dude, how come you fail to ever talk about the EuroFascists and their undivided support for the regime..?

Georgia is the center of a lot of the competition in the region between the US and Russia; the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Shah Deniz gas pipeline are fairly good examples of US investment there (and European as well). Washington and Western Europe and Shevardnadze have had a close relationship since 1991; and whoever replaces him will continue to need Western money in the region to keep Russia at bay.

And of course the war in Chechnya is partly being fought over that area's oil resources; in fact, Russia needs to desperately hold onto its control of its former client states in the region, as well as regions like Chechnya to maintain the export that is almost singly supporting its economy - oil exports. Since the early 1990s, the US has considered Caspian sea region an area of influence, and Russia has been in a rearguard action to combat US and Western European influence there. Think of the "Great Game" of the 19th century. :) You can read Kipling's "Kim" to get a flavor of it.

Jean, why do you believe Russia is in Chechnya over oil? Do you have any evidence that oil is one of the top revenue produces for Russia?

I'm a little curious too Jean. I have some sympathy for Russia's intentions in Chechnya, but definitely not its methods of achieving them.

Chechens jumped the gun on the whole question of independence, which was to be settled in 2000, by doing stupid things like invading Dagestan in 99.

I think, more than anything else, Chechnya is about pride and sending a message to other ethnic republics that secession is not an option and will be met with harsh reprisals.

Russian behavior towards Georgia (which definitely is connected to the Chechnya situation as well to Georgia's own separatists) does have a lot to do with energy policy and its part in helping the Russians build a "liberal empire."

I can't quite tell if Russia is pleased with the situation in Georgia or not. My gut reaction would be "no," but Russia seems pretty cool with things. This could come in quite handy with keeping Aslan Abashidze (leader of Ajaria Autonomous Republic) and neighboring states in check.

Oil is definitely one of the top revenue producers for Russia, and will remain so along with natural gas.

Chechnya was a major oil producing region in the early 1900s, but by 1990 that had declined considerably. There is a Transneft pipeline that crosses Chechen territory, but it is very often closed and Russia has been working to build pipelines around Chechnya (via Dagestan) for obvious reasons. Grozny was an important oil refinery center before the war, but I doubt that's still true.

We've covered Caspian pipeline politics before here on Winds of Change.NET, and it's a subject worth following. Type "Caspian pipeline" into our search engine, and you'll see.

Why wouldn't Russia be please? It's FM , Ivanov, negotiated the resignation thus boosting their prestige in the country. You have an untested, inexperienced government taking reins whose politics smack rather highly of the same nationalist claptrap that saw most of Eastern Bloc's peripheral territories drown in fratriciadal massacres in 1990s. Just because the opposition was against Eddie, doesn't make them any better or , potentially, any less corrupt. All of this adds up to a high likelihood of delay in the US sponsored pipeline.

As for the fact that Russia is almost as dependant on oil and export as Saudi Arabia, that's nearly indisputible

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-20.html

And one of the primary reasons for war is in fact the idea that posession of Chechnya would susbstantially improve logistics of supplying Caspian Oil to Western markets, through Russian-satellites. So you have Iran, Russia and US competing for influence, since US doesn't want any of the other two to get a hegemonic position in what is quickly emergin as the region that's even more oil-rich than Middle East proper.

Nor does the U.S. want to sit by as any of the Central Asian republics go Islamist, and potentially become another Afghanistan. Most have armed Islamists with al-Qaeda links on their soil.

Prior to 9/11, the game in this region was mostly between Russia, Iran, and Turkey, with some efforts by China and the US and EU working their commercial interests in the region but little else.

By October 2001, the picture was very different.

Central Asia is now a region worth paying closer attention to, and that's why we run Nathan Hamm's outstanding "Central Asia -stans Summary" every month.

Thanks for the Argus link, that was quite enlightening. When I first heard that Shevardnadze had resigned I had some concerns, considering that he has been a solid ally of the West for a long while. However, it sounds like Saakashvili is both a more dynamic leader and more likely to resist pressure from Russia, which Shevardnadze was apparently beginning to compromise to. My major concern would be if the new government decided to cut cooperation with the U.S. in regards to training and keeping the Pankisi Gorge from becoming an al Queta haven; that would be a significant setback in the current war. I've read nothing that indicates Saakashvili or the other reformist have anything like that in mind.

The usual suspects will accuse the U.S. of just making another chess move in the Great Game. Folks like that see the diabolic hand of the USA/CIA/Mossad/etc. in everything anyway, so I don't worry about that. Myself, I'm glad the transfer of power will apparently be mostly bloodless, and hope that the current turmoil in Georgia will result in a state on its way to prosperity, rather than another failed state where terrorism can breed.