Joe! Jamais de ma vie! Defenseology is JC's term, he did the definition, not me! :)

I think Mr. Barnett's ideas are fascinating but, as the discussion of Russia implies, I suspect we'll have at least as many problems keeping countries in the Core as we will moving countries from Core to Gap. There's no guarantee that once a country is in the Core it will stay there. There's no "Brezhnev doctrine". And remember how that turned out anyway.

And in the real world of limited resources whether we choose to use those resources to keep countries in the Core or move them from Gap to Core may be both a political and moral challenge.

Hi Dave,

I agree, but I think Barnett's ideas are better taken as a frame of mind rather than the plan he lays out in his book.

Also, I must agree with this thinking that Bush has the strategic vision, but it may be up to Kerry to carry them out tatically.

I don't see Kerry having either the mentality, the will, or the diplomatic ability to carry Barnett's ideas out tactically. His successor may be another matter, however, if the ideas take root in the Democratic party and produce a body of work that becomes an animating force.

The neoconservatives did this, and just as they drew on Bernard Lewis et. al. it would be possible for a neoliberal contingent to do the same with Barnett. Right now, however, Barnett's ideas are far too weak within the Democratic party to act as a set of ideals or a lens to see with.

I'll add that if proliferation mushrooms on us (and I mean the real kind in Iran/NK, not the Russia stuff), this whole discussion could transform very quickly - and not necessarily in a way friendly to Barnett's doctrines.

Because of this reality, I remain deeply unconvinced that this is a time for deals - I think it's more like "time to deal (with it)."

Hi Joe,

To be honest I am caught right now:

1. Bush, comprared to Kerry, has the mentality to at least somewhat understand this. His "pseduo mascular wilsonism/neocon thing" shows this.

2. Kerry, however, can probably better follow through, assuming he chooses to follow throw. I think that Bush has had too many screw-ups tactically speaking.

So one hand, there's a man with a vision and firmly comitted to it, but cant seem to execute it well. On the other, there's a man who could execute but is probably to weak to do so.

Speaking in terms of war, maybe its better to have a good set of goals with a poor game plan, rather than have no goals and wishy-washy game plan?

Does anyone here agree with me here?

I am the only confused one, re: Bush v. Kerry on foreign policy?

No daniel, a lot of people are wrestling with this. There are really 2 questions here:

[1] "good goals + poor game plan" vs. "no goals + wishy-washy game plan"

In this battle, I take door #1. It's possible to improve execution if goals are clear - but wishy-washy game plans are no coincidence if a solid foundation of real goals aren't there. How would deficiencies in the game plan ever be fixed then, except by accident?

Of course, this assumes correct characterizations. But I'm trying to ask the question within your framework.

Question #2, in my view:

[2] Have we in fact moved to a point where, as Barnett puts it, it's time for deals, coming together over Barnett's thesis, and structure-building over pre-emption?

I'd say that given Iran & North Korea's current state, it's a bit early for that to say the least.

First of all, these situations creates an immediate set of fundamental security issues whose importance far eclipses the long-range core/gap forecast stuff. Second, if proliferation isn't stopped, core/gap issues will begin to move closer to questions of civilization denial and total war, vs. closing gaps and trying to move states to the Core. Not good for anybody.

I will say that the next 4 years are probably going to be the tipping point for proliferation one way or another. Depending on how it all goes, it's possible that Barnett may have more of a point in 2008.

At which point we will come to an interesting 3rd issue - Core states who see profit by keeping others in the Gap and cutting deals with dictators. France is of course the exemplar here, and I'm not sure that Barnett really has any answers for that at this point.

Joe,

Going back on the first quesiton, could we at least argue that perhaps Kerry could see through on Iraq?

Barnett's approach is a long term approach, but right now we need to get Iraq right - along with Iran and N. Korea.

Although, I am not sure how either Kerry and Bush will handle Iran or N. Korea in the next few years.

On point 2, I absolutely agree. We dont know how Iran and North Korea will look to unfold yet. So its best to hold all the available options.

Sidenote: Apologies for the horrible typos in this post and the preceding ones. I've been staying late with projects, papers and presentations due all this week. Actually, I am writting something borrowing on some elements of Barnett's approach.

Daniel - we could argue that first point, but if you look at Kerry's record (funding votes, dissing several allies, dissing the Iraqis, setting timetables for pull-outs), literally every signal this guy has sent indicates that he's going to make Iraq worse. I'm less than thrilled with many aspects of the present administration's handling of Iraq, but Kerry has "Iraq disaster/defeat" written all over him IMO.

As for your other points, we pretty much agree.

The biggest issue isn't Iraq any more, it's Iran & NK - and Bush's plan for Iran is very unclear, and I've ripped him for it. The only thing that can be said for Bush's Iran policy is that unlike Kerry, he's not connected to pro-regime forces via his funding base and doesn't want to try to be the mullahs' friend.

Less of a disaster does not = solving the problem, though, and the consequences of not solving it are huge.

Hence the ambivalence many people feel, I think.

The current administration's plans for NK are somewhat more clear, and involve a combination of multilateral pressure and prepping a blockade. With South Korea as a de facto ally of the North, and the severe intelligence problems re: locating or even identifying key NK sites and leadership, this may be the best that can be done in the wake of that disastrous 1998 treaty/sucker play. I'd still like a much more extensive public discussion of America's options than I've seen to date.

RE: typos. Life is to short to stress about that.

Am I the only one who thought Dr. Barnett sounded dangerously naive and idealistic?

To cite one practical problem, it appears that some $10 billion +/- has gone missing from the U.N. Oil-for-Food programme, and considerable funds may have found their way into the pockets of influential French and Russian "statesmen". Given that state of affairs, how successful would a Kerry or any other Administration have been in putting together an anti-Saddam coalition in 2002?

As Lord Palmerston put it, nations have no permanent allies, only permanent interests. But in Dr. Barnett's world, so-called Core nations are supposed to see themselves bound together by self-interest the way the United States of America have cooperated peacefully since 1865 or so. Whether or not this world view is practical or not is presently being tested in real-time over in the EU.

In its short life, the EU has held together reasonably well but the system hasn't yet faced a serious stress test. If one is idealistic enough to believe that the EU constitutes a functional currency zone and that the burgeoning army of unelected Eurocrats in Brussels will serve the interests of the international populace, then maybe the EU won't turn into the abject failure that some pragmatists (like me, for instance) expect.

Defenders of the EU faith should be prepared to defend the behavior of the Eurocrats in the bizarre case of Ms. Marta Andreasen, former Chief Accountant for the EU and a woman of considerable character, who is about to be dismissed for refusing to sign off on the EU's near-incompetent accounting system. This scandal may or may not be looked back upon someday as Europe's ENRON, but nobody can possibly know until some distant, future time when honest, diligent auditors gain complete, unfettered access to the financial records.

It will be a far better world if Dr. Barnett's vision is one day realized, but it would be a mistake to base our childrens' future on his quasi-utopian ideal.