This might be of some assistance.

The letter was found on a Baghdad safehouse believed to have been used by Zarqawi along with numerous other items, including a rather large chunk cyanide. Enough al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam, and al-Tawhid members are in coalition custody by now (as well as the US being in control of Sergat and Khurmal) that the idea that we don't have some of Zarqawi's screeds or orders on file by now would be somewhat odd. He also owned a video store in Jordan at one point before becoming an international terrorists, so I'm sure that samples of his handwriting are on file somewhere and likely have been for at least 2 years.

In addition, at least two senior al-Qaeda members in Iraq have been captured in recent weeks - Hassan Ghul and Husam al-Yemeni. Ghul is the bigger fish of the two and got caught near the Iranian border (no word or whether he was coming or going) and given what can be extrapolated about the al-Qaeda presence in Baghdad due to the numerous suicide bombings that the group has conducted there in the last year, it would stand to reason that Ghul spilled the location of the safe house where the letter was found, as well as the likely identify of the author.

Whoever wrote the letter is clearly in contact with al-Qaeda's top brass on a person-to-person basis as well as in quite a position of authority among the Iraqi al-Qaeda, claiming that he masterminded as many two dozen separate bombings on coalition targets, which easily places him on at least the Zarqawi level. If it isn't Zarqawi (and I doubt this), the likely author is Abu Iyad, a Saudi al-Qaeda leader who fought with the Chechens and declared himself "emir of the mujahideen in Baghdad" last March.

Dan;

I've made the remark this morning on my own blog, that given the change of targeting apparent in the two car bombings yesterday, that the message contained on that memo we found, may have already gotten through; that the al-Qaeda may already be operating in the manner asked for in that memo.

On that basis, it strikes me that we discovered only one copy of the note... one of possibly several... and that clearly the message was had by at least some within al-Qaeda, who are now acting upon it's message.

Care to comment?

Coalition forces got this to the NYT quickly. It is an important find, and there is lots more on the CD than just that one doc.

The key is that AQ knows they are losing, that Iraq will be a democracy, and that dooms them.

Zarqawi is Muslim, he is from that part of the world, he speaks the language - and he doesn't think that Iraqis are unable to grasp democracy. People in the West who think that should take note.

I wonder what else was on that disk?

What else was on the disk? Hopefully, names, safe-house locations, and Swiss account numbers.

According to the general tone of the note, Zarqawi is asking al-Qaeda to lift its ban on targeting Shi'ites (al-Qaeda has disseminated anti-Shi'ite propaganda in the Sunni areas but has yet to engage in the kind of widespread sectarian violence in Iraq that Zarqawi was asking about, which would be something along the lines of what the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi does in Pakistan). The question of who blew up Ayatollah Hakim last summer in the Iraqi holy city of An Najaf aside, al-Qaeda has yet to engage in the kind of mass killings of Iraqi Shi'ites that one might expect if true, though that rumored and now denied assassination attempt on Ayatollah Sistani could have been intended as the beginning of such a campaign.

The major Zarqawi attacks over the last 2 weeks, however, have more or less involved targets that al-Qaeda considers to be "collaborators" with the Americans - Kurdish leaders, Iraqi cops, and the nucleus of the new Iraqi army. Once Shi'ite clerics and/or mosques start getting bombed in large numbers, then we'll know that al-Qaeda has decided to act on Zarqawi's suggested initiative.

Another reason as to why al-Qaeda is somewhat unlikely to approve Zarqawi's request deals with a fact that a good chunk of the leadership is now being hosted by the most fanatical Shi'ite elements of the Iranian government and as such are unlikely to bite the hand that feeds them. In various al-Qaeda propaganda statements, Abu Abdul Rahman al-Najdi, a member of the organization's media committee, repeatedly stressed the need for jihadis only to target the "satanic" Shi'ite and Sunni clerics who sided with the US and even referred to the Imam Ali mosque in An Najaf as "God's House," all of which is likely to be anathema to the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi crowd. While al-Qaeda is not generally seen as being ecumenical, it prefers to exercise a pragmatic Pan-Islamic outlook whenever possible among like-minded individuals, hence their willingness to side with like-minded Shi'ites in this regard. A lot of the reason for al-Qaeda's leadership adopting this mentality goes back to Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and Hassan Turabi, two ideologues whose pragmatic mindsets strongly influenced both bin Laden and al-Zawahiri.

Finding this missive on CD-ROM indicates that at least some elements of al-Qaeda are either practicing strict communications security or understand that allied elements do not have reliable Internet or telephone communications. Wouldn’t it have made more sense to email or fax such a memo rather than rely on a courier? Only if the intended recipients had the necessary communications links.

The only other explanation is that Zarqawi did not have access to a fax machine or computer with Internet connection. At least he had a CD burner.

Dan Darling writes in his informative comment:

Another reason as to why al-Qaeda is somewhat unlikely to approve Zarqawi's request deals with a fact that a good chunk of the leadership is now being hosted by the most fanatical Shi'ite elements of the Iranian government and as such are unlikely to bite the hand that feeds them.

Sunni Al Qaeda are willing to start a sectarian war, which minority Sunni would end up getting slaughtered, but would push Sunni towards Al Qaeda. Why wouldn't the Shiite fanatics running Iran think along the same lines? Iraqi Shiites would look toward Irani Shiites for support against Iraqi (and Saudi?) Sunnis?

I don't think Iraqis want a Civil War. There seems to be a true Iraqi patriotism developing. NPR of all places interviewed survivors of yesterday's car bombing of young men lining up to apply for jobs in the new Iraqi police. Two out of three would still sign up. Money line: I'll never allow the terrorists to win. The third guy was with the police, said he'll quit, if the US can't provide security.

The Kid:

"Finding this missive on CD-ROM indicates that at least some elements of al-Qaeda are either practicing strict communications security or understand that allied elements do not have reliable Internet or telephone communications."

My guess would be the former. The loss of Qaed Sinan Ali al-Harethi to a Predator drone in Yemen seems to have sent the leadership a healthy reminder of their own mortality as well as the nature of US intelligence.

"Wouldn’t it have made more sense to email or fax such a memo rather than rely on a courier?"

E-Mails can be traced, as can fax addresses. If Zarqawi is sending a fax a message to Saif al-Adel at an Iranian military base, he wouldn't want to take any chances that his superiors' locations could be compromised. In addition, he might have sent an oral message with Ghul (who has now been identified as the intended courier) that he wasn't going to risk committing to writing.

Jabba:

"Sunni Al Qaeda are willing to start a sectarian war, which minority Sunni would end up getting slaughtered, but would push Sunni towards Al Qaeda. Why wouldn't the Shiite fanatics running Iran think along the same lines? Iraqi Shiites would look toward Irani Shiites for support against Iraqi (and Saudi?) Sunnis?"

Sadr and his Mahdi Army have already launched pogroms against Sunnis and Christians in the southern regions, but they have been hampered thus far due to the fact that the general public follows the teachings of Ayatollah Sistani, whose theological authority (as well as sanity) trumps Sadr's by several degrees.

I can easily see al-Qaeda and the Iranians trying to run parallel lines of sectarian warfare against the coalition in Iraq in order to dislodge the US and hopefully balkanize the nation. However, the Zarqawi letter makes no reference to Iranian involvement in all of this (though Sadr has been laying the groundwork for several months or so) so all of this is just an educated guess on my part.

I agree that most Iraqis don't want a sectarian or civil war. After the Iraq-Iran War, the Gulf War, and over a decade of sanctions and bombing, they frankly seem sick of it all. That may well explain why Zarqawi is unable to recruit sizeable Iraqis into his ranks as indicated by the letter.