Dan,

First of all, there is no "Arab race." In fact, I am of the opinion that no races exist (genetically speaking, they certainly do not exist). Now, if you want to refer to Arabs as an ethnic group (which in itself is problematic), then I would be more inclined to accept that terminology.

"I believe this memo is significant information because if even some of its contents are true, it means as I have argued both on Winds of Change.NET and on my own blog that Iraq was an imminent threat to the United States through its relationship with al-Qaeda, even if one sets aside the question of WMD."

To be frank, I have yet to see anyone claim that no contacts existed between his regime and Al Qaeda. What one needs to prove is that the quality of the contacts were such that they constituted an "imminent threat," not that contacts existed. Example: right now the Pakistani goverment - or rather elements of it - have contacts with Al Qaeda and the Taleban, and Pakistan has an active and operational nuclear arms program; are you suggesting that merely because such contacts exist that the US should invade Pakistan?

"unhyped intelligence" - How do you come to take conclusion? Simply because the reports are "raw," does not mean that they are unhyped, or otherwise fallacious.

"According to a May 2003 debriefing of a senior Iraqi intelligence officer, Iraqi intelligence established a highly secretive relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and later with al Qaeda."

What sort of relationship?

You concluding three-pronged argument is mere conjecture based on a thin historical narrative. In other words, you find what you want to find.

"First of all, there is no 'Arab race.' In fact, I am of the opinion that no races exist (genetically speaking, they certainly do not exist). Now, if you want to refer to Arabs as an ethnic group (which in itself is problematic), then I would be more inclined to accept that terminology."

The Baathists disagree in this regard, but I more than understand and tend to agree with your point on this one. The intent was to explain what Baathists believe ideologically rather than to remark on the accuracy of such beliefs.

"To be frank, I have yet to see anyone claim that no contacts existed between his regime and Al Qaeda."

Numerous individuals have been making various statements to the effect that that Iraq had nothing whatsoever to do with bin Laden. I had one of the adjunct professors at my college inform me of this just the other day.

"Example: right now the Pakistani goverment - or rather elements of it - have contacts with Al Qaeda and the Taleban, and Pakistan has an active and operational nuclear arms program; are you suggesting that merely because such contacts exist that the US should invade Pakistan?"

No, both because Pakistan has rounded up ~500 al-Qaeda including all kinds of folks like Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi Binalshibh, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Tawfiq Attash Khalid, Ali Abd al-Aziz, Hanbali's brother, ect., in large part because al-Qaeda's plans include the destruction of the current Pakistani junta and the formation of a theocratic state. Our relationship strategic relationship with Pakistan is far from ideal because the byzantine-esque conspiracy nature of the Pakistani junta's inner workings and its unwillingness to cut of support for over two dozen Kashmiri groups, three to five of the largest of which are fair weather al-Qaeda affiliates that are also partially controlled by the ISI. We also know that al-Qaeda has tried to assassinate Musharraf and fight the Pakistani military.

All of these facts put us in a completely different boat than Iraq, IMO.

"How do you come to take conclusion? Simply because the reports are 'raw,' does not mean that they are unhyped, or otherwise fallacious."

The hype alleged by the administration's detractors took place in the cherry-picking of the intelligence analysis, not in the data in of itself. Raw intel does not guarantee accurate intel (and I noted some of the differences and problems with the memo's account today), which is why I'm comparing this to what we can discern from open source documents. As I mentioned before, this is far from ideal but is probably the best that we can achieve right now.

"What sort of relationship?

You concluding three-pronged argument is mere conjecture based on a thin historical narrative. In other words, you find what you want to find."

As I mentioned before, this is far from ideal, but I am simply trying to demonstrate that much of the data contained within the memo can be harmonized with what we know and/or can discern from our knowledge of the individuals involved. I also noted the problems with this individuals claims in regard to the EIJ and would simply ask that you at the very least acknowledge that reaching this sort of conclusion is far from a total abandonment of all reason or logic.

I would submit the beating back of Iraq from Kuwait and over a decade of hide and seek put Saddam's Iraq in a different category than other countries in the region. Did I mention the attempt to assassinate Bush 1?

An interesting quote from James Woolsey in '98:
http://www.time.com/time/community/transcripts/chattr021898.html
"We have responded weakly now, or not at all, three times, since the Gulf War. In 1991, we did not protect the Shia in southern Iraq when Saddam attacked them. We shot a few cruise missiles at an empty building in 1993 when Iraq tried to kill former President Bush."
Doesn't that qualify as a direct affront to the US? Why does this never get a mention in factors tipping towards dumping Saddam?
Also;
"Since the beginning of the nineties, we have seen substantial reductions in numbers of reconnaissance satellites and other parts of our intelligence collection at least in numbers. We have tried to make the systems and the people more flexible, in order to compensate for the smaller numbers. Sometimes, this has been successful. But the budgetary pressures have left us with somewhat less collection capability than I would like."
More:
"He is probably quite prepared to hide and disperse the chemical weapons or precursor chemicals that he has, as well as the biological weapons, or the materials to make them."
And although in most of the article, he alludes to the benefits of "strikes against Saddam..he at one point say we should do "everything we can, short of invading with a land army in order to bring about a change of government in Iraq."
Perhaps he was sitting on a fence that fell on 911?
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gunning/interviews/woolsey.html
Other than Mr. Yasin, who goes to Iraq, and the suspicion that Ramzi Yousef may be connected to a state intelligence operation, what else is there that makes you say that Saddam may be involved in this?
Well, it depends what you mean by "this." If "this" is terrorism against the United States, I think it's pretty clear that we have him dead to rights on trying to assassinate former President Bush in the spring of 1993.

"Dead to rights?"
Yes. President Clinton believed that. That's why he launched the 24 cruise missiles at the empty building in the middle of the night in the summer of 1993, after Saddam tried to assassinate former President Bush and the bomb didn't go off. The CIA looked into the forensics of the bomb and told President Clinton that it was an Iraqi government bomb. He then asked the FBI to double-check and sent an FBI forensics team over; they did the same thing. We both said, "Yes, this is an Iraqi government plot." That was the occasion for the launching of the cruise missiles against the empty [Iraqi security service] building in the middle of the night.
Now, I think that anybody who's looked at the 1993 plot to try to assassinate former President Bush believes that it was an Iraqi government plot. I don't think that President Clinton's response was anywhere nearly as forceful as that terrible plan of Saddam's that happily didn't come off.
“I don't know how many pieces of evidence one needs in the case of someone like Saddam Hussein. We are not, after all, trying to convict him in a court of law beyond a reasonable doubt. We're trying to make a judgment about American foreign policy and national security policy and whether that set of circumstances creates enough material for us to make a judgment that he has been actively involved in terrorist incidents against the United States. ...”

Rich Reilly,

A ten year old cassus belli starts to stink after a while.

"We're trying to make a judgment about American foreign policy and national security policy..."

Fine, then quit asking the world for money and troops.

"...quit asking the world for money and troops."

I'll let Thomas L. Friedman address your point JB.

Iraq is the most audacious nation-building project America has ever engaged in. But to succeed, we Americans needs partners - not only to help, but to provide legitimacy so we can sustain it. Right now, though, we are operating in a context of enormous global animosity. We are dancing alone. We can't let this stop us. We can't cater to every whim - but we can't just ignore it all, especially when it comes from our friends. Because there is no country in the world that we can't smash alone, and there is no country in the world we can rebuild alone - certainly not one as big and complex as Iraq.

Robert Stevens,

Any nation with nuclear weapons can smash any other nation with nuclear weapons. That's been the case since 1945. Thomas Friedman has a flair for saying rather dumb things.

Anyway, you're going to have to give me a better reason to give your country money besides the mere fact that you need the money.

"A ten year old cassus belli starts to stink after a while."
Hey, all is forgiven.(Assuming Saddam turned over a new leaf.)

Woolsey: "We're trying to make a judgment about American foreign policy and national security policy..."

JB: Fine, then quit asking the world for money and troops.
......&
JB: Anyway, you're going to have to give me a better reason to give your country money besides the mere fact that you need the money.

moi: Well, I suppose you have no self-interest in the successful reconstruction of Iraq and its implications for the middle East. Or do you? What country are you from?

Jean Bart:

I sincerely and truly hope that you are not French. For a Frenchman to say that a ten year old casus belli stinks, when Alsace and Lorraine were made the basis of not just the spirit of revanche but MILITARY PLANNING for nearly forty years, is simply stunning.

Moreover, the core issue of Iraq lies in the UNSC Resolutions of 1990-1991. While that might seem a bit old, like a murder charge (at least in the United States), those resolutions are still in effect. (I'd note that FORTY and FIFTY year old resolutions are often cited by those who defend the Palestinians, so ten years is but a blink of an eye.) As those resolutions remained in effect, failure to comply in fact represented a casus belli. (Note: German remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, in contravention of various provisions then 15 years old, were a casus belli as well, that France chose not to take issue w/.)

The 1993 assassination attempt on George HW Bush were merely a further bit of evidence of the nature of the regime.

Dean,

Hmm, well given the fact that this planning was based largely on defensive strategies undercuts your point. The planning was undertook because France knew an aggressive Germany would strike at France again; thus France's efforts to cultivate allies in the coming fight - the UK and Russia. Which it did brilliantly I might add; turning the tables on the Germans when they tried to isolate France over the Morroccan crisis. Even drawing the US into taking the side of France.

"(Note: German remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, in contravention of various provisions then 15 years old, were a casus belli as well, that France chose not to take issue w/.)"

Well, given that our allies were willing to look the other way, how could we? Even as early as 1936 Germany was stronger than France militarily. And if one remembers what occurred to France diplomatically and economically when it invaded Germany in the 1920s to enforce the provisions of the Versailles treaty, well, we can see where an invasion in 1936 would have landed France. The basic lesson France learned from WWII is that one should not count on one's allies; ergo our independent nuclear arms policy.

Now, France certainly made its mistakes in the run up to WWII; not aligning itself with the USSR in the early 1930s being one of them. Of course, if it would have done this, the UK would have been lost as an ally due to the UK's wish to isolate the USSR as much as possible. France in the 1930s, as Americans say, was in a "pickle."

Jean Bart:

I think you are missing the point. YOU wrote that a ten year old incident is insufficient as a casus belli, when France itself chose a forty-year issue as one.

As for French strategy towards Germany, the French were hardly only responding to the Schlieffen Plan. Indeed, French planning was rooted in the offensive for as much its own purposes (including the efforts of Grandmaison and co.) as any response to Germany (else, more forces would've gone to the north).

But if you are prepared to plan based on known offensive strategies (which was insufficient to know, apparently WHERE the blow would even fall), then how do you criticize us, for equally knowing how the Iraqis were likely to act? ESPECIALLY when Germany had not acted overtly against France for 40 years, yet Iraq had for most of the 1990s?

On the issue of the Rhineland, France in 1936 most certainly was stronger than the still-rearming Germans. As the records show, Hitler's own generals would've acted against him had France moved against him viz. the Rhineland; and Hitler had even given orders for the forces to be withdrawn if France intervened.

But if France learned not to count on allies, again, why should it criticize the United States if we draw the same lessons?

"ESPECIALLY when Germany had not acted overtly against France for 40 years..."

Actually, this is incorrect; German efforts to undermine and isolate France were fairly constant from the 1890s onward as France re-introduced itself a power on the world stage. The Germans continued from the 1890s onward to provoke crisis with France; the two Morroccan crisis are examples of this.

"On the issue of the Rhineland, France in 1936 most certainly was stronger than the still-rearming Germans. As the records show, Hitler's own generals would've acted against him had France moved against him viz. the Rhineland; and Hitler had even given orders for the forces to be withdrawn if France intervened."

Actually, you are wrong. France was far weaker militarily than is generally understood. France's efforts to re-arm itself only began tentatively in 1936; France did have a large military force in the 1920s, but economies in the 1930s forced retrenchment (it doesn't take long to make a military toothless). During most of the 1930s, the conscription period was one year (it had previously been three); and there were years in the 1930s which can only be construed as recuiting holes - as the low birth rate caused by the deaths in WWI came to fruition. Its telling to note that in 1939, France, if it had wanted to send bombers to attack German elements attacking Poland, could have sent only a few dozen. And this was after three years of relatively slow re-armament by the French government, after a nearly a decade of the French government starving the French military.

So yes, the Germans would have perhaps withdrawn; but France did not feel itself strong enough to undergo an invasion in the first place - either as a matter of military might or diplomatically. Furthermore, you have to understand that Hitler, as well as the German military, were more afraid of what they thought of the French military vis a vis their experiences in WWI, than what was the reality of the 1930s. Due partly to the ravages of WWI there was a level of fundamental weakness not usually associated with great powers; and this only worsened in the inter-war period. Thus France was a very weak country by this point and the Germans, when they actually invaded France, discovered this. French soldiers fought bravely certainly, but the command structures, the overall strategy for the war, the French economy, etc. were so flawed and weak as to make bravery on the battlefield a useless commodity.

"But if France learned not to count on allies, again, why should it criticize the United States if we draw the same lessons?"

Hmm, I am not criticizing the US for that.

Dean: "The 1993 assassination attempt on George HW Bush were merely a further bit of evidence of the nature of the regime."
-Yes, I should clarify. It was AFTER that when he turned over the new leaf. Grudges are so petty;)

JB: "...but France did not feel itself strong enough to undergo an invasion in the first place - either as a matter of military might or diplomatically."
-Sound familiar?

Rich Reilly,

Familiar? Familiar to what?

Jean Bart,

You list a set of reasons that French military strength was lacking in the late 30's, the economy, the demographic tragedy of WWI, etc... but are these really reasons, or rationalizations? After all, Germany suffered these same privations, and to no less an extent, if not worse.

After all, if Germany possessed sufficient leadership and will to invade France, must we really turn to demographics and economics to explain France's inability to defend herself? Or was this defeat produced by inferior military tactical skill, and a failure of political will?

Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France by Ernest R. May seems to argue this point, and though I haven't read it, the broad outline sounds reasonable.

lewy14,

They are reasons; they are not rationalizations.

The historiography of this area is very complex and highly variegated; as you should know, the title of May's work is a play off of a worked titled "Strange Defeat" by the French historian Bloch (a resistance fighter who was killed in 1944). Bloch blamed primarily blamed the decadance of France.

Regarding your two-pronged explantion, while it is true that the static nature of French warfare the time, as well as the decision to march the bulk of France's army into Belgium, did contribute to the disaster of June 1940, I see this as at best the immediate result of factors which preceded these events - specifically France's lack of military preparedness. The conscription issue is critically important here because French men in arms since the early 1930s had at most one year of training compared to the several years of their German counterparts. The one year conscription had been neccesitated by the economies the French government underwent during the Depression, which hit France four to five years after the rest of the "West," meaning around 1932-1933.

I think the following example illustrates the weakness of France militarily. In the 1930s the French navy, partly as a result of treaties France signed to limit its size, and partly due to economic constraints, couldn't even serve its empire. Troops could be moved from closer Africa colonies, but getting any sort of major military forces to say Indochina was out of the question.

Regarding the issue of politics, the Third Republic was always politically weak and unstable (along the lines of the Italian government in the post-war era). Yet it was able to bring to the fore Prime Minister Clemenceau in 1917, at time when France was faltering; Clemenceau steeling his government to continue the war until the bitter end. So the question is why another Clemenceau did not come to fore in 1940? Well, one did - his name was Charles de Gaulle. Unfortunately for de Gaulle he was not in a position to oust Petain from power; and this is largely because the political class of the WWI era had yet to be replaced as would have normally happened. Why weren't they replaced? Because the generation that would have done so were dead. Not only were manpower shortages created by the war felt in the overall size of the French army, but also in French society; because the flower of French society, its natural leaders, were slaughtered in WWI.

The difference from Germany is simple; Germany did not suffer the demographic or even economic losses felt in WWI. It took another 4.5 million Germans in WWII to reach the per capita losses France felt in WWI.

I don't disagree that of course French leadership failed; or at least much of it. But the question is this - even if France had been blessed with the best leaders possible, given the military and economic weakness France had in 1939-1940, would it have made a difference?

In my opinion, at best what de Gaulle undertook would have been quicked; France would have rallied from its empire as de Gaulle was able to undertake. Except in this case, de Gaulle (or whoever was in charge) would not have had to fight pro-Vichy colonial military units.

You may wish to look at these links for some scholarly thoughts on this issue:

Link 1

Link 2

Link 3

Let me add this URL

Jean Bart,

Well, you've given me much to read, and I'll go back to Keegan's book on the First World War to fact check your assertions on French losses then... I do recall from that book that the casualties were about 10 percent... even given the disproportionate loss of the best and the brightest, I'm not persuaded that the casualty rate (though truly horrific) explains the lack of leadership.

Historians' unwillingness to undertake an analysis of interwar France with an eye to the deep roots of the collapse was, and still is, probably due
to the discomfort of discovering in a post-1945 world that fear of war
could lead to collaboration in atrocity, that anti-militarism can bring
about fascism, and that lack of a certain ruthlessness in policy-making
can easily allow for much greater abuse by others.

lewy14,

Re: the qoutation:

Well, the problem with that particular statement, is that so much ink has been spilled over the issue of France's fall as to make it meaningless.

France lost around 1.4 million men in WWI (that's not counting civilian deaths). And Keegan's poorly written book isn't going to help you much regarding the inter-war years. France had a population twice as small as Germany's, and an industrial capacity four to five times as small. The facts on the ground were the same as they had been in 1914; without allies, France was in a decided position of weakness against the Germans and could not hope to win a war against them. I'm not quite sure why people think of France during this period, or even before WWI I might add, as some sort of equal to Germany.

BTW, I notice that you've completely ignored the rest of my argument; so I shall simply take that as a sign that you accept what I have written.

pakistan is a great country and we are a forefront country in war against terrorism and i dont no that why west is why our against and blamed us that we are with talibans i wants to clear here that israel is responsible for 9/11 attacks but usa is doing ill behaviour with muslims trace a nd kill israel not muslims but i think not i all world know that usa has no power to trapped israel because usa economy depend on isareli

pakistan is a great country and we are a forefront country in war against terrorism and i dont no that why west is why our against and blamed us that we are with talibans i wants to clear here that israel is responsible for 9/11 attacks but usa is doing ill behaviour with muslims trace a nd kill israel not muslims but i think not i all world know that usa has no power to trapped israel because usa economy depend on isareli