Sandee on the Sudanese Security Threat

One of the criticisms that's being thrown about (rather unfairly in my mind, as I hope you'll see) on the issue of Sudan and their ongoing genocide violence in Darfur is where are the folks who were so dead-set on the war in Iraq and why have they dropped the ball when it comes to Darfur?

It's a valid enough question, but one of the things that I think is so problematic about how Sudan is being framed to the American public is that it's being viewed almost entirely through the prism of a humanitarian crisis, a la Rwanda, and not as an issue of US national security.

While the humanitarian situation in Sudan almost certainly warrants international attention and assistance, it would be a mistake not to look at the nature of the threat emanating from Khartoum towards both the US and its allies.

During my last day at AEI on August 6, I watched a conference on Sudan that I had played some small role in researching several weeks ahead of time. Most of what you're about to read about Sudan and the security threat emanating from it comes directly from Ronald Sandee, a senior counterterrorism expert at the Dutch Ministry of Defense. So if you don't believe people like Michael Rubin or Bill Kristol and Vance Serchuk on the issue of Sudan, perhaps you'll believe him, as most of what you're going to read below in italics are his remarks, with some of my own editing, notes, links, and commentary as well.

From the official transcript of the event:

Islamism in Sudan started more or less with the introduction of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1950s. Since then, they have been trying to mold Sudan into their view of the world. They aim to turn Sudan into an Islamic state which is run by sharia.

Also, since the early 1950s, there has been one undisputed leader of the Islamic movement in Sudan, Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi, now 72 years old and once again in jail, although he might be free within the coming days.

Jihadism and terrorism were introduced to Sudan in the early 1990s, when Usama bin Laden and his followers came to the country and built an extensive training camp infrastructure, as well as setting up a business and financial network.

But it was not only Usama bin Laden and al Qaeda who were active in training Mujahadeen fighters and al Qaeda. Also, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard had their camps in Sudan, and still have. And the Islamic regime in Khartoum itself created the Popular Defense Forces. The PDF have camps throughout the country where young volunteers were drilled to be a member of this pro-government militia.

The PDF was used to militarily support the power of the Khartoum regime, often taking the brunt of the fighting against SPLA, and later was used in the Numamai [ph] Mountains to fight against the Nure [ph] people.

Let us return to the birth of the Islamic movement in Sudan. The Islamic movement in Sudan has been known by many different names since it first appeared in Sudan in the early '50s. In 1954, the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood was established. Although the Muslim Brotherhood still exists in Sudan, the Islamic movement also has other manifestations, like the Islamic Charter Fund, the National Islamic Fund, and recently the Popular National Congress.

The Islamic movement in Sudan has changed in name, structure and working methods, but its main ideology, its objectives and its leader, Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi have essentially remained the same in the 50 years of its existence.

The ideology of the Islamic movement is founded on two pillars. The first is sharia, the Islamic law, and the second is the Islamic state. This is based on the conviction that the sharia should regulate all aspects of human life, and that the ideal society can only be achieved if its political organization is Islamic.

This ideology ultimately requires the transformation of the present world order into an authentic pax islamica. To fulfill the objectives of the Islamic movement, the whole international system of states much change from a secular to a religious logic.

The ultimate objective of the Islamic movement in Sudan has been to establish an Islamic state on the principles of sharia and the unity of the Ummah. Furthermore, Islamic movements are committing to fight secularism and to establish God's order in society, according to Turabi. The ultimate goal should be the freedom to address the whole world through Islam without any restrictions whatsoever.

He said about this, "We are calling for a unified strategy of life for all of humanity and that transcends the narrow divisions of greed, color or national origins, and allows us all to cooperate freely and equally for a better world. This is our gift to humanity. This is our main task as Muslims today."

To achieve the Islamic state on the principles of the sharia and the unity of the Ummah, Turabi underlined three ways of access to power--revolution, as in the case of Iran; through the military institution, as in the case of Sudan; and through the ballot box, as in Algeria. He actually endorsed all of these examples as legitimate.

He said, "Fellow Muslims living in alien countries have to be supported, albeit never in contravention of any treaty obligation. Islamic movements already emancipated from nationalist ideology are interacting more intensively across the world."

On June 30, 1989, Omar Al-Bashir seized power in a bloodless military coup and Turabi was taken to prison for technical reasons. He was released early in 1990 and declared his readiness to work with the new regime for aims that he considered identical to those of his party, the Inef [ph]. He became Speaker of Parliament in 1996.

During the 1990s, the Islamic movement and the Islamic regime in Sudan had overlapping membership and power structures. The phase between 1989 and 1999 was a period of cooperation and consolidation between the military regime and the Islamic movement. It started with the military coup in 1989 and ended with the dissolving of the Sudanese Parliament on December 12, 1999.

This dissolution of Parliament was the culminating result of a power struggle between Bashir and Turabi. The government of Sudan provided during this period safe haven and support for members of several international terrorist groups operating in Sudan. The regime also permitted Tehran to use Sudan as a secure transit point and meeting site for Iranian-backed extremist groups.

Sudan in 1989 was more or less bankrupt. Previously smooth relations with the U.S. had soured after the coup and preferential relations with the new Sudanese government kept with the Saddam Hussein regime. The relation with Libya was excellent in the '80s, but cooled down in the early '90s.

Soon after the coup, the Sudanese regime sought a deepening of the relation with Iraq, but after the Gulf War and the UN-installed sanctions regime against Iraq, Sudan had to find a new financially strong partner.

On the instigation of Turabi, the Sudanese government started courting Iran. In the spring of 1991, a strategic partnership was concluded. Both countries would not only work together in the economic and political field, but also in the para-military and military and intelligence fields. The partnership was sealed during a visit of Iranian President Rafsanjani to Khartoum in December 1991. Rafsanjani flew from Senegal to Khartoum with a delegation of over 150 officials. During the visit, he described Sudan as the vanguard of the Islamic revolution in the African continent.

The fresh Iranian-Sudanese cooperation got an extra dimension due to the input of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and especially the at that time newly-established Qod forces. The Qod forces' main task within the IRGC is to perform special operations which are mainly sensitive and clandestine operations.

Furthermore, the Qod forces are responsible for external IRGC activity and for exporting the Iranian revolution. This branch of the IRGC is also the liaison with the revolutionary or radical Islamist extremist groups.

In the early '90s, experienced IRGC personnel was flown from Lebanon to the Sudan, first to train the Sudanese para-military Popular Defense Force and later to train all sorts of Mujahadeen jihadists or terrorists. With the help of the Pasdaran, an infrastructure was created to train thousands of combatants. For specialized training courses, for instance, working with explosives, specialists from outside were brought in especially from the Lebanese Hezbollah.

Also flown in from Lebanon was Iran's new ambassador to Sudan, Majid Kamal [ph]. He was a heavy-weight revolutionary who was Iran's ambassador in Lebanon during the time of the kidnappings of Westerners in Beirut. Within a few years, it was said thousands of Iranians were active in Sudan.

In early 1992, Sudan emerged as a strategic outpost and key part of the infrastructure for Iran's export of the Islamic revolution throughout the Near East and Africa. In short, the relations between Islamist Sudan and the revolutionary Iran were of mutual benefit. Sudan sought assistance and financial help and Iran could use Sudan as a spring board in Africa.

In 1991, it was Hassan Al Turabi who invited Usama bin Laden to come and live in Sudan. After sending a reconnaissance team, UBL accepted the invitation and settled in Khartoum. There, he got special privileges and tax exemptions as a businessman, and started construction work, import-export and agricultural enterprises.

Usama bin Laden ran a complex network of 70 to 80 businesses and charities from Sudan. Bin Laden got the free hand to build and exploit at least 23 training camps for his followers. The Sudanese government denied that there was a terrorist training camp infrastructure in their country. Turabi said, "As for harboring terrorists, let me say this: We have no interest in terrorism."

According to the Sudanese regime's definition of the concept of terrorism, the statement was probably correct. This definition is that all fighting in the name of jihad, including the fight against Israel, is legitimate and in accordance with the duty levied on all Muslims. However, many of the Islamic groups that Turabi distinguished as religious movements are perceived as terrorist organizations in the West; for instance, al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, al-Gamaa al-Islamiyyah, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

During the early '90s, extensive discussions took place between Usama bin Laden, Turabi and representatives of Iran in Khartoum. Once Turabi defined the theological compromise between Sunni Qutbism and Shia Khomeinism on the role of Islam as the supreme force in the modern world and applied the compromise to the Islamist revolutionary process, the road was open for a close and genuine alliance between Iran and al Qaeda.

An alliance, one might add, that endures to this day. And according to numerous documentary evidence as well as other testimony that has surfaced over the last several years, it was Turabi who brokered the non-aggression pact between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. If you want to know who helped to shift bin Laden away from the dogmatic towards the pragmatic approach to terrorism, you need look no further than Turabi.

Turabi and Sheik Mohammed Sayed Numani [ph], who was called an adviser to the Iranian Minister of Culture, or a bridge of Khomeinism in the Horn of Africa, jointly went to Usama bin Laden in Khartoum and they concluded that such an alliance was possible.

During the discussions, an agreement was reached between the Sunni movement of Usama bin Laden and the Shia hard-liners in Tehran to cooperate. Both had a common priority to fight the great satan, the U.S., and the little satan, Israel, first before setting any intra-Islamic quarrels and attacking each other.

With the set 23 training camps constructed by Usama bin Laden under his direction, there were at least an additional 12 camps under the guidance of the Iranian Pasdaran. In the largest country of Africa, it's easy to hide certain training facilities.

In August 1992, George Logofar [ph], the then Sudanese Minister of Labor, defected to Egypt and described the situation in the training camps. He said, "They receive tough training in all types of combat, violence and assassinations, and are to be sent from time to time to some neighboring countries to explore their situations, carry out limited and swift operations, and await a major plan devised by the National Islamic Front to send its members to countries chosen as targets for intensive activity."

...But the Islamists in Sudan are not working through politics and violence alone. They also use the Islamic mission, or the Dawa, as a tool to accomplish their goals. The Sudanese NGO Munazamat Aldawa Islamiya [ph], or MDI, is financed mainly by the Sudanese government and is involved in Muslim missionary activities in the Balkans and in Africa. The MDI is active in the field of cultural reconstruction, aid rehabilitation of injured people and development.

MDI is also associated with trying to link aid for famine relief to conversion to Islam. Recent activities of the MDI are focused on central and southern Africa. It's also known that activists of the MDI are on good terms with the Jamad Atabli [ph], a proselytizing Muslim organization with roots in Pakistan which is known to be an entrance hall to jihadist and salafist [ph] extremist groups.

After 9/11, and after the U.S.-led coalition attacked and defeated the Taliban regime and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, the solid base that al Qaeda had in Afghanistan was gone. A part of the al Qaeda leadership and a certain amount of fighters remain in the remote tribal areas in Pakistan and in the eastern part of Afghanistan until today.

Others struggled with their families through Pakistan and through Iran to return to their home countries. Another part stayed in Pakistan. A large group went to Yemen. What was remarkable was that most of the students within al Qaeda were asked by their teachers to come with them to Mauritania, and they did. Others ended up in Sudan.

The Mauritanian contingent, I should note, was involved in a failed coup attempt with the Mauritanian Baathists in June 2003 against the nation's moderately pro-Western despot.

Also, soon after 9/11 and the start of the campaign to oust the Taliban in Afghanistan, stories and information popped up that large quantities of gold and gemstones were transferred from Afghanistan through Pakistan and Iran to Sudan. This gold and gemstones, it was said, belonged to the Taliban and al Qaeda, and were brought by ship and plane to the Sudan to be put in safe places. Probably, they were deposited in Islamic banks in Khartoum.

By now, we can say that Sudan has again assumed a role as one of the training centers of al Qaeda and Mujahadeen fighters. Like in the first half of the 1990s, Sudan contains an ample number of training camps where Muslim extremists and jihadists are taught the techniques of guerrilla warfare. They come from Europe, central Asia and the Middle Eastern countries, and from Sub-Saharan Africa.

After being trained, they are facilitated by an organization that is still in place and is able to deliver high-quality false documents, means of communication and organized travel arrangements. The newly trained fighters in Sudan turn up in the southern Sahel countries, Saudi Arabia and Iraq to fight coalition forces.

We also see Sudanese who were trained in PDF camps turning up at the border with Israel. It is interesting to note that during the latest prisoner swap between Israel and Hezbollah in January 2004, three Sudanese citizens were included.

Sudan has never made a secret out of its relation with Palestinian terrorist organizations like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Also, links with Hezbollah are almost institutionalized. Against Western pressure, Sudan will not concede that Hamas is a terrorist organization. Hamas is among friends in Khartoum. As a former Hamas representative in Khartoum said, "We have an Islamic project. Sudan has the same project and we are going to carry out this project in all Islamic countries."

The Sudanese government cannot expel the mentioned organizations because the country has a political relationship with Hamas and they see it as an organization with a legitimate cause. Foreign Minister Ismail [ph] refused to call Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah terrorist organizations because they are fighting to end occupation and expel the occupier, and are exercising the right to self-defense.

He also said that the people must not confuse matters and regard them as terrorists. According to the Sudanese, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad have not carried out any military action outside the occupied Palestinian territories. Again, it is just a matter of definition.

Turabi has indirectly supported acts that the U.S. and many other Western countries define as terrorism. In a press interview on the suicide bus bombing in Tel Aviv by Hamas in October 1994 which left 22 people dead, Turabi called the attack an honorable act.

In Sudan, Hamas had not only a political bureau, but it also has other organizations like the Palestinian Students Union in Sudan and the Sudanese Ansadar [ph] movement which is active in fundraising. Also, Hamas has a little business empire in Sudan consisting of profit-making companies.

But we can assess that Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have training camps in Sudan, especially after President Bashir told his fellow countrymen on the 4th of April, 2002, that "We now order the Popular Defense Forces and all the political and military leaders to now open all the military camps to be opened in estates and villages. No peace with the Jews or surrender to the Jews, for war is jihad, jihad is jihad."

Two days later, the PDF announced the opening of [TAPE CHANGE] Mujahadeen in all Sudanese starting [INAUDIBLE]. The PDF commander affirmed that it was determined to pursue public mobilization in support of the Palestinian issue. He said, "In support of Al Qods," which is Jerusalem, "we have started implementing it in all our sectors and institutions."

Sudan is being used as a hub for Palestinian terrorist groups, al Qaeda and jihadist networks. In the Arab-controlled part of the country are training camps for a wide range of groups, including the IMU from Uzbekistan, al Qaeda, the Islamic jihad movement, Hamas, Saudi oppositional groups, and Mujahadeen who turn up as volunteers in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Some of the camps are located near the border with Eritrea or north of Port Sudan in the Jabokaroush [ph] mountains. Others are near the Libyan border or in the Nuba mountains or in the Fuhr [ph]. Some camps are not more than 100 square meters and look more like a Boy Scout camp than a terrorist training camp, but the same goes for a lot of training camps of terrorists in the border area. For groups up to 25 persons, it is useful and working.

It is said that Mujahadeen were used in the Darfur conflicts. Groups of foreign fighters were used by the government to side with the Janjaweed [ph] against the people of Darfur. For the Mujahadeen, it was a kind of training on the spot. After these live-firing exercises, some of the Mujahadeen were sent back to the southern Sahel countries where they came from or back to countries like Nigeria, Cameroon, Togo and Benin.

It was opposition leader and former Prime Minister Sadik Al Mahdi [ph] who stated only recently on July 29th to the Reuters press agency, "Many of the Janjaweed come from Cameroon and from Chad," he said. "The Arabs of Darfur have so far taken a fairly responsible attitude not to get involved."

Recently, training camps were also established in remote areas of Sudan like the Jabakaroush mountains north of Port Sudan for Saudi radicals. In June 2003, 19 al Qaeda suspects with Sadafi [ph] roots were captured in the port of Saudi Arabia. They were trying to set up new training camps Nuba mountains, also.

In August 2003, Syrian nationals and two Sudanese were convicted of running a terrorist training camp in the west of Sudan that taught Palestinians and Saudis how to carry out anti-U.S. attacks in Iraq.

To come to some of the concluding remarks, the question remains if the Sudanese government as such is supporting the activities of training camps in the country as a matter of policy. This is a question that I am unable to answer and I simply don't know. However, one can probably state that certain Islamist hard-liners within the government must know to a certain degree what is going on.

There are entities within the country that benefit from the situation. Although Turabi is once again in jail, it fits within his world view. Islamic fighters who are trained in Sudan and from there go to multiple areas to try to topple governments, and this all within the name of Islam.

At the end of July, Sudanese government officials started to give sharp warnings to the international community not to intervene in Darfur. If U.S. and British forces would intervene, according to these officials the locals would see them as occupying forces and attack them like in Iraq. Also, leaders of the Janjaweed warned that foreign intervention would lead to attacks.

In view of the above, these warnings in all probability need to be taken seriously. A Western intervention seen within the West as based purely on a humanitarian imperative will easily be seen as an attack on a Muslim nation and draw in Islamic fighters like a magnet, as has happened in Iraq. The complications could be staggering. It might be the start for a new round of fighting between the Western forces and Muslim radicals.

Lastly, Sudan is a complicated country with a lot of power structures and networks. Even seasoned diplomats from the Arab world are sometimes exasperated by the complexities of the Sudanese power networks. However, the recent external pressure on the government in Khartoum has evidently led to a closing of ranks.

It is interesting to note that right now government officials and opposition figures are setting aside their differences and are united, since a week we hear that Turabi might be released. Also, robust statements have been coming from Khartoum, like claims that the Janjaweed are in the process of retraining and re-arming and setting up new camps to halt any possibility of foreign military interference.

Other leaders of Turabi's party have already been released at the end of July. It seems that the national Islamists like Vice President Ali Othman Taha and the international Islamists have at least for the moment reconciled their differences. One can conclude that the government leaders still need Turabi when it comes to international Islamist support and contacts with jihadist and terrorist organizations.

If they expect a military intervention, they need to prepare for that situation and then there is only one who can help them. It might be Tehran.

I recognize that there's a lot of information here to be taken into account here, but I think that it is worth noting so that the next time you hear about Sudan in the news the assumption isn't made that they're merely some distant and tragic situation. The fact that they're simply preoccupied with killing their own people at this point is also immaterial - Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was doing that in Afghanistan all through the early 1990s, but today he's leading one three major forces opposed to the US in Afghanistan along with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. So while the US is currently preoccupied with more immediate threats like the situation in Iraq or the ongoing threat posed by Iran, it's important not to lose sight of ongoing terrorist hubs like Sudan, which should be an issue entirely apart from Khartoum's brutal conduct in Darfur.

In conclusion, Sandee stated the following and I think it pretty well sums up my own views on the subject:

Well, I just want to state I hope I made my point that we must see that the Sudan is not only bad inside its own country, but this government also has a lot of hard-line Islamists who are not only playing the role within their own country and not even respect their own Muslim minorities if they aren't from their own race, but that they are also--are at least entities within this government, at least people who know, are still involved in what we still call terrorism.

There are training camps where Mujahadeen are being trained to fight the coalition in Iraq. There are training camps from where Mujahadeen go to Saudi Arabia to attack government installations. So Sudan is still paying a major role in the international terrorism.

Indeed. And sooner or later, Sudan and its brutal government are going to have to learn that if you play with fire, you will get burned. And for those of you who are multilateral enthusiasts out there, I believe that intervention in Sudan or at least in Darfur has wide support across the Atlantic on humanitarian grounds, even in la belle France. There is also strong bipartisan support for stronger US action against Sudan in Congress, the only question is whether or not whoever wins come November is willing to act on that support.

Oh yes, and the clock is ticking.