So I suppose the clipping below is all media misinformation also? And the 100,000 Iraqis estimated in the resistance are all "undercover" foreign terrorists? Self-deception is an essential part of the imperial project, and the minions of empire always practice it. Sooner or later, reality of nationalist resistance breaks through...

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Published on Wednesday, September 15, 2004 by Knight-Ridder
Surge in Violence Threatens Iraq Elections, US Exit Strategy
by Jonathan S. Landay and Warren P. Strobel

WASHINGTON - The U.S. strategy to create a stable, democratic Iraq is in danger of failing, current and former U.S. officials say, and the anti-American insurgency is growing larger, more sophisticated and more violent.

The overall prospects ... are for a violent political future.

Jeffrey White, a former senior Defense Intelligence Agency analyst
A wave of brazen attacks across Iraq has included the deadliest single bombing in Baghdad in six months on Tuesday and at least seven bombings in the capital on Sunday.

The violence increasingly appears to threaten nationwide elections planned for January, which are key to President Bush's hopes for reducing the number of U.S. troops, now 140,000, and making a graceful exit from Iraq.

Many experts on Iraq say the best that can be hoped for now is continued chaos that falls short of a civil war.

"The overall prospects ... are for a violent political future," said Jeffrey White, a former senior Defense Intelligence Agency analyst.

Top Bush administration officials publicly acknowledge that the insurgency is getting worse. But they point out that they predicted it would do that as Iraq's January elections approached.

The officials insist that the elections will go ahead. And, they say, the United States has no choice but to persevere as it builds up Iraq's own security forces to maintain order.

[JK: The rest has been cut. Reporduction of entire articles violates copyright - use excerpts and intersperse them with comments, and always include an URL. I've left the title and author, however, to help you find the article yourselves via search.]

First of all, reproducing newspaper articles in toto creates copyright problems for the site. Dude, note the copyright symbol at the bottom. I'm about to radically shorten that comment.

There's a long way to go in Iraq; like all counterinsurgency wars, there are good signs and bad signs.

Not dealing quickly and harshly with Sadr has worsened the situation, but it has also led to him losing a lot of popular support because of increasingly sharp denunciations by other clerics and the way he and his people conducted themselves (stealing, torturing, killing Iraqis, etc.). This may allow more serious measures now without risking a serious uprising, in which case the guys on the ground were right and I was wrong. I've gone from a sharp critic in that area to "the jury's out."

They've got to keep tightening the noose now, however, and not stop until Sadr is dead or on trial for the murder warrant in his name. Otherwise, the rule of law means nothing in Iraq. That will mean fighting in places like Sadr City, of course, and an increase in violence - but you gotta do what you gotta do. It's, you know, a war.

Fallujah also lies ahead. Stopping the earlier assault on Fallujah just as it was succeeding was the #1 mistake of the war, and al-Qaeda's Zarqawi now runs that place openly as its ruler. I think the Iraqi government gets the mistake now, as do the American commanders, and that battle will be a very important one when it comes. I expect to see Ramadi go first as a heavily Iraqi operation, though.

Make no mistake, these 2 efforts re: Sadr & Fallujah will represent major battles. So, there is much ahead of us, for good or ill.

Unlike Tom, however, my agenda isn't about transparent defeatism and opposition to America. It's about making sure Iraq ends up as a success, and the war is won.

Chrenkoff, Praktike, Dan Darling, Sackett, the Iraqi bloggers, and the many other sources we bring you on our blog and in our Iraq Reports offer us different viewpoints, and different information. It's up to each of us to make up our minds re: what's going on, and what the priorities need to be in order to win.

FYI, the article Tom cites can be found here.

You have to be a San Jose Mercury subscriber, though (registration is free).

"Unlike Tom, however, my agenda isn't about transparent defeatism and opposition to America."

Opposition to the Imperial Project is by no means "opposition to America". On the contrary, opposing Empire America upholds the deepest democratic ideals upon which the US was founded. Your whole take is like a King George loyalist discussing how those pesky colonists in the hedgerows can be wiped out by the careful application of Redcoat military power.

History says " It won't work". Similarly, the Pentagon plans for permanent bases in Iraq are doomed. Functioning democracy in Iraq will just doom them sooner, or do you think President Sadr (who polls much higher than Allawi) will agree?

Read some Mark Twain to see how deep the historical roots of opposition to agressive foreign military adventures runs in the US.

Twain believed (correctly, I think) that the US could not be both a Republic and an Empire.
Mark Twain said further of the brutal American genocide:

“...I have seen that we do not intend to free, but to subjugate the people of the Philippines. We have gone to conquer, not to redeem... And so I am an anti-imperialist. I am opposed to having the [American] eagle put its talons on any other land.”

I'll try to avoid the "imperial project" nonsense and address the question at hand:

With limited data, here is my assessment:

1. Sadr's "uprising" has lost popular support because his band-o-thugs has been revealed for what it is. He has become very unpopular wherever there has been proper opportunity to compare the tender mercies of his ruling methods with that of the Provisional gov't, Coalition forces, and Sistani's folks. Therefore, I believe the worst of the internecine Shia conflicts are in the past.

2. The Kurds appear to be biding their time, secure in their institutions, and awaiting a future opportunity to more negotiate a clearer, more permanent relationship with the rest of Iraq.

3. The Sunni Arabs remain as they have always been. The Ottoman empire alternated between oppression and non-involvement, depending on how unified the locals were in resisting the Ottoman gov't. They can (and have been) co-opted in large numbers.

4. Iran and Syria (in particular) and other Muslim "brothers" continue to interfere with internal Iraqi affairs. Assad's regime, in particular, IMO, is fighting for its life in Iraq -- once the battle is joined in Syria, it is over for his tribe's monopoly on power. It should be no surprise that its clients, Hezbollah et al, are also active in creating trouble.

Now, as to what should be done:

1. Hold elections as scheduled, where they can be organized. Any delegate slots from Sunni areas go unfilled until elections can be held there UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOV'T.

2. Continue a carrot/stick approach with the Sunni tribal leaders. As the locals comprehend the clear differences between the forces of construction and destruction, the stage is set for the liberation of minds and cities.

3. Build reliable indigenous security forces as quickly as possible, consistent with maintaining quality and readiness to fight. Iraqi forces need to be involved in liberating Iraq cities from the thugs -- even if the US does the heavy lifting.

MG

PS: It's not that I am uninterested in debating "imperial project" claims. I just don't find debate possible -- insufficient common ground exists upon which to base a debate.

praktike, I'd like to read your site, but that layout is brutal on the eyes.

Joe,

Partial agreement here with MG on this. First priority is the security situation; the other priorities he raises are important but maybe are further down my list. You wanted 3 priorities:

1. Establish internal (and indigenous) security. This means recruiting Iraqi police and soldiers and protecting the recruits while they're trained -- there's only so many recruiting-station bombings they can stand. It also means heavy reinforcement of US and allied MP and civil affairs units.

2. Lock the country down, and there are two parts to this, one being: clean out the opposition. The presence of enemy enclaves -- which are very close to an enemy government-in-being -- is intolerable both from a military standpoint and if you're serious about a legitimist Iraqi government. This is partly a job for combat units but police units and Iraqi authority has to be closely integrated. That's the J5/G5's job.

Entwined with this is establishing arms and movement control: nothing, nothing should be moving without our (or our gov't's) leave -- the car bombings and improvised explosives suggest that some enemy had to move it under our noses. If that means seizing as many privately-owned weapons and vehicles as we can, so be it. Yes it will be a major undertaking. We do this or we lose. Movement control is critical to managing any theater of war.

3. Get the reconstruction going, and hire as much local labor as possible to do it. This will (1) get rid of some of the background chaos, (2) get some of the money the Administration has budgeted for the reconstruction into circulation, (3) get more Iraqis employed, self-sufficient and working under our supervision, not hanging out and looking for trouble, and (4) establish a number of the objectives we invaded this country to accomplish. Andrew Sullivan does have something of a point on this score.

There's got to be more options than continuing the war or pulling out. Maybe I'm looking at this like an MP but frankly, no security and no stabilization means nothing gets done. And that would mean it was all for nothing.

PS. Praktike has a point on Boss Tweed; are we really naive enough to think that a country with no history of democracy -- hell, no history as a country prior to 1919, or maybe 1928 -- is going to flower into a self-sustainable democracy? Even Russia is failing that test. Maybe we should take another look at the history of the MacArthur Shogunate.

An interesting hyperlink to a story from one of the Iraqi enclaves, by way of the SF Chronicle foreign service, about al-Sadr's child warriors.

FWIW.

A quick QED on the Iraqi security forces issue. Presumably we want to leave Iraq someday, and that means an Iraqi security force. Today's NY Times notes that 19 Iraqi National Guard recruits got it yesterday. Third bombing this week. At least 47 police recruits a few days ago. All of this is not a good way to encourage recruits, even ones desperate for work.

Nor does it suggest that we're controlling the security -- a car bomb suggests that someone was able to gather explosives, put it in a car, drive it through an occupied country --

Are we serious about finishing this campaign? Are we?