According to documents recently captured in Switzerland, al Qaeda is strong today than it was three years ago. It seems that killing off "leaders" in a very loosely structured organization like al Qaeda may not be all that useful strategically. Isn't the organizational structure much more like many of the de-centralized organizations we are used to dealing with all the time? Be these protestant chruches, community improvement organizations, etc.?

For sake of argument, imagine if say the Church of Christ (I used to be a member before I became an atheist) was a terrorist organization - how easy would it be to destroy, given their ideological cohesiveness, yet de-centralized organization?

By coincidence, just this morning I had started work on a post-9/11 history of al Qaeda, initially organized around the captures in Pakistan. That is, by focusing on events surrounding the arrests of Abu Z, Binalshibh, KSM, and Ghailani, I was going to try to form a picture of AQ's location and disposition since they were driven out of Afghanistan. I had concluded that it would also be necessary to reconstruct the histories of the regional affiliates (JI, etc), since AQ's story is tied up with theirs; also that the timeline of AQ's post-9/11 attacks would be the other key ingredient. Partly I was doing this because I wanted an idea of how the war against AQ is being fought. There's an arrest here, an attack there, a raid somewhere else, but the flow of events is obscure.

Something I'd like to see: a Flash animation, consisting of a world map, with mugshots of AQ heavies moving back and forth across it in South-Park fashion, mapping out their known activities since 2001, or even since 1989. The animation should also indicate attacks and arrests, and the accumulation of AQ figures in captivity.

Gary Gunnels:

"According to documents recently captured in Switzerland, al Qaeda is strong today than it was three years ago."

I'm unfamiliar with the documents you're citing, though if you're referring to the reorganization of the core leadership inside Iran to the degree that they were inside Afghanistan pre-9/11, I'd have to agree. This is something that has been noted by myself and others here on WoC on numerous occasions.

"It seems that killing off 'leaders' in a very loosely structured organization like al Qaeda may not be all that useful strategically. Isn't the organizational structure much more like many of the de-centralized organizations we are used to dealing with all the time? Be these protestant chruches, community improvement organizations, etc.?"

I certainly wouldn't downplay the importance of capturing or killing leaders or the effect that doing such things has on al-Qaeda and its allies for purposes of morale and recruitment if nothing else. I also think that al-Qaeda and its allies are a lot more centralized and inter-connected than many people are willing to admit, but that is a discussion for another time ...

"For sake of argument, imagine if say the Church of Christ (I used to be a member before I became an atheist) was a terrorist organization - how easy would it be to destroy, given their ideological cohesiveness, yet de-centralized organization?"

Ideologically, there isn't much of a difference between al-Qaeda and Hamas or even al-Qaeda and a number of anarchist or fascist groups with respect to how they view the US or Jews. But in terms of who's running things on the strategic and tactical levels as well as the relative level of professionalism involved, I don't think that there's any argument that can be made that al-Qaeda poses the most and deadly immediate threat to the US with respect to those above groups despite their ideological similarities.

I'm not terribly familiar with the organizational make-up of the Church of Christ being Catholic myself, but as far as al-Qaeda's internal organization goes it's probably best described as an amalgamation of a multinational corporation, franchise operation, a government granting agency, an NGO, and so-on. These rather odd characteristics are one of the things that make the group's hierarchy such a murky thing for people like me to keep track of.

I believe the Israeli military's received view is that decapitating terrorist organizations messes up their developing tactical operations, but that the organization is reconstructed in two or three months. As the pillar of a long-term strategy, it hasn't worked for them, nor I would expect, for us.

Having said that, especially in the cases of live captures (seldom the Israeli practice), I would think potential to disrupt terror operations would be greater.

Good list, and thanks, Dan. The counterterrorism people have done some really great work, and the CIA and SOC ought to get more credit for that.

I'm still trying to wrap my head around the "two-thirds of the leadership have been killed or captured" number that was the result of a September 2003 report, and how it relates to where we are today.

And while I think it's critical that we nail these guys, and especially terrorist masterminds like Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, it seems that Al Qaeda's knowledgebase is something they can desseminate quickly and widely. I wonder if the US has a good handle on the new generation's capabilities and ambitions.

And I'll not in passing that only one kill here occured in Iraq.

"it seems that Al Qaeda's knowledgebase is something they can desseminate quickly and widely."

The can go for reliability - wide spread piles of complete information. Or they can go for secrecy. You can't manage both.

If they all had complete plans on their computers, then picking up Ramsi Youssef in late 1999 would have prevented 911. Yes, you can talk encryption and passwords etc - but wide_dissemination is the near antithesis of secret. The more people that exist that know the passwords, the higher the probability of a breach of security.

AJL:

I think that there's a lot difference between the way that al-Qaeda operates in comparison to Palestinian groups like Hamas or Islamic Jihad in a number of ways that are both good and bad for the US with respect to our pursuit of the organization. As far as how to achieve victory against al-Qaeda in the long-term, I think that Dr. Gunaratna does a fairly good job of sketching out how to accomplish this in the last section of his book in which he presents a 3-step method towards neutralizing the threat: military elimination of al-Qaeda proper, military and non-military neutralization of its support infrastructure as well as its popular appeal, and winning the ideological battle inside Islam, though that could probably be broadened to encompass a lot of other categories.

"Having said that, especially in the cases of live captures (seldom the Israeli practice), I would think potential to disrupt terror operations would be greater."

Taking somebody alive is generally preferred even if they don't have actionable intelligence because they help to fill in gaps in our knowledge with respect to the broader picture of al-Qaeda among other things.

praktike:

"Good list, and thanks, Dan. The counterterrorism people have done some really great work, and the CIA and SOC ought to get more credit for that."

Well, like I said, the list was produced from memory and is incomplete. If I started listing the middle management and the cannon fodder, this would be much, much longer.

"I'm still trying to wrap my head around the 'two-thirds of the leadership have been killed or captured' number that was the result of a September 2003 report, and how it relates to where we are today."

I think that the figure in question has been politicized to a certain extent both by its proponents and its critics. The criticism that all of those positions have been filled in by new people since their previous office-holders were eliminated is quite true - as is the point that people like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or Abu Zubaydah are not exactly the easiest to replace for a whole host of reasons.

"And while I think it's critical that we nail these guys, and especially terrorist masterminds like Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, it seems that Al Qaeda's knowledgebase is something they can desseminate quickly and widely. I wonder if the US has a good handle on the new generation's capabilities and ambitions."

The knowledge base has been disseminated about as much as it can be ever since the group started to establish a sizeable presence online. If you download al-Battar or Voice of Jihad, for example, you'll see some pretty good example of this. That's been known for sometime now, but what is far harder to pass along are the necessary skills with which to become somebody like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or Mohammed Atef.

"And I'll not in passing that only one kill here occured in Iraq."

Eh? I count Abu Taisir and Habib Aktas as being among those killed in Iraq and Aso Hawleri and Hassan Ghul as being among the captured. I could also add Ayyub Afghani, Qods, and Umar Bazyiani, all of whom are not high-ranking leaders but rather mid-level al-Qaeda or Ansar al-Islam commanders who have been captured inside Iraq.

Dan,

I'm unfamiliar with the documents you're citing...

Well, if you read European newspapers, there was something of a splash about them a month or so ago. I don't think the US press reported.

...though if you're referring to the reorganization of the core leadership inside Iran to the degree that they were inside Afghanistan pre-9/11, I'd have to agree.

Nope, nothing about Iran; merely that the organization has grown by leaps and bounds over the past few years and is doing "good business."

I certainly wouldn't downplay the importance of capturing or killing leaders or the effect that doing such things has on al-Qaeda and its allies for purposes of morale and recruitment if nothing else.

It appears that it hasn't effected morale or recruitment all that much; again, according to these documents found in Switzerland.

Ideologically, there isn't much of a difference between al-Qaeda and Hamas or even al-Qaeda and a number of anarchist or fascist groups with respect to how they view the US or Jews.

Yet Hamas doesn't seem to be particularly interested in directly attacking the US, and most anarchist or fascist groups have not really committed themselves to open warfare with the US (indeed, most fascist groups in the US can't even win court cases). Which anarchist groups are you referring to, BTW?

If you download al-Battar or Voice of Jihad, for example, you'll see some pretty good example of this. That's been known for sometime now, but what is far harder to pass along are the necessary skills with which to become somebody like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or Mohammed Atef.

Agreed, which is what I'm trying to get at here. Handbooks and so forth are easily passed around and no doubt more widely disseminated now than ever before. The real threat isn't these conventional bombing operations, however, it's spectacular attacks that only a guy like KSM ever seemed capable of envisioning. Is there anybody of his skill level and twisted imagination left? Also keep in mind that the Hamburg cell was critical because those guys were educated, capable, committed, and accustomed to moving in and out of Western society. A somewhat rare set of attributes.

Eh? I count Abu Taisir and Habib Aktas as being among those killed in Iraq and Aso Hawleri and Hassan Ghul as being among the captured. I could also add Ayyub Afghani, Qods, and Umar Bazyiani, all of whom are not high-ranking leaders but rather mid-level al-Qaeda or Ansar al-Islam commanders who have been captured inside Iraq.

My mistake.

Gary:

I read European newspapers on a regular basis, though I haven't seen anything relating to the documents you describe.

"Nope, nothing about Iran; merely that the organization has grown by leaps and bounds over the past few years and is doing 'good business.'"

I'm genuinely curious on this, as I can't find it on Google News searches - most of the stuff on al-Qaeda activity in Switzerland seems to refer to the group's use of the country as a logistics center. If you have any more information on this, it would be extremely helpful.

"Yet Hamas doesn't seem to be particularly interested in directly attacking the US, and most anarchist or fascist groups have not really committed themselves to open warfare with the US (indeed, most fascist groups in the US can't even win court cases). Which anarchist groups are you referring to, BTW?"

Look at some of the crazier folks who attempted to recreate the Battle of Seattle at the RNC convention and you should get a pretty good idea.

"Is there anybody of his skill level and twisted imagination left? Also keep in mind that the Hamburg cell was critical because those guys were educated, capable, committed, and accustomed to moving in and out of Western society. A somewhat rare set of attributes."

There are a couple that come to mind off-hand, like Saif al-Adel, Zarqawi, Amer Azizi, Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, ect. Most of them, however, have been forced to relocate to reasonably secure places like Iran (or in Zarqawi's case, Iran and Fallujah) so that they can plot unincumbered by the problems one faces being on the run. As for Westernized recruits, keep an eye out for people like Shukrijumah or Gadahn.

Ah, Shukrijumah ... which reminds me that Michelle Malkin is not very careful with the facts.

Thank goodness she's just a bad journalist and not in charge of anything important.

oops, here's the link.

Oh, and don't you think the FBI ought to update its most-wanted list?

Inspires confidence, doesn't it?

Yet Hamas doesn't seem to be particularly interested in directly attacking the US

While Hamas aren't part of the IIF, they're a regional jihadist group like JI or the GSPC.

That aside, there is reasonable speculation that the suicide bombers caught in NYC who were planning to attack the subway were Hamas.

praktike:

As far as Shukrijumah's nationality is concerned, I remain agnostic. Keep in mind that according to both Kuwait and Pakistan, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was never one of their citizens either. All I know is that he's walking around with a number of apparently legitimate Saudi passports under both his birth name and various aliases.

And yes, the FBI's most wanted page is a rather disappointing sight, given that Zarqawi isn't even listed.

Colt:

JI and GSPC are both part of the IIF.

Dan:

I know. My point - as badly phrased as it was - was that Hamas is concerned primarily with Israel, as the GSPC is concerned primarily with Algeria, the IIB with Chechnya, LeT with Kashmir, etc.

Dan-

I emailed the FBI a tip: Update your #@#%$@#$^%@$% site!

Btw, Dan, ever heard of this guy?
------------------
"Enter one Mullah Mehmood Haq Yar. He was sent by Mullah Omar to northern Iraq to train Ansarul Islam fighters before the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. Ansarul Islam is a Pakistani militant group. Mehmood returned to Afghanistan only a few months ago and was inducted into a special council of commanders formed by Mullah Omar and assigned the task of shepherding all foreign fighters and high-value targets from Pakistani territory into Afghanistan."

Yesss ... though the Asia Times is kind of behind the times on this one. The Iraqi press was reporting about Yar and his compatriots at least as early as mid-July 2003.

Dan,
Can you point me to any documents or reports backing up the idea that AQ has reconstituted its leadership in Iran?
Thanks