(revised 19:30, following second blackout period) Those of us who are living through the blackout just received an invaluable gift. We looked around for the first time at blank ATM machines, grocery stores closed just as people most needed them because the POS cash registers wouldn't operate, transit systems shut down, water pumps that ceased to operate, no computers. Etc., etc. The Machine stopped, the curtains were parted, and reality took over. We've eaten the red pill, if only for a day or two.
Welcome to the desert of the real.
Steven Den Beste explains what's involved in getting everything restarted. What we need, however, is a serious debate about how to avoid more of this in the first place. Had this blackout gone on much longer, the economic and human consequences would have been immense. Things could have been much worse.
We've talked about Sean Gorman's work here before - he's mapping out fiber-optic networks, and considering how a complex system like that could be disrupted. We've also talked about paying attention to the choke points of the modern world, and the electrical grid is absolutely one of them. Time to stop thinking of it as black box magic; it's a complicated man-made invention, and one that has just shown itself to be as vulnerable as we ourselves are to its disruption.
* Instapundit has more, including some words worth heeding from the IEEE.
* Suman Palit backs them up, and points to another report worth our time, and more good links. "So what would make our energy grid more reliable, less temperamental?"
* Nick Schulz' words are right on... good to see Tech Central Station's editor at The Corner. The Ortega Y Gasset line is absolutely the quote of the day.
* Finally, consider what a determined enemy could do with this lesson, via a SCADA attack. al-Qaeda is weak in the USA, but protecting the electrical grid is very difficult, and they aren't the only potential enemy who could be taking lessons from this. From here on in, I think it's safe to assume that this system is a target, and plan appropriately.
Behind the benefits of civilisation are indeed marvels of invention and construction, maintained only by great effort and foresight. Time to step up, get informed, and do our bit.
No system with constantly changing plant paramaters with loads coming on and off at will and power generators and capacity dispatched ahead of anticipated load can be made proof against all disturbances.
To hope to do so with only 20% reserve capacity is out of the question.
The question is how much is lowering the probability of one of these events from once in 30 years to once in 60 years worth?
If the grid had more storage capacity that was instantly dispatchable there might be some chance of dealing with the kinds of problems we had. Baring that I'd say you would need to get the reserves higher and keep more idle capacity warmed up for instant dispatch.
The answer is super flywheels. Which are at this point only in initial deployment.
In any case with the system only loaded to 75% of capacity, capacity may not have been a problem. It may have been a control problem.
There are thousands of generators and millions of loads. There may be no solution. Or the solution may make other problems worse.
The grid not only transmits power it also stores power in electric and magnetic fields. Changing 60 times a second. The interactions are not trivial. in additions because of the interconnections you can get phantom power flows. Stuff that eats amps while not delivering any power. The amps need to be provided even if the power is small.
Now if we went to a DC transmission system for long distance interconnects that would help. Some. DC at least eliminates most of the phantom flows except at start up.
Another thing I find interesting is that everyone with a light switch in their dwelling is an electrical power expert.
It is fortunate to be living in a country with such smart people.
*MIT report*
What the MIT report glosses over, because we are in the very early stages of deployment, is the lack of energy storage being the limiting market and control factor.
Once there is an economical method of power storage surges could be more easily damped.
Storage and local generation are the immediate answers to the long distance control problem. Solar is viable for reducing peak loads by local generation. Wind is some help.
The problem is not so much energy but local generation. A transmission system that covers 750 miles has delays approaching a quarter cycle at best (actually the speed of electricity in the wires due to distributed impedances will be less than the speed of light so the 1/4 wave distance will be more likely on the order of 500 miles) . Basically you can't control such a system.
What is needed for long distance transmission is DC. Much easier to control. However that gives you a mixed system which adds other problems. Plus the DC system would have an AC component due to the conversion process.
Here is the MIT link:
*MIT report*
Does anyone know...are there any DC components in this system? HVDC connections are used, I believe, for some links in the U.S., though not as much as in Europe.
Edison would laugh. He never liked this AC stuff in the first place.
David,
I think there are some 700 KV DC lines in the west where the interconnect distances are longer.
AC had a lot going for it when the system was originally designed. AC motors are really neat. Transformers can be used for voltage conversion.
DC couldn't be used until very high power DC to AC conversion was possible. AC is probably still the best for local transmission given the simplicity of the components.
Sgt. Stryker has an interesting post, something happened around 8:30 AM to cause this.
With graphs!
Guess we'll have to wait and see.
Sorry, folks...
I'm posting after actually READING Stryker's posts...
Flywheels and batteries and windmills and photo-cells just don't cut it... the nature of the American electrical web-beast is in the measure of on-loading GIGA-Watts... thousands of kilowatt minutes loading up... den Beste also addresses this, to the distillate wisdom:"Alternate energy-du-jour" does NOT make the grade... America depends on (and will continue to depend on for quite some time) coal, LNG and hydro... "
Which makes that power-grid vulnerable to idiot-zealot attack. It was, 30 years ago, and has been every day since. Look at power-pylon number 37... What? You say after pylon # 8 they disappear over the horizon?
You've got it. Waddaya gonna do? Ring each pylon with fencing, charged and tamper-sensitive to report its being touched, to some central/regional anti-terrorist watchroom?
Yeah, mayhaps... but TODAY, Aug 159 BE, it is VULNERABLE!