ability nor, I believe, the willingess to "take out a city or two" in the US." **

Note the choice of words. I'm sure that belief is comforting. Before we gamble with the lives of many thousands of our fellow citizens, however, we'd like to know if this belief is based on anything, or tested against anything other than "it hasn't happened yet." Or, more likely, "I wouldn't do that, therefore he won't."

Remember, folks - the goal isn't to critique Saddam's choices, but to predict them. And the margin for error is near-zero.

Michael, if this bold statement is based on some unique knowledge, please report to the Pentagon and CIA. They would dearly like to know what you obviously know about Saddam's capabilities and state of mind. If it isn't based on anything, however, we have a major case of untested assumptions on our hands. Or mirror imaging. Or both. At which point, you'll forgive the rest of us if we step up and take care of business in the real world, where we prefer not to take those kinds of chances.

This prediction becomes even more questionable given that close reading of both Ba'athist ideology and Saddam's history points to less comforting conclusions. See below.

** ML: "He has not crossed his borders since Kuwait." **

Could this be, perhaps, because he doesn't have a nuclear weapon yet? Real analysis demands answers to questions re: how someone will act with a different set of capabilities. That, too, is part of dealing well with uncertainty.

Saddam's history, in Iran, Kuwait, and elsewhere, has been to take huge gambles and begin wars when he believed he was protected in some way and able to get away with it. The fact that his 2 largest ventures of this type (Kuwait, Iran) ended in disaster and the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Iraqi forces is not comforting. Nor is an attempt to assassinate a former American President via covert "cut-outs," an act that would surely have had the most serious repercussions possible given that legally and technically, Iraq is still at war with the USA.

The intentions of his would-be successors are more uncertain still, and his sons in particular are famously unstable. Serious analysis also demands some level of assurance there, since the capability to use nuclear and/or chemical weapons will outlast Saddam. It does not appear that Michael is even aware this issue exists.

** ML: "His intentions are to be as big a frog in his pond as he can without risking his own neck." **

No, that's the French. :-)

Again, confident assumptions in the place of a true answer of "we don't really know." The only way to be sure of Saddam's intentions is to penetrate his inner circle, and even that isn't foolproof. Yet this is the linchpin for Michael's analysis. If it's wrong then everything else is wrong, and leaving Saddam alone becomes a hellish risk. But the sources for the assumption are not questioned, nor are the logical limitations in the ability to make this assessment even discussed.

The record of history is also unkind to this belief. Attacking Iran nearly got Iraq invaded and Saddam killed - only widespread use of chemical weapons saved him. Attacking Kuwait could easily have got him killed - only Bush the Elder's decision not to pursue his victory saved him. Saddam has a consistent pattern of deeply unwise gambles, and we know from defectors et. al. that people who bring him bad news are shot.

Let's see, a dictator with no meaningful political checks, who can't be told bad news in advance, with a record of risky behaviour, and his finger on the button. This is what Michael's analysis (or lack thereof) considers acceptable risk.

Ba'athist ideology, which has strong messianic pan-Arab overtones and an ideological connection to 1930s fascism, is also less than comforting. It certainly doesn't appear to be a stabilizing factor. For ideology, too, must be part of any worthwhile analysis. Here, as is often the case in the CIA, it is not even brought into the equation. Even as pronouncements about enemy intentions are made with unshaken confidence, in an environment where being wrong could mean tens of thousands of dead Americans. Or worse.

** ML: "Unlike Cuba, we have people (inspectors) on the ground in Iraq. We control the air space over Iraq. I believe it is not appeasement to take a calculated risk rather than engage in a pre-emptive war." **

First, the point of my Cuban example is that no amount of evidence will matter if mirror imaging of enemy intentions and unserious analysis are in play. Michael's "calculated risk" is another fine example. It also utterly ignores history, including the fact that despite massive inspections, Saddam's large biological warfare program remained entirely hidden from inspectors for years until a defector brought it to light in the mid-90s. Even more amazing, Michael continues to push this analysis even in the face of the tapes and photographs Colin Powell brought forward during his U.N. speech, showing that the inspectors were clearly not in control of the situation.

This is what Michael calls a "calculated risk." His calculator can obviously count to much bigger numbers than mine.

The scary thing is, Michael's analytical flaws are replicated all too often at the professional level, by the very people we're depending on to help guide American policy choices and help keep the nation safe. Worse, the nature of the conflict we're faced with ensures that situations designed to maximize these flaws will come up again and again over the next few years.

That why awareness of those flaws, so vividly illustrated here, is so important to all of us as we attempt to make sense of the debates and choices before our elected representatives.

The point that I keep coming back to with regard to Saddam's deterability is Iran, Kuwait, and Israel. In both cases he gambled big, was not guaranteed of victory, and lost big. Yet despite all the hurt he brought on his country in the Iran-Iraq war it did not deter him from daring to invade Kuwait. Despite Israel's possesion of nuclear weapons and despite their demonstrated willingness to launch devastating counterattacks (and in one case to preemptively attack within Iraqi territory to destroy their nuclear reactor) he still attacked. Even if we assume that Saddam is not insane and not suicidal he still seems to take very risky actions. How do we know exactly what he won't risk?

What I find interesting is that M.L. agrees with me on the method of "capabilities" vs the method of "intentions". Then does his analysis based on the method of "intentions".

Joes's analysis is more method of "capabilities" with historical factors including psychological "capabilities" based on history. This is how you arrive at an estimate of probabilities based on capabilities.

Very good.

Hey: thanks very much for the link. My first high profile link, ah. savors.

On a more substantive note, your readers might be interested in the CIA publication Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. It's a great book.

Sorry -- I tried to give a hyperlink to it, but it didn't take. Here it is, again.

http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/index.html