Looking back at Barnett's map, I think he would now say he screwed up. I think the flaw here is that he was looking exclusively at US interventions, and therefore put Chechnya and all of Georgia in the newly integrating Core along with Russia. I suppose you could say that Chechnya is Russia, but Barnett also seems to want to pronounce sovereignty effectively dead anyway so Chechnya and Ingushetia and Dagestan and North Ossetia really ought to be in the Gap.

There's a good argument to be made that the Caucasus entered the Gap when the Chechens and other groups challenged Russian political control at the dissolution of the Soviet Union. That inherently disconnected the Chechens and related groups from the global systems that the Soviets, and current Russians, belonged to.

The issue here, I think, is whether the underlying motives in Chechaya are primarily nationalistic, ethnic or cultural/religious. If the former, bringing them out of the Gap is manageable. If either of the latter two, it's not at all clear they want to be brought out. "They" being those pushing for autonomy.

Isn't it clear that the underlying motives are different for different actors in Chechnya? I think it's hard to generalize because the different elements view the conflict differently.

Chechnya has moved firmly into the 'no good solutions' catagory. Russia can no longer walk away (angry terrorist nation on its border), nor get Chechnya at arms length (angry terrorist nation within its borders), nor seek international help (angry terrorist nation being sheltered by Belgian peacekeepers).

Personally i'm shocked Russia hasnt responded with overwhelming violence. I dont advocate it, but it works. A tactical nuclear weapon detonating over a Chechnyan town would get the terrorists attention. This is another problem the WOT is causing us, the nuclear taboo is weakening. People should keep that in mind when discussing Iran's ambitions. MAD is dead, and in fact it never was foolproof. It happened to work, but it didnt have to. Russia isnt going to abandon Chechnya, and it isnt going to send thousands of troops in again. There is one solution left to them and that should be recognized for the danger it poses.

#29179 I think you're right, praktike.

Lewy 14, good piece. You said:
"If the US is serious about its analysis and purpose in this war, therefore, we owe the Caucasus a hand to pull them up out of the Gap... and we owe Russia a hand in their fight against the Islamists."

Aren't you overlooking that the US could not possibly offer the Caucasus a hand without hurting Russia in its assertion of the region insofar it is within its borders? I mean, support for Georgia (which in fact is being given by the US) will show to Russia's republics like Ingusetia and Chechnya that there is life after separation from Russia. I think what is most important now, is to put any and every aspiration of independence on hold, where it pertains regions that are in the Gap or within 'seam states'. Look for example to Morocco and the Western Sahara. It seems clear to me that the US is in favor of giving Morocco rule (where it already has de facto rule) over Western Sahara. What you don't want to do in this war, is fix one country, but set up new failed states as you go along. As such, the US should fully support Russia in its efforts to pacify its own republics, and tread carefully where dealing with the border countries in the Caucasus.

I still believe that the greatest contribution Russia can make in the War on Islamic Terror, is pressure on Iran, and a full stop to its nuclear ambitions. For which, we should do whatever Putin wants us to do (Show them respect and close down Chechen operations in the West.)

No matter what Russina policy is or was, the people, lots and lots of CHILDREN did not deserve this. This is the same blame America first attitude that people use when they say we deserved 9/11. There is NEVER a legitimate reason to attack a school, NEVER EVER and to suggest otherwise is to give moral equivalence to terrortists.

Isn't it clear that the underlying motives are different for different actors in Chechnya? I think it's hard to generalize because the different elements view the conflict differently.

Precisely. But this fact makes it virtually impossible to find common ground on which to resolve the conflict there.

Lewy14's statement that the US should help the Chechens leave the Gap, while well-intentioned, misses one of the key ideas in Barnett's analysis. I don't agree with all of Barnett's conclusions, but his argument does hinge on systems thinking. He realizes that globalization is proceeding along multiple dimensions at once, at differing paces. What ties those dimensions together is their association with liberal democracy and economies fundamentally organized around private capital.

I recently caught most of a televised lecture Barnett gave, in which he ties this theme directly to the animus of Islamacism. When Marx's ideas failed to take root in Germany, Barnett said, they moved to a less-well-developed country (Russia). Now that communism has collapsed in Russia and its satellites, the attempt to fend off democracy and private capital has retreated to an even less-well-developed environment, the tribal and pre-industrial societies, many of whom are Islamic.

A Pakistani scholar challenged Barnett, saying that it was somehow biased to have most of the Islamic countries appear in the Gap. But as Barnett pointed out in reponse, it is precisely and primarily in those countries that a sustained effort is underway to return to a 7th century mindset and way of life.

And, as Barnett notes, a key conflict point is the legal, cultural and economic p[ower of women, which liberal democracy and private capital promote and which Islamacism is bent on keeping in check. For the moment, Islamacists are channelling some female aspirations into terrorism. A decade or two from now, some of those women may chafe at continuing to be under male domination within their own societies.

V-Man,

Tim Oren raised an interesting point yesterday, and it was in the context of The Pentagon's New Map. An excerpt...

"For example, If one believes that having a ME 'Switzerland' as an object model is useful, Kurdistan recommends itself. With an American defensive shield, it's viable, regardless of the heartburn for the Turks. A systematic doctrine of dismantling terror-harboring countries along ethnic lines, often separating natural resources from trouble makers, could be both a credible threat and a real way of 'diversifying' the mix in the ME. I'm not suggesting this as preferred policy, but as a credible Plan B to what we seem to be doing now. And in this one, Iraq is the bellwether."

No help in Chechnya, alas, but perhaps useful elsewhere (Umm, Saudi Arabia, anyone?). I'm not sure a doctrine that puts all nationalist movements on hold indefinitely is necessarily a good idea. Not only because it removes our freedom to adopt a Plan B like Tim's, but also because it will create strong negative blowback if maintained for a long period of time.

But since Kurdistan isn't Arab, will it have the desired effect?

I think Egypt is the best chance.

Beslan shocked me more than anything to date. Perhaps even more than 9/11. The inhumanity of it made me come to the conclusion that the terrorists don't want Chechnya. They don't want Dagestan. They simply want war.

Longer explanation here: http://lounge.pri.ee/mt/archives/000715.html

Robin Burk:

The issue here, I think, is whether the underlying motives in Chechaya are primarily nationalistic, ethnic or cultural/religious.

Or personal ambition. But does it really make a difference if the exponents themselves don't distinguish among these motives?

If the US is serious about its analysis and purpose in this war, therefore, we owe the Caucasus a hand to pull them up out of the Gap... and we owe Russia a hand in their fight against the Islamists.

Given the clusterf-ck that is America's policy regarding Israel and the PLO, what possible reason would Russia have to trust us to make the situation better?

The Sudan.

Iran and Saudi Arabia are threats - but dealing with their neighbor means that (eventually) people will start voting with their feet. Iran would have been a much tougher nut to crack, and Saudi Arabia would also have been irritating.

So... you don't attack Egypt. They're not exactly first class supporters of the WoT, but they are reasonably stable, so they could use some decent neighbors, something other than Israel to obsess over, and an outlet for dissidents.

Sudan is better situated geographically. The only question I have is... how much do the French oppose this? (How many more years am I going to hear about 'No War for Oil'?)

Check the map: everything south of Russia's border there is in the Gap, to include Georgia.

No, I didn't include wannabe breakaways along Russia's seam for a point: I think letting them go only opens the Pandora's box for Russia, a point Putin is trying desperately to make now with Western "allies."

If the US is serious about its analysis and purpose in this war, therefore, we owe the Caucasus a hand to pull them up out of the Gap... and we owe Russia a hand in their fight against the Islamists.

Owe? From whence does this debt arise?

Personally i'm shocked Russia hasnt responded with overwhelming violence. I dont advocate it, but it works.

They've killed around 80,000 Chechyns out of a population of perhaps a million or so.

Mark Bruehner,

A tactical nuclear weapon detonating over a Chechnyan town would get the terrorists attention.

The notion of proportionality in warfare is an important consideration (though not the only one); is nuking a Chechnyan town a proportional response? Is Russia willing to deal with all the consequences of such an attack - including considerations like the drift of radioactive materials into states which border Russia (not to mention Russia's own population outside of Chechnya)? How would such an attack differ in motive, design or outcome from what happened in Beslan - meaning here the loss of innocents, including children? Now maybe nuking Chechnya is a good idea, but it appears that detailing the consequences is an important consideration of such a decision.

dr. dna,

Anyone even remotely familiar with the history of warfare would not be shocked by what happened at Beslan. In WWII US firebombing killed on occassion at least 100,000 Japanese a day, the Japanese slaughtered hundreds of thousands (perhaps millions) in Manchuria, the Germans enslaved several hundred thousand Frenchmen and took them to work in factories in Germany, etc. To quote Sherman, "War is cruelty. You cannot refine it."

Mark, do you really want the nuclear superpowers threatening non-nuclear groups with the big ones? Because, you see, next up they will threaten each other. Today Chechenistan, tomorrow Kashmir. After that, the world enters the Age of Cockroaches, which I understand are quite hardy.

Did anyone else note that not a single identified Beslan terrorist, so far, is a foreign Arab?

Thanks all very much for the comments, sorry I wasn’t able to check in earlier.

V-Man,

It depends on what I meant by “give the Caucuses a hand up out of the Gap”. Giving the Caucuses a hand doesn’t mean enabling violent secessionists, more like promoting civil society and economic development, the kind of stuff Soros used to do (still does?). It doesn’t hurt Russia to help the Caucuses out of the Gap, it helps them.

Stuart,

You’re right, and it was not my intent to advocate any sort of moral equivalence. Perhaps my metaphor is inadequate in this respect: cancer cells do not make moral choices for which they are ultimately accountable, but terrorists do.

Robin,

I’m not sure from your comment what part of Barnett’s analysis I’m missing. To my mind, aid in the evolution toward “liberal democracy and economies fundamentally organized around private capital” is a key component of giving the Caucuses a hand up out of the Gap. Cultural barriers do not necessarily entail large scale violence – liberal philosophy and local culture have to co-evolve to some degree (witness what is happening in India).

Colt,

Not that I’d necessarily dispute your colorful evaluation of America’s stance toward Israeli and the PLO, but you’ll have to expand before I understand what you’re getting at here.

Thomas P.M. Barnett,

I don’t think anybody would dispute that suddenly granting Chechnya “independence” would help the situation. Ultimately the characterstics which you attribute to the Core (a rich interconnection of social and economic ties with the rest of the world) constitute the only genuine bulwark against terror - true?

The point that I and others here are trying to make is that the conditions which you attribute to countries which constitute the Gap apply equally well to Chechnya, and the continuation of Russian sovereignty in the manner to which it has become accustomed will not drive the necessary wedge between the Chechens and the Islamists. Driving this wedge is a necessary precondition to success here, and improving the “Gap-like” conditions of the Chechens is a necessary precondition to driving this wedge.

AJL:

Please don't think I'm being snipey here but how does the link that you cite confirm your point?

Here's what I think is the relevant part of the link:

Lavrov also said Russian officials' statements that there were Arabs among the attackers had been confirmed. So far, officials have not provided evidence publicly to support claims that about 10 of the hostage-takers were Arabs.

``The information that there were Arabs has been confirmed, as has been information that there were representatives of other nationalities, among them, as I understand, Russians, a Ukrainian, Chechens, Ingush,'' he told Al-Jazeera.

Regional security officials told The Associated Press on Thursday that 10 of the roughly 30 militants who seized the school had been identified, and that six were from Ingushetia, a region sandwiched between North Ossetia and Chechnya.

The other six were from Chechnya, the officials said.

1. The source confirms that some of terrorists were definitely Arabs which would appear to negate your point.

2. You find it surprising that Russians have only been able to confirm the identities of nationals of the Russian Federation in a week?

The US needs to adopt a hands off policy for the Caucuses. If any nukes are to be dropped, they should be dropped on Iran's nuclear fuel processing facilities.

lewy14:

Not that I’d necessarily dispute your colorful evaluation of America’s stance toward Israeli and the PLO, but you’ll have to expand before I understand what you’re getting at here.

The Caucasus are part of Russia's sphere of influence. They're already irritated at NATO attempts to get more involved there. If by:

we owe the Caucasus a hand to pull them up out of the Gap... and we owe Russia a hand in their fight against the Islamists.

you mean really get stuck in politically (sending cash, arms, expertise, etc), the only real benchmark for American ability in that regard is the situation in Israel. And that's been a resounding success...

Though without knowing exactly what you mean by giving the Caucasus a hand up, its difficult to really comment :-)

"Mark, do you really want the nuclear superpowers threatening non-nuclear groups with the big ones? Because, you see, next up they will threaten each other."

Go reread my post. I didnt advocate anything. I stated it was a destinct option for the Russians. They dont need me to tell them that.

My full analysis is that the reason we need to proactively win this war is to prevent just such a thing. Sure, maybe we can baton down the hatches in America and Europe and not get hit for a while, but when an attack does go through at the horror levels of Beslan or worse, we might not need the Islamacists to break the nuclear threshold. If a bunch of Fallujans gutted 200 American school kids, you might be surprised by what even a John Kerry would be compelled to do in response. Blood now or blood later.

I think we need to recall that in Vietnam, the Viet Cong routinely committed atrocities against children, women, and men in villages they were coercing to cooperate with them, or to punish cooperation with the U.S. military.

At the time, the United States media tended to downplay this aspect of the behavior of communists, and to point out whenever they DID concede that it occurred, that the communists were no danger to the U.S. Why did WE have the right to be there interfering. Besides, they said, U.S. troops were the REAL BUTCHERS (Hey, Vetnam veterans against the war have testified under OATH before CONGRESS, so it has to be TRUE!!!!)

Colt,

Agreed, the Russians are already suspicious of our motives in Chechnya and Georgia. Military and intelligence cooperation with Russia could make their counter terrorism operations more effective and less brutal, as well as demonstrating that we are on "their side", and that we have an understanding of who the enemny is.

As for lifting Chechnya out of its Gap-like circumstances, the first job would be to articulate to the Russians why that would be a good idea.

Conrad:

The US needs to adopt a hands off policy for the Caucuses. If any nukes are to be dropped, they should be dropped on Iran's nuclear fuel processing facilities.

First, that ship has sailed. We're already pretty involved in the Caucasus (Georgia). I think we need to be providing whatever encouragement and resources are necessary for the Georgians to close down whatever terrorist facilities are in their own country as a first step. We need to tread carefully in the area because the Russians are sensitive about it.

But I can't get behind a hands-off policy that gives the Russians a free hand to roll over the entire Caucasus. And that's pretty much the mood they're in now.

Mark Buehner (#29184)
>Personally i'm shocked Russia hasnt responded with
>overwhelming violence. I dont advocate it, but it works.
>A tactical nuclear weapon detonating over a Chechnyan
>town would get the terrorists attention.
What purpose would that serve? Chechnya, officially, is Russian territory. Moreover, they've already been responding with overwhelming violence since at least 1999 (short of going nuclear, of course.) Chechnya is not a territory run by terrorists, how would a nuke "get their attention"? They'd only rejoice, I suppose, and go on clamouring about Russian brutality. What is more likely, I suspect, is that will now send kgb assassination teams (like they did in Qatar) to London and the US and take care of the likes of Zakayev, Berezavsky, and Akhmadov. Otoh that'll be a confrontation with the UK and US, so who knows...

Gary Gunnels (#29207)
>>If the US is serious about its analysis and purpose in
>>this war, therefore, we owe the Caucasus a hand to pull
>>them up out of the Gap... and we owe Russia a hand in
>>their fight against the Islamists.
>Owe? From whence does this debt arise?
Maybe because this islamism is in a very significant degree of our own manufacture (in the 80s)? And in the same area, btw.

Conrad:
>The US needs to adopt a hands off policy for the
>Caucasus.
Doesn't seem like that's the plan though (Georgia, Central Asia, etc.) I wonder what Brzesinski would say here :-) ...

>If any nukes are to be dropped, they should be dropped
>on Iran's nuclear fuel processing facilities.
...that are being built for them by the Russians. :-) One thing I can't figure out, quite honestly: why do the Russians help Iran with nukes?

One thing I can't figure out, quite honestly: why do the Russians help Iran with nukes?

Money.

Regional security officials told The Associated Press on Thursday that 10 of the roughly 30 militants who seized the school had been identified, and that six were from Ingushetia, a region sandwiched between North Ossetia and Chechnya.
 
The other six were from Chechnya, the officials said.

No I don't know how six plus six is ten and I suspect the article is being updated on the fly.

lewy14:

Military and intelligence cooperation with Russia could make their counter terrorism operations more effective and less brutal, as well as demonstrating that we are on "their side", and that we have an understanding of who the enemny is.

To really lift the region out of the Gap, we can't really be on Putin's side - and Putin knows it. Georgia and Russia were on the verge of war a few weeks ago, to name just one example.

Colt:

To really lift the region out of the Gap, we can't really be on Putin's side - and Putin knows it. Georgia and Russia were on the verge of war a few weeks ago, to name just one example.

Putin's side is whatever keeps him in power. And anything which improves the security of the Russian Federation is likely to do that. I'd say the U. S., Georgia, and Russia working together is more likely to reduce the threat of terrorism to Russia than Russia riding roughshod over the whole shebang.

Dave Schuler:

I'd say the U. S., Georgia, and Russia working together is more likely to reduce the threat of terrorism to Russia than Russia riding roughshod over the whole shebang.

Me too. Putin wouldn't. He's going to look at Lewy14's suggestion and think, why would I want to make my enemies and rivals stronger?

Gary: I didn't mean the death toll, or the fact that civilians got killed. I meant the fact that they deliberately targeted a school and killed CHILDREN in cold blood. Not even just planting a bomb, but killing them at point blank range.

I don't believe I'm unique or especially naive in being shocked at this. We've all seen alot of death and depravity in the last few years, but Beslan went beyond anything I've seen yet.

And that's exactly what I think they were hoping for.

dr.dna:

Not even just planting a bomb, but killing them at point blank range.

Google "Ma'alot", or "Dahlan school buses", or "Tali Hatuel", or...

The scale maybe new, but the willingness is not. The P.L.O. has been doing it for decades.

Colt,
>To really lift the region out of the Gap, we can't
>really be on Putin's side - and Putin knows it.
Why?

>Georgia and Russia were on the verge of war a few weeks
>ago, to name just one example.
But that's only because of the US support of Georgia. Otherwise they'd be less truculent.

Checkin Out:

Putin wants to be the strongest dog in the park. I can't see him getting on board any plan that threatens that.

To really lift the region out of the Gap, we can't really be on Putin's side - and Putin knows it.

By this I mean we won't be serving what Putin considers to be his interests.

Colt,

Me too. Putin wouldn't. He's going to look at Lewy14's suggestion and think, why would I want to make my enemies and rivals stronger?

I'd tell Putin that strong rivals are better than weak enemies. See, e.g., our situation with China vs our situation with North Korea. Russia's been working on destabilizing Georgia by setting up little breakaway enclaves and undermining the central government. This is nuts and the US is right to oppose it.

Maybe he'd listen, maybe he won't. But I'd maintain that we have a good case.

lewy14:

Don't misunderstand, I like your idea - especially given the alternatives. I just don't think Putin would ever buy it.

I'd tell Putin that strong rivals are better than weak enemies.

A strong rival this decade can easily be a strong enemy the next one. See, e.g., our situation with China... :-)

Colt, don't worry, I know where you're coming from. I'm interested in what a solution would look like, and how it might be sold. I agree it's a tough sell at best.

And while strong rivals can indeed turn hostile, it's is the web of interconnections between the nations of the core which provides the collective security against belligerence, not the relative weakness of rivals. Well, at least in part...

To my mind, aid in the evolution toward “liberal democracy and economies fundamentally organized around private capital” is a key component of giving the Caucuses a hand up out of the Gap.

Levy14, you assume that the Caucuses both want and can accept a "hand out of the Gap". That, to me, is the real question here.

The growth of a global system of economic, cultural and demographic interchange does not come cost-free to any of the participants, even if it brings great benefits over time. The costs are most immediate, in the short run, to those cultures and groups who are farthest from organically evolving natural connections to that system.

The tribal and ethnic groups in the Caucusus historically have rooted their identities in a rejection of outsiders, to a degree and in a manner that is very foreign to Americans. With the rise of Islamacism , that rejection is deepened. This makes it very difficult to give these cultures and groups a hand out of the Gap (even assuming the practical difficulties were soluble) -- for the very process of accepting such a hand would be and is painfully at odds with their deepest traditions, in very real ways. The impact of that pain is likely to outweigh any putative future benefits for many there, at least until such time as there is a homegrown sense that it is time to embrace the wider world, even at the cost of some opening of the hitherto closed ethnic and religious identities that have been a source of pride and unity in the past.

I speak as someone whose family roots are, on one side of my lineage, from that general part of the world.

I agree with Barnett's comments here re: the Pandora's box that this region threatens to become if the Caucusus are allowed to crumble into the Gap. I say 'crumble', which suggests they are not there yet (despite my assertions about cultural identity above) because one thing that Moscow has done for several centuries is to keep sufficient hooks in the area to tie it to the wider world, albeit in tenuous and sometimes brutal ways. Part of the animus behind the Chechen push for independence is that they already ARE somewhat modernized, to their great discomfort. If they lived in the true tribal past, they would ignore and/or exploit central govenment from Moscow in whatever ways they chose, staying sufficiently under the threat horizon to avoid provoking massive retaliation.

But the mountains no longer can hide them totally and they no longer have an insular world to retreat into. Some would like to recreate one, however, which leads (among other things) to Beslan.

Regarding the debate over the presence of Arabs among the hostage-takers, it should be noted that numerous Arab countries such as Jordan and Syria possess not-insignificant Chechen populations who settled there to escape Stalin's mass deportations and inter-mixed with the locals. Russians also likely want to keep the identities of the attackers murky in order to calm down Christian-Muslim tensions between North Ossetia and Ingushetia, which is certainly understandable under the circumstances.

That still doesn't refute Russian claims that Abu Omar al-Saif bankrolled what happened in Beslan, which is far more damning than the ethnicities of the attackers if we're talking about an international connection to the attacks. OTOH, if you want to argue that Basayev isn't tied to al-Qaeda, my advice would be to take it up with French intelligence, which have a lot more damning stuff on al-Qaeda activity in Chechnya than anything I've seen publicly stated by senior US officials.

Robin,

I agree with Barnett's comments here re: the Pandora's box that this region threatens to become if the Caucusus are allowed to crumble into the Gap.

Question: Doesn't Beslan essentially indicate that it is already too late? That Pandora's box is opening as we speak?

Clearly "Gap vs Core" is not an either/or proposition; nations and regions vary in their degree of connectedness with the wider world.

But it would seem to me that a good operating definition of "Gap" would be those regions not sufficiently connected to be able to resist radical Islamist forces taking root, and growing strong enough to perpretrate mass terror. (By that metric Indonesia is already slipping away).

I'm definitely informed by your description of the insular culture of the Caucuses. But my reading of your description is that they are on the edge - a metastable condition which will eventually resolve one way or the other.

If we're serious about a transition to the "Core" being a necessary condition for peaceful co-existence, we'd better start thinking hard about how we're going to accomplish this. Nominal Russian sovereignty over the region does not appear to provide sufficient interconnection or to strength prevent the "crumbling" from continuing. The level of brute force which "plan B" would entail is unattractive on many levels.

"Personally i'm shocked Russia hasnt responded with overwhelming violence. I dont advocate it, but it works."

"They've killed around 80,000 Chechyns out of a population of perhaps a million or so. "

I hadn't been keeping up with that. Is this true?

Let's look at that carefully. The russians have already killed 8% of the chechyns?

I can see how chechyns would be feeling pretty vengeful. Two out of twenty five. Umm.

And now they're going to kill enough Chechyns to intimidate them. If 1 out of 12 doesn't do it, what would? 25%? 50%?

That one statistic makes it clear this is a real nasty situation we're getting involved in.

Some claim that 9/11 was an attempt by Al Qaeda to provoke a clash of civilizations. But does that really make sense? If you wanted to provoke a clash of civilizations, wouldn't you attack somebody who is likely to respond indiscriminately? Wouldn't you attack Russia instead of America? I'd have to say yes.

I wonder if Beslan marks a change in strategy for Al Qaeda. I would look for more attacks in Russia.

IF it is in our power to help countries and societies out of the Gap, it surely is in our interests to do so.

The big questions are IMO:

1) Is that in our power? How can we do so?

2) Do they WANT to come out of the Gap?

3) If significant proportions of those countries do not want to come out, and are willing to violently resist doing so, what must be done to end that resistance so that others who are scared, but perhaps willing to risk such a transition, can do so?

These are not small obstacles to address. I'm not saying we shouldn't try -- we need to do so for our own wellbeing in the future. But we need to be very clear-eyed, I think, about what's involved and about the likelihood we may fail.

For instance, set aside questions #2 and 3, and consider the complexity of bringing pre-industrial societies, many with few natural resources, directly into a post-industrial global economy. What industries, what economic bases can be created there? How can the workforce -- many of them illiterate or with little basis in science, math or languages -- be educated and trained to productively contribute to such industries?

Barnett has pointed to the pressures which will cause massive immigration, in part because of just this issue. How will these immigrants be integrated into their new countries? Will they be WILLING to adopt mindsets, education, political and other practices that make western democracies work?

Tough questions. Made tougher when you read the sermons of Salaafist leaders who have deliberately been encouraging Muslim women to have massively huge families (10-15 children) in order to overwhelm non-Mulsim societies with immigrants.

Now add in the violence-based resistance to any such cultural, economic and political changes. My own sober assessment is that without military intervention as ONE pillar of our strategy, the Gap will continue to erode away at the global network.

What we also need are follow-on strategies that address the other dimensions of the issue.

"They've killed around 80,000 Chechyns out of a population of perhaps a million or so. "

That's just this time around. In 1943 Stalin had the entire Chechen population transported to Kazakhstan for collaboration with the Germans. 25% of all Chechens died in this "Trail of Tears".

Must being a fundamentalist Muslim entail inflicting all of your religious beliefs on others in a manner that makes it incompatible with American style democracy? I'd like to know at what point in the spectrum of Muslim religious thought that line is crossed. And I want to know how many Muslims are in that group. And, as people have already said, religion is just one part of the culture that must be compatible.

Lewy14,

Megadeath is coming for the Chechens no matter what we do. So why bother?

Remember America cooperated with the interests of the Khmyer Rouge and the Chinese against that of the Cambodian people for close to 10 years after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia during the Cold War.

What chance do you think the Chechens -- who are documented working with al-Qaeda world wide and fighting American troops -- will have versus the confluence of American and Russian interests in the War on Terrorism?

I'd like the answers to the questions I just posed and also $1,000,000 and I also don't want to grow old.

Robin

”The growth of a global system of economic, cultural and demographic interchange does not come cost-free to any of the participants, even if it brings great benefits over time. The costs are most immediate, in the short run, to those cultures and groups who are farthest from organically evolving natural connections to that system.”

I think I understand your position on the cultural costs as being immediate. IE The sense or fear of changing one’s identity and beliefs leading to resistance at any cost. To me this is a normal fall out regardless of evolution or immediate change. Am I correct in this assumption?

I also understand the tangible costs such as the financial drain on a society that promotes the change by any means (immediate and future).

I for one advocate bringing the “GAP” into the fold but what I’m grappling with here is the limitations placed on the societies that can promote the change.

We are taking the view of the Caucusus as being a worldly problem / crisis that requires worldly intervention which may well be true. Russia on the other hand sees it as Russia’s problem.

My question here is how to deal with the tangible when it becomes apparent that the tangible resource is not sustainable? I think this is a significant part of the Russia versus Chechnya dilemma. If and when that limitation is reached then I would suspect that nuclear fall out will become the only viable option.

Mr. Barnett
Thanks for joining the discussion and I’d be interested in your thoughts along this line as well.

Alice

”Must being a fundamentalist Muslim entail inflicting all of your religious beliefs on others in a manner that makes it incompatible with American style democracy? I'd like to know at what point in the spectrum of Muslim religious thought that line is crossed. And I want to know how many Muslims are in that group. And, as people have already said, religion is just one part of the culture that must be compatible.”

1 ) Yes
2 ) When people decide / rule for themselves and Islamic religious teachings / beliefs decide for and rule no one.
3 ) Unknown however indications are the count is a significant following with a leadership structural organization.

Alice:

I'd like to know at what point in the spectrum of Muslim religious thought that line is crossed.

Alas, not very far. For Arabs especially, it is cultural as much as religious.

There are passionately Christian people who don't inflict their views on others. I guess I'm just trying to figure out why so many Muslims can't simply let God handle the heathens and settle for trying to persuade people to be Muslim through word and example. Obviously the majority of Christians found a way to view the Bible as a book that doesn't condone the violent spread of the religion, despite past interpretations to the contrary. Are you saying that passionate Muslims can't do that with the Koran?

And of course I agree about sep. of church and state.

USMC, yes, I do think that the costs of entering the Core are real no matter how quickly or slowly it is done. Evolutionary change can be more palatable, however, especially if it happens without significant opposition from political and religious leaders.

The longer-term benefits of joining the global network are real, as we measure benefits. To the Islamacists, they are no benefits at all, but rather evil temptations which undermine the pre-industrial, tribal and theocratic society the Islamacists would like to impose across the world.

This is the dilemna of many people in the Gap countries -- they feel the immediate dislocations of the spreading global networks right now, but they don't necessarily feel the benefits of those networks personally or have hope they will do so quickly. Worse, they have among them those who are willing to impose violent sanctions against any evolutionary changes towards joining the Core.

IMO our limitations re: bringing these countries and societies into the Core are many -- although I stress we can and must try to do so where / when possible. One of the serious limitations we face is just this dilemna I'm mentioning, felt by those who are in the Gap.

The only way past this that I can see is a multi-pronged approach: oppose the violence with military and law enforcement action (both), find countries like Iraq which have some cultural and economic basis for knitting into the Core more easily than (say) Afghanistan, and work there first.

As an analogy: if I need to replaster a large hole in my wall, I may need to lay in some lathes or plastic mesh first. Otherwise the plaster itself will just keep crumbling and will never form up into a solid wall surface. Countries like Iraq and Egypt need to be solidified and knit more closely with the Core before we are likely to be very successful reaching out to places like Chechnya. We can try, of course -- but inevitably the focus will have to start with opposing and cending the violence before much else can happen.

Robin
Thanks for the reply but I'm still looking for the answer to this question.

My question here is how to deal with the tangible when it becomes apparent that the tangible resource is not sustainable?

Specifically as it applies to Russia.

Alice,

My (limited) understanding leads me to believe there are at least two schools of Islamic thought which are antithetical to our interests: Sunni Wahhabi/Salafi, and the Shia school of wilayat al-faqih (rule of the jurisprudent), which in its modern incarnation is identified with Khomeini. These sects appear unable to co-exist with anything we might identify as democracy; in particular “the consent of the governed” is not a concept with recognized legitimacy. I cannot claim any scholarly knowledge here but some basic information is easy to come by, with the standard caution that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. Perhaps this source might be a place to start. Also, I found this article on the relationship between various fundamentalist strains of Islam pretty informative.

USMC,

I find your question a tad confusing – let me try to restate it, and combine it with some things Robin said.

Russia sees this as an internal problem, but how are they going to help Chechnya out of the Gap on their own when they have no tangible resources to do so? And how are they going to “start with opposing and ending the violence” in Chechnya when they so clearly lack the strategy, tactics and means to do so… unless…

You know, my problem with Trent’s opinion is not that I don’t think he has a case, but that he does. I hope he and others will forgive me for wanting to ponder the alternatives.

Thank you. I'll check them out.

Lewy: "You know, my problem with Trent’s opinion is not that I don’t think he has a case, but that he does. I hope he and others will forgive me for wanting to ponder the alternatives."

Trent is like the Doomsday Guy on the modelling team. His worst case scenarios are supposed to inspire alternatives. The scary thing to me, is that he is right so often. :(

Trent Telenko (#29287)
>What chance do you think the Chechens -- who are
>documented working with al-Qaeda world wide and fighting
>American troops -- will have versus the confluence of
>American and Russian interests in the War on Terrorism?
There are numerous players there: no one runs a unified anti-Russian front on the Chechen side. As far as the confluence of the American and Russian interests, I wouldn't overestimate it. The US (and the UK) have been obviously cultivating at least some Chechens -- Zakayev in London and Akhmadov in the US now; both are Maskhadov's people, wanted by the Russians. I suspect this confluence may be overstated :-) , after all Anglo-Saxons and Russians have been more or less natural enemies historically. The West may be cultivating Chechens not dissimilarly to how the Ottoman Arabs were cultivated and used in WWI to stab the Turks in the back. It is well within the US/UK interests to push Russia out of the Caucasus -- there's oil there, and also in order to round out the belt of accessible, friendly statelets -- Georgia, Central Asia, Afghanistan -- around the Middle East.

OK, say we help the russians genocide chechnya.

How will that play in the arab/moslem world?

I'm not up to speed on this stuff. The russians have already killed 8% of the chechens. Does that include a few hundred children or were they careful to kill only military-age males?

This is looking more and more like one of those things where we have two or more sides doing atrocities against each other and we pick one side to support because the other is doing atrocities.

I can see we'd like the russians as allies. They have a big population which could build a big army, they have a lot of resources, a lot of trained professionals of various sorts. Do we really want the russians as allies? Do we want to be their allies against chechnya and let them be our allies against iraq and iran?

This smells real bad.

lewy14,

My problem with you post is that it is a fantasy projection of what you wish the Chechens to be and not what they really are.

When Stalin deported the Chechens, 40% of them were killed. That is a genocide in anyone's books.

Many of the survivors fled into criminal gangs across the Soviet Union and survived by virtue of their cunning, ruthlessness and cruelty.

These events atomized Chechen culture such that the tribal cohesion was destroyed. The highest social organization in Chechen culture is a criminal gang.

Go back and read Dan's stuff on the Chechens attemps at self government with that in mind.

Then think through the implications for trying to help them.

My problem with you post is that it is a fantasy projection of what you wish the Chechens to be and not what they really are.

What are they, Trent?

>>When Stalin deported the Chechens, 40% of them were killed. That is a genocide in anyone's books.

>>Many of the survivors fled into criminal gangs across the Soviet Union and survived by virtue of their cunning, ruthlessness and cruelty.

etc.

Could not the same logic apply to Russian (or for that matter European) Jewry?

>>Then think through the implications for trying to help them.

Is the claim that this groip of people has been brutalized so thoroughly that the smart thing to do is to finish the job, in the interests of our own safety?

Could not the same logic apply to Russian (or for that matter European) Jewry?

Right. Because Jews are notoriously thieves and murderers, rather than, say, doctors and lawyers.

T.J. Madison,

I think I get what you're saying but you really, really, REALLY ought to be a heck of a lot less ambiguous about it.

I would have to insist you clarify here.

Because Jews are notoriously thieves and murderers, rather than, say, doctors and lawyers.

That is only true for people who don't hate Jews, though.

I second Lewy's demand.

Oh forget it, why wait.

What T.J. meant (I really friggin hope) was that Trent was offering a very flawed argument for eliminating the Chechens, not that eliminating the Jews is a good idea.

In fact I was going to offer the example of Japanese society in the immediate post war period, which was also reduced to criminal gangs.

But Colt your comment can also be reversed: are there no Chechens with an education, a profession, a clue? Are they irredeemable to a man, woman and child?

lewy14:

But Colt your comment can also be reversed: are there no Chechens with an education, a profession, a clue? Are they irredeemable to a man, woman and child?

Of course not, and I never implied otherwise.

But I think you're right about TJ.

I can see how it looked like I implied Chechens were only thieves and murderers, but I blame TJ for the whole thing :-)

Of course not, and I never implied otherwise.

Correct, Colt, you didn't, sorry if I came across as agressive.

I guess my point should really be addressed to Trent, who really does seem to imply that the Chechens are irredeemable.

Yes, it's TJ's fault entirely. 8)

Scrolling back up a bit...

J Thomas: Whatever the (genuine) risks of drawing the Russians close to us at this point, I think they're outweighed by the (also genuine) risks of pushing them away.

Jinnderella: I’ve no dispute with Trent’s role, only that he seems to recognize no other. I’m hardly alone as a target of his harangues, so I count myself in good company.

Trent can answer on his own, but the short response to T.J's:

"Could not the same logic apply to Russian (or for that matter European) Jewry?"

is simple... No. European Jewry had been atomized by the Nazis and much reduced, but

(a) Many of those who were left afterward had all lived in and been part of highly functional, advanced Western cultures for most of their lives. All that was required for them to step back to that state was the removal of the Nazis who had forced them, unwillingly, out of that. So, many of the early Zionists carried their European roots and organization into Israel (hence the state's early union/socialist character).

(b) As for the former Russian Jews, they had another asset that the Chechens lack: a substantial number of compatriots, many of them family (like mine, for example) who had not been affected by the Holocaust, and who were fully integrated into other Western countries. Indeed, the early Haganah and IAF were heavily staffed and even supplied by Jews who had served in the Allied armies. This served as an immediate support mesh allowing rapid integration.

© The Jews that remained did not consist of criminal gangs with long histories, but of concentration camp survivors and citizens of Western countries. Bit of a difference.

Interestingly, Israel's absorption of Soviet Jews 50 years later would also be a fairly smooth process (indeed, it was this influx that kicked off Israel's tech. boom). But then, they were Jews living in a Soviet system but not asked or even allowed to rule (though they often filled technical/scientific posts). All the Soviet Jews did was exchange captivity in one constructed and semi-working polity for citizenship in another already constructed, working polity. That's an immigrant's challenge, not a national-political one.

I'll leave Trent to speak re: the Chechens, but evaluation of their chances should include some explanation of the Chechen region in the last 15 years of the Soviet empire: who ran it then, what the ethnic structure was, and what has happened to that leadership cadre since.

>>What T.J. meant (I really friggin hope) was that Trent was offering a very flawed argument for eliminating the Chechens, not that eliminating the Jews is a good idea.

Yes, exactly.

If I had made the same statements Trent made with but with respect to the Jews, I would risk being banned from this forum, and not without good reason.

Joe,

This is a short recent history of the Chechens, via strategypage.com, assuming it hasn't scrolled off yet:

http://www.strategypage.com//fyeo/qndguide/default.asp?target=Russia/

...The Russian public is angry, although they are also tired of five years of fighting in Chechnya. But this incident just confirms the reasons why most Russians tolerate the brutal counter-terrorist methods in Chechnya. The war began because of Chechen terrorism (kidnapping and an invasion by Islamic militants). In addition, Russians have long feared Chechen criminal gangs throughout Russia. The pervasive "Chechen mafia" is largely the result of a World War II decision. In 1943, as German soldiers entered Chechnya, many Chechens rebelled against the Russian government and joined forces with the Germans. In response, most of the Chechen population was forcibly moved to Kazakhstan in Central Asia in 1944. Many Chechens died in the process. The Chechens were allowed to return to Chechnya in the late 1950s. But that removal of the entire population also caused many Chechens to flee to other parts of Russia. Since these Chechens did not have proper documents (during the Communist rule, you needed special travel documents to leave your home town), they got into criminal activities. The Chechens are nothing if not resourceful, and by the time Chechens were allowed back into Chechnya, many had become prosperous running organized crime operations. That activity continued, causing most Russians to associate Chechens with organized crime and other unsavory activities.

September 2, 2004: When Chechnya first declared independence from Russia in 1993, the Russians promptly invaded. The Russians quickly tired of getting a lot of their troops killed for what appeared to be little gain. In the wake of their 1994 withdrawal from Chechnya, Russia simultaneously declared Chechnya still a part of Russia (and paid pensions and government salaries there) and left the Chechens to their own devices. But the Chechens could not govern themselves. It was as simple as that. The central government in the province controlled little beyond the capital Grozny. At least six major warlords held sway, and then quite loosely, over the rest of the province. Criminal activity rapidly increased. Between 1997 and 2000, some 1300 Russian civilians from southern Russia were kidnapped for ransom. When the money did not appear to be forthcoming, the victims were murdered. Hundreds of these captives were rescued as Russian troops again advanced into Chechnya in late 1999. But kidnapping wasn't the only racket. There was also auto theft, rustling, drug running and diverting oil from pipelines running through the province. This last scam was abetted by gangsters taking over local oil refineries and going into the fuel business. Add to this the usual gambling, extortion and prostitution rackets and you have a pretty grim place. For while a lot of the victims were fellow Chechens (who didn't belong to a particular gangs clan), most were in neighboring areas.

But what really mobilized public support for another invasion of Chechnya was one gang that specialized in religious fanaticism (in addition to some more secular crimes, everyone found kidnapping and smuggling too lucrative to give up for religious reasons.) Not content with just turning Chechnya into crime central, the Besayev gang decided to turn all the southern Caucasus into an Islamic republic. Most Chechens practiced the more laid back Sufi form of Islam, but Besayev and his followers managed to convert a few thousand Chechens to the more hard nosed Wahhabi form of Islam. It aid in this, non-Chechen fundamentalists came in to join the jihad. A few hundred converts were made in neighboring Dagestan. In the Summer of 1999, Besayev and company decided it was time to stop preaching and start fighting. Several thousand holy warriors invaded Dagestan. The Chechen criminals were bad enough, but this was too much for the Dagestanis, and they fought back. Some 32,000 Dagestani civilians who fled the invasion, and the 1,500 locals were killed in the fighting, sometimes massacred by the holy warriors for resisting. Twice the Russian police and troops drove Besayev's warriors back into Chechnya. But after the third invasion, the new prime minister of Russia decided to reestablish control of Chechenya.

In February 2000, the senior Islamic cleric of Chechnya, Mufti Akhmed Khadzhi Kadyrov, proclaimed that the Russian occupation of Chechnya was the only way the people were ever going to be free from all the criminal activity. During the late 1990s, the Russian government had basically ignored the pleas of Chechnya's neighbors for relief from the increasing criminal activity. Reassuring press releases and more border guards were all that was sent to paper over the situation. But the local resentments built up, not just in the Caucasus, but throughout Russia. What was going in Chechnya was symbolic of the lesser degree of lawlessness throughout the country. Russians were waiting for someone to do something. But no one wanted a lot of Russian troops to get killed in the process. The 1993 battles in Chechnya had been humiliating for the Russian military, and people as a whole. In 1999, the Russians were more careful, numerous and decisive. This time the Chechens were also divided. The Russians soon occupied the entire country and began negotiating with many of the clan based groups for some kind of deal. The Russians wanted to get a majority of Chechens to agree to keep the crime rate, especially against people outside of Chechnya, down.

Chechen independence was not a major issue, Chechen's disruptive effect on the entire region was. This was nothing new. The Chechen's had, for centuries, been one of the more powerful ethnic groups (out of over fifty) in the Caucasus. The Chechens were used to doing as they wanted, and were tough enough, and ruthless enough, to get away with it. Two centuries ago, this unruly attitude brought the Chechens into violent contact with the expanding Russian empire. The Russians kept killing Chechens until the survivors agreed to behave. But such bloodletting is never forgotten in places like the Caucasus. The Chechens hate the Russians and want to be free to do whatever they want. And that's what the war in Chechnya is all about.

In so many words, the Chechens have always been nasty barbarians. Stalin made them worse by atomizing their tribal culture so there is no one person or series of persons who can legitimately enforce a settlement on the Chechens as a group.

Now the cycle of history has gain reached the point where a lot of Chechens will be killed again. What is new in this cycle compared to the 1890s, 1920's or 1940's is that Arab Islamist Imperialism is meeting Russian's post-Soviet "Haiti with Nukes" corruption.

The Russians are too weak to over awe the Chechens and the Arab Islamists are beyond the reach of the Russians. So the Arabs can always buy one or more Chechen gangs to do what Besayev's gang has done. That means that there will be more Beslans until the Russians decide to deal with the Chechens once and for all.

Some like T.J. Madison think I am a monster for shattering precious projective delusions of sainthood on nasty Hobbsian barbarians.

I don't care a whit.

The simple, awful, truth is that whatever the innocence of individual Chechens, Chechen group culture cannot be allowed to live to by the post-Soviet Russian Federation if they want to be safe. So it won't be.

Furthermore, it isn't in America's interest to interfere with what is going to happen.

Trent,

Thanks for posting the excerpt from Strategy page (the link is expired, as you'd feared).

I think T.J. would be the last person to dispute the fact that the Chechens are nasty Hobbsian barbarians. Near as I can tell, he thinks we are all equally nasty Hobbsian barbarians (just some more equal than others).

I think he has a problem (as do I, as do others) with a dependent clause to the effect "therefore they must all die". You acknowledge the awfulness of such a conclusion, and I agree. It's awful.

And so in reading your excerpt on Chechnya from strategy page I'd make a a few points:

1) that the real bottom line for Russia is not elimination of Chechen culture but the elimination of Jihadi culture.
2) that there are Chechens (Mufti Akhmed Khadzhi Kadyrov) who recognize the problems and extreme danger that Chechen culture is creating.
3) that the possibility of what Russia may do may create a consensus within the Chechens to deliver up Basayev and his jihadi ilk.

If the Chechen culture is as criminal as the article indicates, that itself may suggest a strategy. Every criminal culture has a method of dealing with idiot extremists who bring the heat down on the whole group. Is Basayev really the most powerful force in Chechnya now, more powerful than all others combined?

lewy14,

Consider the implications of the following:

1) During the Battle of Grozny - part of the 1994 Russian invasion of Chechnya - Chechen criminal gangs were kidnapping Chechen fighters off the streets in Grozny and holding them for ransom.

2) Al Qaeda was significantly involved in an organizational and financial role in the Chechnen resistance to the 1994 invasion, and provided a number of fighting personnel.

3) The extent of foreign (Arab) support for the Chechens in 1994 remains disputed. It was at least significant. It might have been major.

It is possible that Trent is correct in stating that the most advanced form of Chechen social organization is a criminal gang, given the Stalinist atomization of Chechen culture. If this is correct, Al Qaeda would have been dominant in the 1994 "resistance" to the Russian invasion.

"Every criminal culture has a method of dealing with idiot extremists who bring the heat down on the whole group."

If this is correct, Al Qaeda would have been dominant in the 1994 "resistance" to the Russian invasion.

This is an interesting hypothesis, but it doesn't seem to jibe with the timelines presented in Trent's post or Dan's analysis, which seem to date the Wahhabi influence as encroaching after the intial expulsion of Russian troops after the fall of the Soviet Union.

As to my "analogy", it was no analogy at all, it was straight up analysis. Let's say that criminal gangs are the building block of Chechen society. The perpetrators of Beslan are going to bring the Russian whip down, and end up ruining business for a lot of gangs. Won't the Basayev contingent feel the heat?

lewy14,

Chechen criminals were kidnapping Chechen fighters while the Russians were blowing the city apart, i.e., the Chechens don't cooperate even in extremity.

>>I think T.J. would be the last person to dispute the fact that the Chechens are nasty Hobbsian barbarians. Near as I can tell, he thinks we are all equally nasty Hobbsian barbarians (just some more equal than others).

My claim is that most people will become nasty Hobbsian barbarians (and much worse) when the authorities tell them to, and that mentally unstable people may become murderous psychotics under extreme conditions, for example having their family murdered by the Red Army. Some uncommon people are highly resistant to being whipped into a murderous frenzy by either events or propaganda. These are the people we need to be doing business with.

Selection pressure is also at work here. Intelligent, sane, and resourceful people tend to flee dangerous environments, so we shouldn't be surprised if few in Chechnya meet all three of these conditions.

>>I think he has a problem (as do I, as do others) with a dependent clause to the effect "therefore they must all die".

Yep. Any plan by the Russians to escalate their atrocities (80k civilian dead so far) in response to the Beslan attack is totally insane. It's exactly like saying, "What those terrorists did was so awful that we should EMULATE THEIR EXAMPLE and become even WORSE terrorists." It's absurd on the face of it, and it works against the Primary Goal: Decreasing the Long Term Body Count.

People who advocate tacit approval of Russian retaliation against Chechen civilians (as opposed to focused military action against the terrorist elements) have forfeited all logical grounds to complain about the use of terrorism against the US, Muslim silence about the crimes of Al Qaeda, etc.

Lewy14,

Pay close attention to what I said here:

>In so many words, the Chechens have always been
>nasty barbarians. Stalin made them worse by
>atomizing their tribal culture so there is no
>one person or series of persons who can
>legitimately enforce a settlement on the
>Chechens as a group.

Given the nature of the Chechens there is nothing we can do to help them while there is much we can do to hurt our interests in working with the Russians to fight al-Qaeda terrorism if we try.

T.J. Madison said:

>Yep. Any plan by the Russians to escalate their
>atrocities (80k civilian dead so far) in
>response to the Beslan attack is totally
>insane. It's exactly like saying, "What those
>terrorists did was so awful that we should
>EMULATE THEIR EXAMPLE and become even WORSE
>terrorists." It's absurd on the face of it, and
>it works against the Primary Goal: Decreasing
>the Long Term Body Count.

The primary American goal in the war on Terror is to secure the American homeland from terrorist attack, whatever it takes.

Currently we are choosing to do this by reforming the cultures of terrorist supporting regimes.

"Reform" in the case of Iraq has involved the killing of approximately 30,000 Iraqis since Baghdad has fallen, 80-90% of whom were armed when American forces killed them. That being said it is likely that hundreds if not thousands of innocent women and children are among the dead.

In the near future, after the Nov. 2nd election the American military is going to go ito Fallujah, Ramala and other Sunni strongholds to clear out the jihadis ahead of the Jan 2005 elections in Iraq. This will easily kill another 30,000 Iraqis with a much higher percentage of innocent non-combatants because the Jihadis will use them as human shields against American firepower.

After we are through doing this, Shia and Kurdish police units will be placed in Sunni strongholds to assure that Sunni resistance does not reoccur. This will result in a significant number -- hundreds if not thousands -- of fighting age Sunni males being "disappeared" given the tribal histories involved.

And for all that, this is the more humane approach.

The alternatives include simply throwing nukes.

>People who advocate tacit approval of Russian
>retaliation against Chechen civilians (as
>opposed to focused military action against the
>terrorist elements) have forfeited all logical
>grounds to complain about the use of terrorism
>against the US, Muslim silence about the crimes
>of Al Qaeda, etc.

T.J., your standard of what constitutes "tacit approval" says that anything less than American troops standing between Russian troops and the Chechens is "tacit approval."

That is insane.

The Russians are dealing with a culture that willingly joined the Islamist Death cult. Any culture where the death cult can spread to a significant fraction of the population is so fundamentally sick that it will be wiped out by neighboring cultures in self-defense in any case.

Read this from David Brooks column and let it sink in:

We should by now have become used to the death cult that is thriving at the fringes of the Muslim world. This is the cult of people who are proud to declare, "You love life, but we love death." This is the cult that sent waves of defenseless children to be mowed down on the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq war, that trains kindergartners to become bombs, that fetishizes death, that sends people off joyfully to commit mass murder.

This cult attaches itself to a political cause but parasitically strangles it. The death cult has strangled the dream of a Palestinian state. The suicide bombers have not brought peace to Palestine; they've brought reprisals. The car bombers are not pushing the U.S. out of Iraq; they're forcing us to stay longer. The death cult is now strangling the Chechen cause, and will bring not independence but blood.

But that's the idea. Because the death cult is not really about the cause it purports to serve. It's about the sheer pleasure of killing and dying.

It's about massacring people while in a state of spiritual loftiness. It's about experiencing the total freedom of barbarism - freedom even from human nature, which says, Love children, and Love life. It's about the joy of sadism and suicide.

It is the fate of death cults that they murder their followers, either directly or via their neighbors killing them in self-defense.

This has happened to the Thugee of India, the Hassasins of Syria, and to the Imperial Japanese Army.

Now that inevitable fate is coming for the Chechens.

Knowing it is inevitable does not mean I approve. It means I am not going to advocate a counter productive American effort to interfere so I can feel better afterwards when the Russians do the deed.

Trent

Thanks for laying out the ground work.
Now maybe I can put my question in a much more comprehensive way.

1 ) We know Chechnya is a hot spot for criminal activity.
2 ) We know Chechnya has been aided by the Islamic factions of ill repute.

Two very important questions arise out of that as it relates to the WoT.

1 ) Can the Chechnya populace be saved by removing the extremists?
2 ) Is the Chechnya populace a lost cause?

We have discussed at the length how to move the “GAP” into the “CORE” and the expenses to all sides involved to accomplish this. We have also discussed at length Russia’s limited capabilities and Russia’s views concerning out side help. Specifically help from the US. Help from others in the “CORE” world community hasn’t been discussed as an option yet. So I’m not sure if this is even viable let alone something acceptable to Russia.

Now my question as it stands is:

My question here is how to deal with the tangible when it becomes apparent that the tangible resource is not sustainable?”

In my mind if I follow Russia’s options through to some sort of conclusion other than writing Chechnya off and using tactics of containment. Of which everyone seems to agree containment is an unacceptable solution due to the consequences that will follow.

Russia’s limited tangibles now place nuclear resolution (genocide) as a very viable option on the table. One would hope this is a drastic last measure of Russian survival. Are we ready to deal with this? Are we ready to commit to Russian demands for anything to avoid what seems to be the inevitable? If not are we ready to deal with the Pandora’s Box of nuclear reprisals? Surely they will come and surely those that have the genie will wield the big stick.

Ummm, I guess I must remind you guys that we are all nasty Hobbesian barbarians under the skin. Biologically speaking. There is nothing genetic that prevents the Chechens from accepting the rule of law, if we can be creative enough to find a way to bring it to them.
Trent is correct in his analysis that it is a tough problem. But maybe we could look at the absorption of native american tribes and scicilian hill gangs into their respective Lockean societies?

Obviously these questions can't be considered in isolation however hard we may wish that we could but is the greater question how to we move countries from "GAP" to "CORE" or preventing countries moving from "CORE" to "GAP"? The way I read the news from Russia right now it's a legitimate danger.

USMC said:

>1 ) Can the Chechnya populace be saved by
>removing the extremists?

With whose human intelligence?

The Israelis have the most widespread and sophisticated terrorist humint on the planet backed up by a world-class signals intelligence and UAV surveillance.

Have they been able to separate the Palestinian extremists from the rest of the Palestinian population?

No, they have not.

Look at America's efforts in the Shia areas of Iraq. We have excellent humint from the Shia on Al-Sadr's forces from friendly shia and have we been able to separate the Iranian backed shia extremists from the rest of the Iraqi Shia population?

No we have not.

We have already gone through the Russian problems with Chechnya and they cannot separate out extremist Chechens because of their corruption.

What do all three situations have in common? There is an outside power fomenting Islamist trouble with oil money. There is no chance any of these three situations will be resolved without that oil money being cut off.

Only America has a chance of doing that with Iran...that is why the latter is grasping for nukes ASAP.

>2 ) Is the Chechnya populace a lost cause?

Yes they are.

The sad truth is that just because we have the power to kill them doesn't mean we have the power to save them.

>Ummm, I guess I must remind you guys that we
>are all nasty Hobbesian barbarians under the
>skin. Biologically speaking. There is nothing
>genetic that prevents the Chechens from
>accepting the rule of law, if we can be
>creative enough to find a way to bring it to
>them.

The problem here isn't genetic DNA.

It is cultural DNA.

You can remove an indivdual or even a nuclear family from its ciultural context and have them assimilate into a new cultural pattern rapidly. Larger family groups are harder. Whole tribes are close to impossible because tribes are self replicating pieces of the home culture.

The Chechen example saw the strongest social unit -- the tribe -- displaced by another much more vicious and atomized self-replicating social unit, the criminal gang.

There are no bonds of trust in Chechen culture. There are only predators and prey.

The only way to save the lives of individual Chechens is to assimilate them into non-Chechen cultures as widely spread individuals in a much larger culture where they are isolated from each other.

That just is not going to happen, unless there is another Chechen Diaspora.

>Trent is correct in his analysis that it is a
>tough problem. But maybe we could look at the
>absorption of native american tribes and
>scicilian hill gangs into their respective
>Lockean societies?

jinnderella.

Ask the Comanche how the Texans 'assimilated them.'

Trent

”Is the Chechnya populace a lost cause?”
"Yes they are.”

I was quickly coming to the conclusion that the Chechnya populace is a lost cause and I was wondering if anyone else actually saw it the same as I do.

Now we’re down to the questions that I believe deserve to be more carefully vetted.

“Russia’s limited tangibles now place nuclear resolution (genocide) as a very viable option on the table. One would hope this is a drastic last measure of Russian survival. Are we ready to deal with this? Are we ready to commit to Russian demands for anything to avoid what seems to be the inevitable? If not are we ready to deal with the Pandora’s Box of nuclear reprisals? Surely they will come and surely those that have the genie will wield the big stick.”

Trent,

I disagree with your opinion that the Chechen people voluntarily joined the death cult. A very small number of them did. The balance is traditional Chechen nastiness - just ask their neighbors. It is the combination of traditional Chechen nastiness with the resources and experience of the Arab death cult which makes them so threatening to the Russians.

So the Russians will eventually use their tried and true method of abating Chechen traditions for a few generations, i.e. slaughter of most Chechens.

I quite agree that anyone who tries to help the Chechens deserves what will happen to them. That is a self-solving problem. Think of it as evolution in action.

It certainly would be nice if the Chechens would stop behaving like Chechens, so the Russians won't have to kill most of them. Lots of things would be nice. And won't happen.

USMC,

The Chechens are too dispersed for nukes to be a viable option. Persistent chemical weapons delivered by spray tank equipped aircraft look to be the most likely route of killing to me.

Understand it will be years before this comes to pass.

We will not only see more Beslans, we may see a chemical weapon attack in Russia like the one al-Qaeda had foiled by Jordanian security forces.

That attack was meant to kill 80,000 people in Aman, Jordan and the headquarters of Jordanian intelligence besides. The higher levels of corruption in Russia make the chances of such a weapon being both successfully placed and detonated much higher than in Jordan.

Trent,

Back up a second. There are those who do not distinguish between the death of children in terrorist acts like Beslan and the death of children as an unintentional consequence of the combat of war. I do make this distinction. Recall the analogy which started this post: there is a cancer here, and it has to be cut out. Chemotherapy kills some good cells along with the bad, but it’s necessary if the patient is to live. I’d not deny the Russians their right to pursue this course, even given their lesser standards of proportional force and rules of engagement.

But a pro-active, thorough, and indiscriminate murder of the entire Chechen population, “whatever the innocence of individual Chechens”, as you put it, is something else again.

Question: what percent of the population in Chechnya has sold their soul to the jihadhis? This article from the NYT seems to corroborate much of Dan’s analysis (if you ignore the headline and much of the spin, SOP with the NYT). I think it is fair to question the depth of support for jihad within the population as a whole (as opposed to the fighters, where the sway of the Wahhabi is undeniable). Tom seems to question this as well.

It is a mistake to view a culture dominated by criminal gangs as being without the means of social control. Gangs are means of social control, and criminal gangs are naturally resistant to death cults. In extremis, the US has negotiated with criminal gangs, e.g. the shipyards during WWII. Morally compromised, but it beats genocide.

If I’m wrong, as you and Tom are so sure of, it would be because the criminal gangs (the intrinsic nastiness to which Tom refers) are more attached to revenge than they are to survival. This may be the crux of the matter.

Finally I think your reading of the ability of the US and Israel to separate the extremists from the population is excessively pessimistic. In Najaf, the shrine still stands, the population has not been exterminated, Sistani supports democracy, and Sadr has been humiliated. Not a complete victory but absolutely not a failure which would motivate wiping them all out.

[hat tip to praktike on the links]

lewy14:

Finally I think your reading of the ability of the US and Israel to separate the extremists from the population is excessively pessimistic.

What proprotion of Arabs in Yesha support suicide bombings? 60-85%, depending on who does the polling. Israel could separate out the extremists, but it would mean depleting the Arab population quite severely.

If the Chechens are as fargone as the 'palestinians', there's every reason to be pessimistic.

lewy14,

We're not going to commit genocide on the Chechens. The Russians will. They've done it before several times, and will again, several times. The Russians would rather not do so because the effort required is very inconvenient, especially at the moment. Right and wrong have nothing to do with it. This is about power and security. The Russians are real big on power and security.

You persist in projecting your attitudes onto foreigners. This is error.

Continued failure to address the points Trent and I have made about the nature of Chechen society has an effect on your credibility. If you think we are wrong, point to evidence pertaining to the Chechens themselves rather than further reasoning by analogy from non-Chechen behavior.

Checkin Out proved me wrong with evidence, and I admitted it. Can you do what he did?

Trent,
(I can almost hear your sigh of infinite patience)
this is the genius statement--

"The problem here isn't genetic DNA.
It is cultural DNA."

If it was genetic programming we'd be out of luck. Memetic programming can be changed, and memetic evolution can happen at speed.

As for what happend to the Commanches, brute force assimilation would be preferrable to genocide for me. And don't we have a few more tools in the kit now than the Texans did, and aren't we more aware of process?

What, specifically, are we trying to say Chechens have or don't have?

>I disagree with your opinion that the Chechen
>people voluntarily joined the death cult. A
>very small number of them did.

Numbers mean things.

Consider this Dunnigan passage:

But what really mobilized public support for another invasion of Chechnya was one gang that specialized in religious fanaticism (in addition to some more secular crimes, everyone found kidnapping and smuggling too lucrative to give up for religious reasons.) Not content with just turning Chechnya into crime central, the Besayev gang decided to turn all the southern Caucasus into an Islamic republic. Most Chechens practiced the more laid back Sufi form of Islam, but Besayev and his followers managed to convert a few thousand Chechens to the more hard nosed Wahhabi form of Islam. It aid in this, non-Chechen fundamentalists came in to join the jihad. A few hundred converts were made in neighboring Dagestan. In the Summer of 1999, Besayev and company decided it was time to stop preaching and start fighting. Several thousand holy warriors invaded Dagestan. The Chechen criminals were bad enough, but this was too much for the Dagestanis, and they fought back.

...in light of the small size of the Chechen population to start with.

What does several thousand mean in a population of less than 3 million? Especially one as atomized and trust bond handicapped as the Chechens are?

Frankly Tom, Besayev's Wahhabi contingents probably have more trust in each other than any other Chechen gang. That is what makes them so powerful in Chechen society.

Hell it makes them powerful in light of Russian Security forces corruption in the Caucuses, come to that.

Praktike,

Cohesion. Even the Iraqis have tribes.

Lee Harris has much to say on this issue in his Civilization and Its Enemies.

The Chechens have the most fragmented, least cohesive, and most "barbaric" culture of any in the Caucasus. In addition to the most purely nasty attitude, and cruelty, in that area. This was before the Stalinist disapora atomized what was left of the Chechen tribal bonds.

Tom,

Your argument is that all the previous history of the Chechens would indicate that they are incapable of anything other than self destructive behavior. Your extrapolation is that further self destructive behavior will result in actual destruction of the Chechens. I hear you, I’m nothing if not attentive. Your challenge for me is to produce a counter example – fair enough.

What would you accept as such a counter example? What about the existence of Chechens who are fighting on the Russian side and attempting to create some sort of civil society there? Apparently not, because these things exist in Chechnya today – or is that a myth? What about my observation that criminal gangs are in fact a means of social control? You’d seem to be arguing that not only are the Chechens controlled by criminal gangs, but by suicidally inept and irrational criminal gangs.

Surely there are some Chechens who have a clue as to what’s in store for them if they don’t get a grip. Perhaps you are correct in that history does not offer an example of where such a group of Chechens has managed to hold sway over their people in the past. I’ll concede that this would be very strong evidence for your scenario, but it does not constitute proof of inevitability, nor a concrete reason to work against that outcome.

Colt,

Yes, I’d have to agree that Gaza and the West Bank are pretty far gone, in fact more so than Chechnya. Ditto, probably, for Fallujah. But there is a difference between people who will advocate for jihad in a poll and those who are willing to carry it out.

lewy14:

But there is a difference between people who will advocate for jihad in a poll and those who are willing to carry it out.

On an individual level, of course. But on a broad, cultural level? The society that arms, protects and worships the suicide bomber will produce suicide bombers - and not much else.

>If it was genetic programming we'd be out of
>luck. Memetic programming can be changed, and
>memetic evolution can happen at speed.

Lewy14,

Memetic transmission of information in barbarian cultures is primarily via oral tradition of clan elders. Hence it is slow and highly resistent to outside memetic pressure.

In the case of the Chechens, those elders are usually old before their years early 30 something criminal gang leaders.

>>T.J., your standard of what constitutes "tacit approval" says that anything less than American troops standing between Russian troops and the Chechens is "tacit approval."

No, my standard of approval is uninterrupted transfer of funds from the USG to the Russian government.

>>The primary American goal in the war on Terror is to secure the American homeland from terrorist attack, __whatever it takes.___

This strikes me as a shaky goal. Surely there are some exchange ratios not worth implementing.

"There are no bonds of trust in Chechen culture. There are only predators and prey.

"The only way to save the lives of individual Chechens is to assimilate them into non-Chechen cultures as widely spread individuals in a much larger culture where they are isolated from each other."

This discussion is likely to be historically important. Whether or not the chechen survive, 30 years from now a few examples of anti-chechen hate-speech will get widely quoted, as a few examples of anti-jewish hate-speech from the years before WWII get widely quoted.

These posts might be the ones.

That will be completely independent of whatever degree of objective truth they may have.

Trent,

It was jinnderella who made that comment, not me.

Robin Burke made the same argument that changing the culture isn't easy. In fact her observation was even more pessimistic, that the process of integration with the Core creates more atomization and instability in the short run, not less.

I'm an engineer by training, I don't like to give up on problems unless I can prove there is no solution, however bleak things look. If you've accepted past history as your proof of the future, there may be little I can argue with, as I've already acknowledged to Tom.