I didn't intend for this to be my first blog entry on Winds of Change since my return from DC, but I thought it might help to supplement Armed Liberal's earlier remarks on Chechnya and in particular the people who orchestrated the wave of terrorism that has killed upwards of 500 Russian civilians since last week.
This should in no way be seen as an endorsement of Russian policies in Chechnya, which have been worse than brutal - they're simply ineffective. I'll conclude with a link to a reputable organization that is seeking to raise money for the victims of this tragic act of barbarism.
A little background ...
First of all, claims that this has to do with the Russian military presence in Chechnya completely misunderstand the situation.
The problem with Chechnya, more or less, is that the Russians tried to surrender after their failure to bring the rebellious republic back into the fold in the first Chechen war and it didn't work. The country was taken over by a mixture of international terrorist organizations, Wahhabi theocrats, drug cartels, and other criminal organizations that subsided more or less on generous funding from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
This funding helped the Wahhabis to finalize control over the institutional infrastructure of the de facto independent state and led for calls for the imposition of sha'riah even though most Chechens (and Caucasus Muslims in general) are Sufis. The al-Qaeda presence in Chechnya was headed up by bin Laden's protege Amir ibn al-Khattab, a Saudi national who had previously assisted Islamic fighters in the Tajik Civil War and the Armenia-Azerbaijan War over Nagorno-Karabakh.
In 1999, Khattab and his "Islamic International Brigade" used Chechnya as a base from which to invade the neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan (summarized here by GlobalSecurity) as part of a long-term al-Qaeda strategy to export the Chechen political culture to the rest of the Caucasus. That failed invasion of Dagestan marks the proper beginning of the current fighting in Chechnya.
Originally, the Chechen command structure was fairly solid and made up of both secular nationalists led by President Aslan Maskhadov and Wahhabi extremists led by Shamil Basayev, the former Chechen prime minister who serves as Khattab's superior, having fought alongside him in Nagorno-Karabakh and been yet another product of Afghanistan's terrorist training camp. However, since the fall of Grozny in 2002 the Chechen Wahhabi fighters under Basayev have increasingly been in ascendance and are set up along the following lines:
- United Forces of the Caucasian Mujahideen: The Russians refer to this group as the Supreme Military Majlis ul-Shura of the Mujahideen Forces of Caucasus, but this is the coordinating organization under which all of the Chechen Wahhabi groups operate that is headed up by Shamil Basayev. It also includes the Chechen sha'riah court, which provides theological rationales for activities such as that which we witnessed in Beslan.
- Islamic International Brigade (IIB): Commanded first by Khattab and then his late successor Abu Walid al-Ghamdi (a relative of 3 of the 9/11 hijackers), the IIB is also known as the "Arab brigade" or the al-Ansar Mujahideen due to the high percentage of Arab al-Qaeda fighters in its ranks. While other Chechen groups contain al-Qaeda members serving either as "officers" or in some kind of a military advisor capacity, the IIB is unquestionably the hub of the al-Qaeda presence in Chechnya.
- Special Purpose Islamic Regiment: (SPIR) Also known as the al-Jihad Fisi Sabiliah Special Islamic Regiment and formerly commanded by the late Ruslan Gelayev (killed in early 2004), SPIR engages primarily in guerrilla attacks against Russian forces as well as the execution of those Chechens deemed to be collaborators. Also contains a fair number of Turkish jihadis in its ranks.
- Riyadus Salikhin: This is a Romanization of the Russified form of Riyadh al-Saliheen or Garden of the Righteous, which I believe comes from Islamic descriptions of Paradise. This is basically the Chechen equivalent to the Tamil Tigers' Black Tigers suicide bombing squad and essentially performs the same duties for the Chechen Wahhabis. It first came into existence in June 2000 when two suicide bombers blew up a truck loaded with explosives at a checkpoint near a Russian OMON (Special Forces) unit at Alkhan-Yurt in Chechnya.
Suicide bombing, I should mention, is not an indigenous Chechen tradition but rather a Middle East import, although the Chechen sha'riah court has appropriated the concept of smertnitsi (the idea of virtuous warriors willing to sacrifice their own lives in defense of others) in its theological justifications. In most cases, members of Riyadus Salikhin are the widows of dead Chechen jihadis.
- Islamic Army of Dagestan: The name given to the Karamakhi-based Dagestanis recruited by Khattab that helped him to forment his 1999 invasion of Dagestan.
- Military Council Majlis al-Shura of Ingushetia: The name given to the Ingush Wahhabis who fought alongside the United Forces during the June 2004 raid into Ingushetia and led by Abu Kutayba, a Saudi national.
- Urus-Martan Front: A small Ingush group led by Akhmed Basnukayev that was fighting for greater autonomy in the Urus-Martan and Achkoi-Martan districts of Chechnya before it was absorbed into the framework of Basayev's United Forces.
Basayev's terror offensive ...
Since August 21, Russia has been subject to a wave of Chechen terrorist attacks masterminded by Basayev and bankrolled by al-Qaeda through the personage of an Arab national named Abu Omar al-Saif who serves as the network's paymaster in the Caucasus. While the European and Pakistani arrests of numerous mid-level al-Qaeda figures over the summer appear at least on the surface to have disrupted the network's plans for attacks inside Pakistan and hopefully the continental United States, no similar pattern of disruption appears to have occurred in Iraq or the Caucasus by virtue of the famed al-Qaeda decentralization.
Here's a basic chronology of Chechen attacks prior to Beslan:
- From August 21-22, upwards of 60 Russian and Chechen-backed troops were slaughtered in and around the Russian-controlled Chechen capital of Grozny. While Russian troops routinely die by the dozens inside Chechnya, these attacks utilized the same tactics that were first harnessed in the June 22 raid by hundreds of Chechen and Ingush jihadis into the Ingush capital Nazran as well as the nearby cities of Karabulak and Sleptsovsk. Over 100 Ingush were killed during that raid, including the republic's interior minister, and the 3 cities were more or less sacked by Basayev's fighters. I mention this because it indicates just how confident Basayev was feeling to have devoted such a large percentage of his forces to the raid. In contrast to the tactics employed by Sadr's Mahdi Army (which attempted to take and hold territory), Basayev's fighters took what they needed from the Russian armories and banks and left the town before Russian reinforcements could arrive.
- On August 24, we had the twin plane bombings apparently carried out by members of Riyadus Salikhin that killed 89.
- On August 31, a double suicide bombing in Moscow killed 10, also perpetrated by members of Riyadus Salikhin.
Why North Ossetia ...
Basayev's reasons for selecting North Ossetia in general and Beslan in particular are obvious to one familiar with the warped nature of al-Qaeda and its fellow travelers.
Unlike most of the North Caucasus, most North Ossetians are Eastern Orthodox Christians, so it "makes sense" to target them rather than say Russian Muslim schoolchildren in Ingushetia or Dagestan if you're a Wahhabi who subscribes to bin Laden's belief in a Huntingtonian-esque clash of civilizations. In addition to being majority Christian, North Ossetia was also one of the few regions of the North Caucasus that voluntarily joined the Russian Empire and its population formed a lot of the levies that were eventually used to subdue other Caucasus nations that refused to submit to the Tsar. As such, even the murder of innocent schoolchildren can be fit into a warped idea of "vengeance" for actions that their ancestors may have committed.
I should point out that regardless of what one thinks about Russian involvement in Chechnya, the people of Beslan had no power whatsoever to effect Russian policy in region. Basayev is an educated man who is quite familiar with the North Caucasus, so he must have known this when he was planning the attack. Things like this make his decision to target the innocent people of Beslan all that much more inexcuseable.
However, I should point out that Basayev's ambitions extend far beyond just Chechen independence, so everybody saying that a political solution to the Chechen war or Russian withdrawl from the region is going to solve the issue is going to be sorely disappointed. Here's Amir Ramzan, one of Basayev's flunkies, in an interview with the Chechen propaganda website Kavkaz Center from last year:
Q: From your words I can assume that you operate not only in Chechnya but all over the North Caucasus.
R: Yes, very much so. Not only we carry out raids to various areas in the Caucasus, but we also form local Jama’ats, militant sabotage groups locally. We are joined by a lot of Kabardinians, Dagestanis, Karachaevans, Ingushetians and even Ossetians (Muslims).
Q: That means that those in Russia who say that you want to create a caliphate in the Caucasus from sea to sea, are right?
R: Yes, it is so. Since they are unwilling to negotiate with us, then we’ll be doing what we can. And there is a lot we can do. Next year the war will seize the entire Caucasus from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea. Apart from Ossetia and Ingushetia, this year another guerrilla war has already started in two areas of Dagestan bordering Chechnya. I swear by Allah, this is only the beginning. Russian authorities are well aware of this and this is why they are trying to organize formations of the local residents in the area who could resist us effectively. Similar process is taking place in Chechnya. But it will come to absolutely nothing. Having reached a certain level of confrontation inside Chechnya, Russia will sooner or later have to withdraw its troops beyond the Terek River, for instance. In that case we will need no more than two weeks to destroy all the pro-Russian puppet formations.
Note that his reference to negotiations refers to the establishment of a caliphate from the Black Sea to the Caspian, not to Russian withdrawl from Chechnya. So unless one wants Putin to consider placing millions of people in the hands of these madmen, there is really very little for him to negotiate with Basayev about. Maskhadov is another matter entirely and the Russians might do well to obtain a political settlement on that end, as he has indicated that he might well be open to such a thing.
Fred Pruitt also has some thoughts on what the Russians can learn on their end from what happened in Beslan and I think he hits the nail pretty well on the head.
Links to al-Qaeda ...
People keep asking me about this over on Regnum Crucis or via e-mail, so I'll be up-front: in my own opinion, the only difference between al-Qaeda and Basayev's Chechen Killer Korps is one of semantics, especially when one considers the prominence of people like bin Laden's protege Khattab or Abu Walid al-Ghamdi within the hierarchy of the Chechen forces loyal to Basayev. I've said as much before, but since there is a fair amount of quibbling that can be done in this regard I'll just stick to what is pretty much universally agreed upon by serious observers of the situation in Chechnya, including even some politicians:
- Khattab first met bin Laden during the Afghan War and later served as the leader of an al-Qaeda brigade sent to assist first the Tajik Islamists in the Tajik Civil War and later the Azeri military during the Armenia-Azerbaijan War during the early 1990s.
- Ties between al-Qaeda and a number of other Chechen leaders go at least as far back as the early 1990s.
- Basayev first met with Khattab while fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh and then traveled to Afghanistan to receive al-Qaeda training along with several hundred fellow Chechens.
- By August 1995, a large number of Basayev's followers were Afghan-trained Chechen or Arab fighters.
- Several hundred additional Chechens were trained in Afghanistan during the republic's period of de facto independence from Russia and former Chechen president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev convinced Mullah Omar to recognize Chechnya as an independent state and allow it to set up offices in Kabul and Kandahar. A number of elite Chechen fighters were also made members of bin Laden's personal guard.
- Basayev and Khattab sent emissaries to Afghanistan in 1999, who met with bin Laden in Kandahar and returned with several hundred members of al-Qaeda's elite Brigade 055 as well as a large amount of cash to help bankroll the invasion of Dagestan. An additional $30,000,000 was later funnelled to Khattab from bin Laden through the International Islamic Relief Organization and Global Relief NGOs based in Georgia.
- As the fighting intensified in late 1999, bin Laden sent large amounts of money and weapons to Basayev, Khattab, and Arbi Barayev and appointed Abu Tariq to oversee the distribution of al-Qaeda funds in Chechnya. Abu Tariq was killed in December 2002 and succeeded by Abu Omar al-Saif, another Arab national.
- Al-Qaeda funding was used by Chechen commanders loyal to Basayev to recruit fighters from Georgia, Ingushetia, South Ossetia, Azerbaijan, and Dagestan.
- The last contingent of Chechen trainees arrived in Afghanistan in the spring of 2001 fought against the US-backed Northern Alliance at Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
- After 9/11, Khattab sent a token force of Chechen and Arab fighters to Afghanistan to demonstrate his solidarity with bin Laden as well as recognition of him as the undisputed leader of the international Islamist movement.
- A number of key al-Qaeda commanders, including Saif al-Islam al-Masri and Abu Iyad, a member of the group's ruling council, sought sanctuary with Khattab following the fall of the Taliban.
- After Khattab's death in February 2002, al-Qaeda contacted its various NGO front organizations in the Gulf to urge an additional shipment of $2,000,000 to Khattab's successor Abu Walid al-Ghamdi.
- Al-Qaeda WMD chief Midhat Mursi has used the Chechen stronghold in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge as a base from which to train European al-Qaeda members in toxins and crude chemical weapons.
- Abu Omar al-Saif has called for attacks on US forces in Iraq and Abu Walid sent a force of Arab and Chechen fighters to Iraq in answer to Abu Musab Zarqawi's January 2004 request for assistance.
This does not include, of course, Russian reports that Abu Omar al-Saif bankrolled this most recent attack or that there were dead Arabs found among the bodies of the Beslan hostage-takers.
What can be done to help the victims?
As I said, the innocent people of Beslan had absolutely nothing to do with Russian policies in Chechnya and should not be held accountable for whatever differences one may have with the policies of the Russian government. MoscowHelp has been set up to assist the survivors of this tragedy and has already raised $95,206, or nearly double what the US government is donating.
UPDATE: The Telegraph has a pretty good primer on what Basayev's ambitions are that should help to make it clear why negotiations aren't going to end the fighting in the region.
Dan! I'm so glad you're back!
I want to know now why there's not a breath of this in the MSM. Stan at Logic and Sanity showed me a Wash post article from last year about Al Qaeda influence in Chechnya-- why isn't this at least a visible story now? And is it visible in the Russian press?
"...my first blog...."
Blog entry. Blog entry. You've not started a whole new blog here, and metonymy isn't what you're doing.
Yes, I'm a usage wonk.
One makes an entry in or on a blog. A blog is a web log.
That's all that is written, and if people want to make multiple "blogs" they should show their many URLs.
decaf, Gary, decaf...<g>
A.L.
jinnderella:
Aww, thanks ;)
C-SPAN was (and is?) very kind to provide us with direct translation feed of the events from the Russian news services and just from watching what's reported internally within the Russian press, there isn't any doubt that al-Qaeda was involved. As for why this isn't being covered among the US press, don't ask me, but you have to remember that while American press coverage of this attack is certainly better than it has been in previous cases, in general Western coverage of events inside Russia is extremely poor. I think Isikoff and Hosenball have a Newsweek "web exclusive" up dealing with al-Qaeda in Chechnya, though I don't think that they take it nearly as far as I do.
Gary:
Apologies, I'll try to do better next time ;)
My congratulations to you, Mr. Darling, as this is the kind of briefing this site was meant for. Very useful order-of-battle intelligence, among other things.
It also shows that, whatever grievances the Chechens have had historically, their war has been subsumed by AQ. Indeed, given the number of Chechen fighters found elsewhere, notably Afghanistan, it suggests they've enlisted.
It also suggests that President Putin has a much bigger fight than simply pacifying the Chechen-Ingush. If it means dealing with Riyadh rather than Grozny then maybe this Administration needs to look in.
Wow.. outstanding post. Thanks much for the information!!!
MoscowHelp link is non-active.
Finally, someone talking some sense.
Thank you Dan.
Here is my poorly hewn attempt at identifying the enemy: http://www.nopunditintended.com/?q=Who-is-the-Real-Enemy
Dan,
I am interested in your opinion of the level of reprisal that Putin will take in this matter. I interpret his comments regarding "fear" to mean that he intends to demonstrate a Russian lack thereof. What is the probability (in your opinion) of a Russian "Carthaginian" response?
Rick:
Russia can't mount a "Carthaginian" response to Chechnya for the simple fact that they already have - I believe the standing body count is something like 80,000 civilians killed so far in the second Chechen war, which is why as I said this blog entry shouldn't be seen as an endorsement of Russian behavior in Chechnya. The battle for Grozny left much of the city in ruins and Chechnya proper is now run by a Russian-backed government. Putin could strike at Chechen bases in the Pankisi Gorge or attempt some type of punitive actions against Saudi Arabia, but I think that the chances of either of those actions being carried out are far from likely.
The best steps that Putin can take are pretty much those outlined by Fred Pruitt over on Rantburg with respect to the Russian military in order to make it a more effective sword with which to aim at people like Basayev. An increased Russian military presence may also be necessary in places like Dagestan or Ingushetia, as the United Forces clearly have infrastructure in place there that facilitated their travels into North Ossetia to begin with.
How many non-combattants reside in the Pankisi Gorge. What general level of explosive yield would be necessary to reduce all enemy forces in the Pankisi Gorge to combat ineffectiveness? What total percentage of the Caucasus Muslim militants would be negated by this type of attack?
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Venue: The Hajj (Jan.-Feb. 2005, Mecca, SA)
Attendees: 2 m Muslims
Entertainment: 10+ megatons of primo Russian thermonuclear attitude adjuster (i.e., 5+ tons of martyr-making hydrogen fusion per unwitting Muslim).
User name: Morituri
Password: Allah be braised!
Agenda: Remember Beslan!
Parting gifts: 72 virgins per attendee.
(NB: Because of the anticipated heavy demand for virgins at this event, we recommend that you depart for paradise ASAP, perhaps even before the Hajj.)
Dan,
The Russians face two related problems here - traditional Chechen nastiness and outside support for it. The latter greatly complicates the traditional, and highly effective, Russian solution for the former - wholesale slaughter. The Russians have calmed the Chechens down before with genocide and will again. Sooner than you think. You just aren't bloody-minded enough.
They're Russians, Dan. They ARE bloody-minded enough. History made them that way and whacks them repeatedly when they don't pay attention. Likewise the Chechens pay attention only when most of them are dead. It's a tough neighborhood.
I suggest you go here: http://www.strategypage.com/fyeo/qndguide/default.asp?target=RUSSIA.HTM</> and read the entries for September 2-3.
IMO the Russians will eventually use Saddam's solution to the Kurdish question - nerve gas delivered by air, only for purposes of genocide as opposed to intimidation.
I suggest you try focusing on where events are going instead of where they are now. That is how to predict the future.
Arab support for the Chechens - mestaticization of the Wahabbi cancer - will cease only when the Arabs no longer have significant unearned income, i.e., after the collapse of Saudi Arabia and our de facto seizure of control of the oil income of the other Arab states in the Persian Gulf. Iran's mullah regime will be gone in about 12-18 months - I have money on our invasion starting no later than 10/31/05 (for weather reasons).
So the Chechens will have funding and cadres coming in from the outside for some time. This means further horror shows like Breslan and the theater in Moscow. At some point the Russians will uncork.
So it's just a question of time. IMO that will take place after the Saud regime collapses. The EU will not then risk its relationship with will be, at that point, the world's largest oil exporter. And the nutballs will go absolutely berserk with atrocities.
Consider how the West saw this series of wars: 1980s Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya. For us, it was about Afghan resistance, post-communist fractiousness, Serbian genocide, Chechen independence. For Russia and Serbia, it was largely all about Wahhabi terrorism, assisted by foreign powers. There really needs to be some sort of examination within the West as to how we ended up on the same side as al Qaeda so often. And I would like to see some of the blogosphere's self-made terror pundits reach out and make contact with their Russian counterparts, who must exist. We need to hear their side of the story.
Something about the CIA's support for the mujahideen has long puzzled me. Supposedly it was the biggest covert operation in the agency's history. Yet somehow the whole world knows about it! When and how did it make the transition from covert to common knowledge? Was it just that they stopped lying about it, once the USSR ceased to be? Furthermore, there was definitely overt support for the Afghans as well. So where was the line drawn? Was it as simple as: rhetorical support overt, material support covert?
We now face the opposite problem when it comes to the CIA and bin Laden - people are willing to believe in any sort of connection. The safe consensus, so far as I can make it out, is that it was Pakistan's fault. The CIA liaised with the ISI, and the ISI wouldn't let them see what was going on in the training camps. Pardon me for thinking that this is just another cover story. Bin Laden was there as the on-site representative of Saudi Arabia, the US ally which was matching the funding for the mujahideen dollar for dollar. It wouldn't surprise me to learn that the famous dual-use Islamic charities were a CIA invention. I also find it very suspicious that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's brother Zahed, the one relative who almost never gets mentioned in the press, reportedly administered a Kuwaiti charity in Pakistan and Afghanistan, one that was finally declared to be a terror-financing organization just a few months before last year's war in Iraq. So I think there are people in American intelligence who have known about these guys from the beginning, and who may even have worked with them back then.
This is supposed to be a post about the Chechens, so here is another example. Ex-DCI James Woolsey has endorsed the theory that the 1999 bombings in Russia which precipitated the second Chechen war were actually carried out by the Russian secret services. I should hasten to add that this is a theory first advanced by Russians, on the basis of two things: the "Ryazan incident", in which Russian special forces were found placing a bomb in a building, and the presence of hexogen, a Russian military explosive, in the residue of the bombs that went off. I believe the official explanation of the Ryazan incident is that it was a training exercise. Perhaps it was an attempt to test the intelligence skills of local law enforcement (this is where contact with Russian warbloggers would be useful...). As for the hexogen, I am reminded of the argument that the 2001 anthrax letters must have been sent by an insider, because they carried an American military strain. In any case, my point is that if a senior intelligence official (retired) like Woolsey is willing to say that Russia bombed its own people as a pretext for suppressing the Chechens, is it any wonder that the foreign policy elite and the press in general have the attitudes they do?
jeffers:
I believe the Pankisi Gorge plays host to thousands of Chechen refugees and that most of the Chechen bases there are a mixture of small villages and mountain strongholds. The Russians also have a definite intel problem, see Fred Pruitt's remarks for more on this.
Tom Holsinger:
The Russian solution with respect to Chechnya thus far has been pretty much indiscriminate retaliation against those believed to be insurgents or to support the goal of Chechen independence. Keep in mind that there are only about a million Chechens out there to begin with and that tens of thousands of them were killed during the events that led to the current Russian control of their country. As far as the nerve gas solution, Putin appears to support the idea of a pro-Russian government in Chechnya backed by private armies and Chechens loyal to Moscow. As long as that continues to be his ideal outcome for Chechnya, I don't see the introduction of chemical weapons there as much of a feasible outcome.
Also, as the presence of Ingush, Dagestanis, Georgians, and Azeris in the ranks of Basayev's fighters should indicate, the issue is now going far beyond Chechnya to include other Caucasus republics. Basayev and Co are a symptom of a much broader problem.
The new political geography could complicate any Russian response. For one thing, the Pankisi Gorge isn't in Russian territory but in the Republic of Georgia. Georgia is something of a US ally, has a post-post-Soviet government now that its ex-Soviet strongman is out and a populist (Mikhail Saakashvili) is in, and Georgia has hosted our special forces. Russian forces in Georgia seem to be supporting breakaway movements (and out-and-out smugglers) in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia. That crap isn't helping either the anti-AQ war or the security problems on Russia's southern border.
And the smuggling is a problem, even if jihadis aren't themselves infiltrating. Weapons of all sorts are bought, sold and moved in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestria over on the Moldovan border. If an ex-Soviet nuke gets loose that's where it might be offered for sale.
For an ex-KGB man, Putin seems to be running an awfully anarchic empire. But it would help if he had a stronger neighbor adjoining Chechnya and North Ossetia, not a disgruntled neighbor with more holes than a Gruyère cheese, most of them with Putin's fingerprint. In any event, a Russian offensive in the Pankisi Gorge would very quickly cause problems in Tblisi. And in Washington.
(BTW, I wanted to provide hyperlinks to some very interesting articles on ex-Soviet territories -- the Economist has run quite a few of late -- but they're all archived as "premium content" on their website, exclusive to print subscribers. Still, people on this site may want to consider subscribing as this mag seems a lot more comprehensive than US MSM, if a trifle skeptical. Unsolicited plug.)
Thank you very much for this summary of such a labyrinthine situation. I really think is the best one I have read until now.
Let me reciprocate somehow telling you something about the Riyadh al-Saliheen myth; it’s very interesting and it doen’t surprise me that it has come up in Thetchnia. It has become central to much of the folk narrative behind the suicide “martyr” would they say terrorist attacks, but it is older. The expression means indeed “the garden of the virtuous”, but it has a larger meaning.
On the one hand it has been used as a title for haddits (Islamic traditions attributed to prophet Mohammad) collections; the one by Imam Nawawi is a best-seller not only among jihadist sympathizers but generally appreciated by revivalists. In fact, among lots of moral and sometimes esoteric tales, it is said to include the theological justification for the suicide bombers –Islam traditionally forbad suicide- and is apparently used in the mind conditioning previous to the suicide.
The candidate to "martyr" is isolated and told that he or she not only will go automatically to the Garden of the Virtuous but will also be entitled to designate 72 friends or parents that will win acceptance into Paradise thanks to his deed. Iran’s mullahs used also this folklore to motivate their revolutionary guardians during the Iran-Iraq conflict: the shock troops were issued a plastic key to the garden of the virtuous prior to being sent into WWI style attacks against the iraqui lines.
Dan,
Excellent post! Very informative.
I blog about the possibility of a Russian incursion into the Pankisi Gorge as a result of the Breslan massacre. I have a feeling there will be a pretty significant response, because Putin's speech highlighted a lot of weaknesses, which was quite surpising, because as you know, his whole presidency is based on an image of tough, uncompromising, strength when it comes to Chechnya. And he might conclude that the only way to redeem that "credibility" is to be brutal and launch some kind of offensive. Plus, not doing anything other than reforming his security services (while important) is an invitation to more horrendous attacks like this one. So, he might have no choice but to respond.
Dan,
That's where Putin is now. Consider where Putin will be 4-5 years from now.
His current solution would probably work but for the Chechen crazies having privileged sanctuaries out of country. Tell me how Putin's current program can work given the crazies' foreign support and sanctuaries.
Mitch P. and Dan-- Thank you so much! The past four days have just been horrible, with atrocities dominating the media and only clueless generalizations for analysis. I was starting to feel that there was no one at the helm!
But that can't be true, the "Cabal" is always watching, right?
Juan: You got my attention, that was absolutely fascinating. Gratitude for sharing. The Riyadh al-Saliheen myth sounds much more like a "Ghost Dance" cult than fundamentalism-- where is John when you need him?
Dan,
What Russia has done so far in Chechnya. while brutal and rather severe, is in no way Carthaginian. I tend to agree with Tom's post above concerning the probability of a very lethal Russian reaction.
I am just unsure as to the potential level of constraint that Putin will feel from the European community. What does Russia risk by adopting a program of ethnic cleansing in Chechnya? If the question is phrased as "Whose children?" then I'm not even sure that Europe will come up with a believable display of handwringing. Breslan may mark a European turning point.
Bob Harmon:
Georgia used to have Ed Shevardnadze, who turned a blind eye to Chechen activities in Pankisi and only really started paying attention to al-Qaeda activity there after large numbers of them started arriving from Afghanistan. He got with the program for a time, but then he stopped cooperating so the US started clandestinely supporting the Georgian dissident movements in concert with George Soros of all people. Enter the Rose Revolution and Saakashvili, who is US-educated and extremely sympathetic to our concerns in region.
Russian activities in Georgia are extremely complex (for example, Basayev at one point fought with the Russians in support of Abkhazi separatism before he met up with Khattab in Nagorno-Karabakh) and seem to have initially (and currently?) been started as an attempt to rein Georgia back into the Russian sphere of influence, as I believe both Abkhazia and South Ossetia support a union with the Kremlin. The US convinced Putin to drop support for another break-away region, Ajaria, earlier this year and the region came back under the influence of the Georgian central government. Saakashvili has undertaken some sterner efforts in Pankisi, but the region is still a haven for Basayev's Chechens and their al-Qaeda allies. As you mentioned, the region is entirely awash with cheap guns and other weaponry and there don't seem to be many prospects of that improving in the near future.
Because the US clandestinely supported Shevardnadze's ouster and now supports Saakashvili, a Russian invasion of Georgia is likely to cause a lot of trouble in Washington.
LJ:
The idea of a massive Russian invasion of Georgia proper or just Pankisi is still very much on the table, I suspect. They also now have to deal with Basayev's infrastructure in Ingushetia that would have had to have existed in order for the incursion into North Ossetia to have ever occurred. As it now stands, Russian forces have sealed off North Ossetia and are launching an aggressive search for any of the hostage-takers who may have escaped (they already paraded one escapee around on Russian TV). That should be their top priority while they assess the situation, identify who the foreign backers were (I imagine that Abu Omar al-Saif is getting his checks signed by someone other than bin Laden) and make preparations to neutralize them. Keep in mind that the Russians assassinated Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, the former Chechen president and Wahhabi ideologue who convinced Mullah Omar to recognize Chechen "independence," back in 2003 after they'd linked him to the theater seige. If I were a prince in a certain Magic Kingdom, I'd be doubling my security and getting somebody else to start my car and taste my food right about now.
Tom Holsinger:
By eliminating those foreign sanctuaries, IMO. Supporting efforts in Pankisi similar to those that were achieved in Ajaria (or, if Putin's feeling cranky, invading Pankisi outright) and continuing to press other regional powers on cutting off the flow to Basayev and Co. As for Saudi Arabia, there are a number of options here that are basically the same ones that the US has. This is one of those areas where working together with the Russians against a common foe should be helpful.
Rick Ballard:
Sorry, I interpretted "Carthaginian" to mean the demonstrable destruction of the center of the opposing power in such a manner that it leaves no doubt as far as who is in charge. Other than sowing salt in the ruins of Grozny, the Russians have pretty much done that. Ethnic cleansing is one possibility, but like I said I don't think Putin is too likely to exercise that option because right now his main supporters in Chechnya are independent militias and local security forces loyal to Moscow, all of them composed of Chechens.
I'd be very surprised if the combined membership in those groups I listed above ever topped 10,000 (plus their immediate families, if we're looking at the potential for more Riyadus Salikhin members). Those are the people that Russia needs to pull their intel and professionalize their forces in order to eliminate, along with their foreign backers living abroad. I don't think that a Hama-style response is too likely to change that.
As for a European reaction, if European elites focused on Russian treatment of Chechens with half of the ferocity and self-righteous outrage they do Israeli treatment of the Palestinians I very much doubt anti-Zionism would be half as acceptable as it is these days in European intellectual circles. The Europeans already have their eyes half closed on Chechnya and I doubt Russian ethnic cleansing of the region would do much to change that.
I have a vague recollection that the Pankisi Gore had been cleaned out; did I imagine this, or are the bad guys back?
Dan,
Thanks for your replies, you certainly appear to have a good handle on the intricacies involved. Is there any possiblity that Putin and Saakashvili might decide that a joint game of "cowboys and jihadis" was in order? Has Georgia ever mounted any military action at all wrt the Pankisi Gorge?
There are periodic reports that it's being or been cleaned out, but most of these (at least under Shevardnadze) were at best window-dressing to help secure US aid. Saakashvili has started cracking down on known arms depots and weapons caches, but he hasn't done much in the way of substance as far as the Russians are concerned.
I should also mention that Basayev's thugs coexist with the larger Chechen population in Pankisi and that separating the two out is by no means easy.
An increase in Russian-Georgian cooperation is likely something that the US would welcome but the problem is that such cooperation is precluded by the issue of the Russian-sponsored separatist enclaves in Georgia like Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We got a settlement on Ajaria that was okay for all parties, but unless we can duplicate that success I wouldn't see much in the way of improvement in bilateral relations.
In actual fact, even after the Russians got kicked out of Chechnya in the first war they never relinquished their claims and they prevented international recognition or any aid from going in.
Chechnya was devastated, its government was incapable of controlling the country, and it descended into chaos. It was nobody's fault but the Russians'.
For a more realistic appraisal of who started the second Chechen war and Al Qaeda's minimal involvement, see Slate
Mike:
A couple of points here.
My reference to the Russians attempting to surrender refers to the Russian decision after the first war to grant Chechnya de facto independence with the very real possibility of it becoming de jure further down the line. Russian troops only returned to Chechnya after Khattab invaded Dagestan in 1999.
As far as this:
In actual fact, even after the Russians got kicked out of Chechnya in the first war they never relinquished their claims and they prevented international recognition or any aid from going in.
Chechnya was devastated, its government was incapable of controlling the country, and it descended into chaos. It was nobody's fault but the Russians'."
I believe I said at the very beginning:
"This should in no way be seen as an endorsement of Russian policies in Chechnya, which have been worse than brutal - they're simply ineffective."
On the substantive points raised in the piece you cite from Slate:
"So, what does al-Qaida and international Islamic terrorism have to do with any of this? Probably very little."
I would point out that CNN, Time Magazine, Time yet again, the UK Guardian, and the Washington Post all disagree on this one. More to the point, the Slate article doesn't even bother to refute any of the claims regarding people like Abu Omar al-Saif, it just pretends they don't exist.
"Chechens have plenty of reason to do what they do without outside inspiration. In addition, their tactics are very different from al-Qaida's."
Not really, hostage-taking was described in detail in an issue of al-Battar. I've even seen a videotape from Afghanistan showing training on how to hold a school hostage.
"Osama Bin Laden's group generally aims for maximum casualties;"
Not in Saudi Arabia they don't and the same goes with Pakistan. And don't 300+ civilians count as maximum casualties?
"the Chechens, at least when they have staged hostage-takings, have not seemed to have that goal."
Not if they get what they want. Bin Laden offered to call off attacks in Europe too, if they would get off his back for awhile.
"the Chechens, on the other hand, explicitly exclude Westerners from their list of targets;"
Eh? They sure as hell didn't when they took that Moscow theater hostage and Arbi Barayev was paid by al-Qaeda specifically for the purpose of killing Westerners.
"they target Russians and Russia-sympathizers."
Which, in their warped worldview, is everybody who doesn't support them.
"Finally, the Chechens' demands, when they have made them, have always focused on the war in Chechnya to the exclusion of any religious or international agenda. They have consistently demanded a the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya—an unattainable goal in the current Russian political climate, but one that may look plausible to the Chechens because it worked after Budyonnovsk."
See the Amir Ramzan quote above. Their agenda goes way beyond just Chechnya.
"Russian intelligence has produced little or no evidence that al-Qaida is present in Chechnya."
US, UK, France, and Australia all beg to differ on that score, but what the hell do they know?
"Russian officials claimed that there were Arabs among the hostage-takers, but this information has yet to be confirmed, and even if it is, it may mean only that foreign men have come to fight on the side of Chechens—something that has happened before and something that happens in every conflict, whether or not a major international organization is involved."
Yeah, that's why Khattab was running a freakin' Arab brigade or why Abu Omar al-Saif is Basayev's sugardaddy ...
"On the other hand, it would be surprising if al Qaida had no presence in Chechnya at all. Chechens are Muslims, and they are at war; representatives of virtually every Islamic organization have at one point or another sent missionaries and recruiters to the region."
I very much doubt they've all hosted the same training and exchange programs, however ...
"They have also sent money. Researchers of al-Qaida say that, in addition to its own organization, the terrorist network has a number of loose affiliates, essentially freelancers, who get occasional financial support. Most likely, some Chechen groups or individuals fall into that category."
You can split hairs as much as you like on this stuff, but let me reproduce a quote from Abu Omar al-Saif via MEMRI:
"Similarly, I recommend to the Mujahideen that instead of engaging in clashes and warfare against the Saudi government, it is better to go to Iraq. There, there are weapons aplenty and there they can fight the Americans. It is no secret that great damage will be caused the Americans if the Mujahideen turn to Iraq to fight them.
"As for the clashes in Saudi Arabia, there is no doubt that they gladden the Americans. It gladdens them that the Mujahideen are killed by the Saudi government. I recommend to the youth to act according to their interests and to turn to Iraq instead of dealing with confronting the Saudi government."
Like I said, split as many hairs between Basayev and al-Qaeda as you desire.
Thanks for the information, Dan.
Do you really think that it's possible that Putin would order the FSB (or the Russian agency that conducts foreign ops) to strike at various Saudi princes or Wahhabi clerics? Not that I would oppose such a move, but it seems as if that would create more problems than it would be worth.
Destroying the Pankisi and Ingushetian terrorist infrastructure seems to be the most important issue at hand. And another regarding the Pankisi, since it's part of Georgia itself, I can't imagine Saakashvili will take that laying down. Although, it appears doubtful that the Georgian military would pose any challenge to the Russian army. Or maybe Putin will say if Saakashvili tries to intervene, he'll march his army all the way down to Tbilisi. The close relationship between Washington and Tbilisi throws a wrench into this, of course. I think because of that, Putin will not go anywhere south of the Pankisi unless something else dire happens.
Mitch.P, very good points, all this is rarely mentioned anymore. You see, in Russia itself, there's a widespread opinion (ranging from suspicion to outright paranoia) that behind this explosion of separatism and terrorism stands not just Saudi Arabia as a money donor, but the West itself -- who's out to finish the job begun by the collapse of the USSR and destroy the country by fair means or foul. This conspiracy theory is not totally incomprehensible if one considers a few things, some of which you mention yourself.
First, militant Islamism (terrorism included) is in fact, or at least perceived as, a western creation constructed as a Western proxy in the 80s for use in the war in Afghanistan -- financed by the Saudis (formally; with oil money of course, but this money comes from the West, and besides, SA has been always the West's ally: as has Pakistan, btw, which had its role in the Afghan events too) with the US official and unofficial blessing, CIA help, British SAS tactics training and so on; don't forget Stingers, supplied to the mojaheddin by the US too -- they made a huge difference in the war power-balance by dramatically diminishing the efficacy of the Soviet air power, unchallenged before that. ObL and friends whom we are fighting now were there during all these years, "learning the ropes", so to say.
Second, Western (or at least, Anglo-Saxon) engagement with the Moslem world goes even further back in time, to the beginning of the 20th century at least, and definitely to WWI in the Middle East and the Ottoman Empire, when Arabs were basically bribed by the British to hit the Turks in the ass. The current layout of the Arab Middle East is a post-WWI British (and in a smaller degree, French) creation.
In other words, there's a perceivable long-term pattern of the Western (mainly Anglo-Saxon) use of Islam as a proxy in geopolitical struggle. Of course, Afghanistan, as well as the Caucasus, and Turkestan (Central Asian states) are, geographically, the heart of the old Russo-British imperialist conflict in Asia (a.k.a. The Great Game.)
I remember, relatively recently Zbignew Brzezinski (sp?) was interviewed on the radio, and someone raised this question with him, pointing out that the current "War on Terror" is really an offshoot of the fundamentally West-vs-Soviets Afghan war of the 80s. Someone asked him, was perhaps the WTC bombing and all that came afterwards -- the invasion of Afghanistan, Irak, etc -- too heavy a price to pay for the success there (against the Soviets in the 80s, that is)? No, said Zbig, this little donnybrook in Afghanistan (the recent one, in 2002) and the rest is nothing compared to the success against the Soviets in the 80s.
Russians are very receptive to this kind of things and, remembering their history, are suspicious that the West actually continues "The Eternal War on Russia" by using this Islamic militancy; and that the Chechen (at the moment) terrorism -- along with the developments in Georgia, which borders on Chechnya; and don't forget the new US bases in the formerly Soviet republics in Central Asia, Uzbekistan, and so on; and add in here the fact that the UK offered political asylum to Ahmad Zakaev (and Berezovsky, btw, who's a wanted man in Russia); plus Chechen rebel emissaries, received by the US officials -- is actually sponsored by the West seeking to excise the Caucasus, Georgia, and whatever possible of Central Asia from the Russian "zone of influence", as they call it, or at least penetrate this region significantly. They see their decade-old problem of Chechen terrorism as a manifestation of a much larger geopolitical threat to their country.
LJ:
They assassinated Yandarbiyev in the middle of Qatar, so I wouldn't put it past them. It all depends on just how angry Putin is and how much he's willing to risk escalating the conflict.
Saakashvili doesn't control Pankisi except as a measure of diplomatic myth, a la the idea that Somalia is some kind of a real country with the actual machinery of government. He couldn't stop a Russian push into Georgia, but it would almost certainly mean war between Georgia and Russia. Another problem is that a Russian invasion and likely conquest of Georgia would almost certainly mean importing the problems inherent to the lack of professionalism within the Russian military that we've seen in Chechnya into Georgia.
All the same, I don't think we can rule out a Russian invasion or punitive strikes against Georgia in the near future.
Can we correct Breslan to Beslan so people will stop parrotting it over the blogosphere? Even news outlets are starting to call it Breslan.
Breslan is in Germany.
Beslan is in N. Ossetia.
Where is that decaf Gary was offered?
Duly noted, Joel.
Dan,
As long as people are entertaining military fantasies here, any chance of our special forces and forward air controller guys participating in an OEF style sweep through Pankisi led by the Russians? Air support could come from our bases in Central Asia. Our presence could be a guarantee to Georgia that the Russians would stop before Tbilisi, and leave once the place was cleaned out.
Per mitch p. and Checkin Out, we could pitch it as helping to clean up a mess we helped create.
Well, it's a thought, maybe not a good one, but if your analysis holds (and it looks solid from here) then their fight is basically our fight, too.
Latest reports suggest the death toll will top 500. With ~350 already confirmed, and ~200 still "missing", I rather doubt they just decided to run away from home all at once.
With this being a deliberate attempt to target children, I don't think many realize it yet, but the response to this attack has the potential to put the 9/11 response in the shade.
For the record, I wasn't suggesting that Putin will put Russian soldiers at risk in the PankisiValley.
...and while I'm here, I'd point out that any implicit belief that the school attack ends this series of terrorism against Russia has zero corroborating support.
Where does this fit in with Al Qaeda's grand agenda?
Are their objectives met?
In Russia?
Globally?
Heads up.
jeffers,
You're right on all accounts.
Islamism is like any of the other terror mongering isms we've faced. They act towards the creation of their brand of Utopia. Until that is accomplished, their objectives are not met.
Russia should understand Islamism quite well. They are not far removed from their own "ism".
Yet, I wonder if living under communism has made them blind to the destructive force of another dangerous ism. Or is it simply that becoming Russia again has made people feel that the culpability of the Soviet Union no longer belongs to them?
Color me curious.
Anyone reads Russian here? Here's a Russian article entitled "The W